GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 


Other  Works  by 
J.   ELLIS  BARKER 


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GERMANY'S 
ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 


By 

S.    GRUMBACH 


TRANSLATED,  ABBREVIATED  AND  INTRODUCED  BY 

J.   ELLIS    BARKER 

Author  of 

"  MODERN  GERMANY,"  "  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  GERMANY," 
"  THE  GREAT  PROBLEMS  OF  BRITISH  STATESMANSHIP,"  ETC. 


NEW  YORK 

E.  P.  BUTTON  &  COMPANY 

68 1    FIFTH  AVENUE 


COPYRIGHT,   1917 

BY  E.  P.  BUTTON  &  CO 


CONTENTS 
CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION i 

CHAPTER  II 
GERMANY'S  OFFICIAL  WAR  AIMS      ....        7 

CHAPTER  III 

THE   WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  GERMAN   BUSINESS   MEN         .         24 

CHAPTER  IV 

THE  WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  GERMAN  INTELLECTUALS        .         39 

CHAPTER  V 

THE   WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  GERMAN   SOCIALISTS      .  .         55 

CHAPTER  VI 

HOW      GERMANY      WOULD     TREAT     THE      CONQUERED 

PEOPLE  .    « 64 

CHAPTER  VII 

GERMANY'S  GENERAL  WAR  AIMS      ....      69 

v 

369897 


vi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VIII 

PAGE 

GERMANY'S  WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  BELGIUM      .        .      81 

CHAPTER  IX 
GERMANY'S  WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  FRANCE       .        .      90 

CHAPTER  X 
GERMANY'S  WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  ENGLAND      .        .      98 

CHAPTER  XI 

V^RMANY'S    WAR    AIMS    REGARDING    RUSSIA    AND 
POLAND 105 

CHAPTER  XII 
GERMANY'S  AIMS  REGARDING  HOLLAND    .        .        .     1 1 1 

CHAPTER  XIII 

A  GERMAN  CENTRAL  EUROPE 117 

CHAPTER  XIV 
i.  GERMANY'S  COLONIAL  WAR  AIMS      .        .        .        .126 

CHAPTER  XV 
GERMANY'S  WAR  AIMS  IN  THE  FAR  EAST    .        .        .130 

CHAPTER  XVI 

A   GERMAN    WORLD 134 

ANALYTICAL  INDEX 143 


GERMANY'S 
ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTION 

AT  the  beginning  of  the  great  struggle  people  discussed 
ardently  the  cause  of  the  war.  At  present  they  are 
discussing  almost  as  ardently  Germany's  war  aims. 
Opinions  on  the  subject  are  divided.  Some  believe 
that  Germany's  war  aims  are  exceedingly  far-reaching. 
Others  think  that  they  would  be  reasonable,  and  they 
quote  in  support  moderate  statements  made  by  Herr 
von  Bethmann-Hollweg  and  other  Germans. 

Germany's  war  aims  are  not  sufficiently  known  in 
this  country.  There  are  some  books  on  the  subject, 
but  these  are  on  the  whole  not  very  comprehensive. 
By  far  the  fullest  account  of  Germany's  war  aims  may 
be  found  in  Herr  S.  Grumbach's  monumental  volume, 
Das  Annexiomstische  Deutschland,  published  by  Payot 
and  Co.  at  Lausanne  in  1917.  That  volume  contains 
on  nearly  500  pages  a  vast  number  of  important 
documents  in  favour  of  annexation  and  opposed  to 
annexation.  By  far  the  larger  number  of  the  docu- 
ments are  in  favour  of  annexation.  Analysing  the 
evidence  which  he  supplies  so  abundantly,  the  author 
states  in  his  Preface: 

"  No  one  can  deny  that  the  whole  non-Socialist 
Press  of  Germany  belonging  to  all  political  parties, 


2         GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

excepting  only  a  few  notes  and  articles  in  the  Berliner 
Tageblatt,  the  Berliner  Volkszeitung  and  the  Welt  am 
Montag,  unceasingly  demands  annexations  of  territory, 
not  by  hints  but  very  openly.  " 

Among  the  hundreds  of  extracts  given  by  Herr 
Grumbach  are  to  be  found  demands  for  annexations 
made  by  the  leading  German  rulers,  statesmen,  poli- 
ticians, business  men,  scientists,  publicists,  etc.,  and 
by  the  following  papers  and  periodicals:  Deutsche 
Tageszeitung,  Preussische  Kreuzzeitung ,  Die  Post,  Ham- 
burger Fremdenblatt,  Miinchner  Neueste  Nachrichten, 
Deutscher  Kurier,  Magdeburgische  Zeitung,  Saarbriicker 
Zeitung,  T'dgliche  Rundschau,  Leipziger  Neueste  Nach- 
richten, Rheinische-Westfalische  Zeitung,  Freiburger 
Tageblatt,  Westfdlische  Politische  Nachrichten,  Han- 
noverscher  Kurier,  Kolnische  Zeitung,  Kolnische  Volks- 
zeitung, Badener  Nachrichten,  Germania,  Hamburger 
Volksblatt,  Dresdner  Volkszeitung,  Frankfurter  Volks- 
stimme,  Chemnitzer  Volksstimme,  Preussische  Jahrbucher, 
Die  Grenzboten,  Deutsche  Revue,  Der  Panther,  Das  Neue 
Deutschland,  Das  Grossere  Deutschland,  Deutsche  Politik, 
Weltwirtschaft,  Internationale  Monatsschrift  fur  Wissen- 
schaft,  Kunst  und  Technik,  Die  Zukunft,  Suddeutsche 
Monatshefte,  Hochland,  Die  Hilfe,  Das  Monistische 
Jahrhundert,  Die  Glocke,  Sozialistische  Monatshefte,  etc. 
The  list  is  very  imposing.  Papers  and  periodicals  of 
all  kinds,  from  the  most  conservative  organs  down 
to  the  less  important  Socialist  publications,  have  been 
drawn  upon.  The  book  is  a  mine  of  information.  It 
is  invaluable  to  the  historian  and  the  student. 

Grumbach's  book,  having  been  completed  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1916,  does  not  contain  any  of  the  annexationist 
views  expressed  in  Germany  during  the  last  twelve 
months,  during  which  the  demand  for  annexations  has 
become  louder  than  ever.  It  is  sincerely  to  be  hoped 
that  the  author  will  complete  his  service  to  history  by 
giving  us  another  volume. 


INTRODUCTION  3 

A  weakness  of  Grumbach's  work  is  its  arrangement. 
People  wish  to  know  Germany's  aims  towards  Bel- 
gium, France,  England,  Russia,  Holland,  Africa,  China, 
Central  Europe,  etc.  Besides  they  will  ask :  "  What 
are  the  annexationist  views  of  the  German  official 
classes,  of  the  German  intellectuals,  of  the  German 
business  men  and  of  the  German  Socialists?"  In 
order  to  make  it  easy  for  readers  to  survey  the  field, 
the  author  should  either  have  arranged  his  material 
under  topics  or  he  should  at  least  have  provided  the 
book  with  a  good  analytical  index.  Unfortunately,  his 
arrangement  leaves  much  to  be  desired,  and  his  book 
lacks  an  index. 

The  British  public  is  reluctant  to  read  lengthy 
collections  of  documents.  Besides,  paper  is  scarce 
and  printers'  costs  very  high.  In  order  to  make 
Herr  Grumbach's  excellent  book  accessible  to  the 
English  public  and  to  ensure  to  it  that  popularity 
which  it  deserves,  I  have,  in  translating  it,  abbreviated 
it  considerably.  Furthermore,  I  have  rearranged  the 
contents  of  his  book  and  have  provided  it  with  an 
Analytical  Index.  Of  course,  the  classification  of  the 
contents  of  a  book,  such  as  Herr  Grumbach's,  is 
difficult  because  German  annexationists  are  apt  to 
refer  almost  at  the  same  time  to  Belgium  and  Central 
Africa,  to  England  and  China,  etc.  Therefore,  only 
a  rough  division  by  topics  could  be  effected.  For 
instance,  the  chapter  "Germany's  War  Aims  regarding 
Belgium, "  contains  incidentally  a  good  many  refer- 
ences to  England,  France,  and  other  countries.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  chapters  dealing  with  German 
annexationist  aims  regarding  England,  France,  etc., 
contain  incidental  references  to  annexations  in  Belgium. 
Therefore,  I  would  refer  those  who  wish  to  find  all  the 
references  to  Belgium,  India,  China,  or  some  other 
country,  to  the  Analytical  Index  at  the  end  of  this 
book. 

No   extracts   from   the   anti-annexationist   utterances 


4         GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

collected  by  Herr  Grumbach  have  been  given,  because 
they  are  very  few  and  are  very  unimportant.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  war  an  anti-annexationist  league, 
the  Bund  Neues  Vaterland,  was  founded  by  Freiherr 
von  Tepper-Laski,  a  celebrated  Prussian  sportsman, 
who  inclines  towards  republican-democratic  views. 
The  league  received  the  attention  of  the  police.  It 
was  treated  as  a  dangerous  organisation;  its  meetings 
were  placed  under  police  supervision;  its  publications 
were  seized;  it  was  prevented  answering  attacks 
made  upon  it,  and  its  secretary  was  arrested.  Not 
unnaturally,  the  league  disappeared.  Its  petition 
opposing  annexation,  which  covers  thirty- four  pages 
of  Grumbach's  book,  is  the  principal  anti-annexation 
document  supplied  by  him.  The  rest  consists  chiefly 
of  declarations  made  by  minority  Socialists.  It  is 
significant  and  worth  pointing  out  that  many  of 
these  anti-annexationist  utterances  were  treated  as 
dangerous  publications  and  were  confiscated,  whereas 
the  most  fantastic  demands  for  the  annexation  of 
territories  were  allowed  to  be  circulated.  In  many  in- 
stances such  demands  were  actually  made  on  behalf  of 
the  Government  and  were  distributed  at  Government 
expense. 

The  fact  that  practically  all  Germany  clamoured  for 
the  utmost  ruthlessness  in  warfare,  and  for  almost  un- 
limited annexations  and  monetary  exactions,  is  due  to 
the  insane  cult  of  Might  which,  during  the  last  few 
decades,  has  completely  obscured  the  idea  of  Right. 
How  far  this  has  taken  place  may  best  be  seen  by  the 
utterances  of  some  of  the  highest  German  authorities 
on  law  who  might  be  expected  to  place  Right  high  above 
Might.  Professor  Zorn,  one  of  the  leading  German 
authorities  on  International  Law,  who  represented  the 
German  Government  at  the  Hague  Conference,  pointed 
out  on  one  of  the  opening  pages  of  his  well-known 
hand-book  Grundzuge  des  Volkerrechts,  that  there  was 
in  reality  no  such  thing  as  International  Law,  that 


INTRODUCTION  5 

International  relations  were  based,  not  on  Right,  but 
on  Might.  One  of  the  most  eminent  teachers  of  law 
is  Professor  Josef  Kohler  in  Berlin.  Referring  to  the 
present  struggle,  that  authority  on  International  Law 
and  Justice  stated  in  the  Berlin  newspaper  Der  Tag, 
of  March  3Oth,  1915 — (the  quotation  will  be  found  in 
Grumbach's  book  on  page  157)  : 

"  The  German  General  Staff,  which  acts  always  con- 
scientiously, recognised  that  the  invasion  of  Belgium 
was  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  Germany.  No 
right  is  so  strong  and  so  absolute  but  it  must  give 
way  to  necessity.  And  if  we  act,  guided  by  necessity, 
we  do  not  violate  right,  for  right  must  give  way  to 
necessity.  Owing  to  the  very  idea  of  right,  every 
right  is  circumscribed.  ...  In  truth,  Belgium  and 
the  Belgian  dynasty  have  amply  deserved  their  fate. 
He  who  abases  himself  and  becomes  England's  tool  in 
order  to  fight  Germany,  deserves  no  better  fate.  He 
who  fights  Germany  fights  against  culture,  and  he  who 
goes  hand  in  hand  with  men  of  the  kind  of  Grey,  de- 
serves to  perish. " 

According  to  Professor  Kohler  and  to  Professor  Zorn, 
Might  is  Right. 

Of  course,  if  Might  is  Right  it  follows  that  weak 
nations  have  no  right  to  existence,  that  the  principle 
of  nationality  is  an  absurdity,  that  the  State,  which 
represents  power,  has  all  and  every  right,  and  that  na- 
tionality, which  represents  race  or  language,  has  none. 
We  get  that  view  in  an  article,  written  by  Dr.  R.  Strahl 
in  Die  Grenzboten  of  May  5th,  1915.  In  that  leading 
political  weekly,  the  learned  Doctor  stated  (Grumbach, 
p.  200)  : 

;<  The  State,  as  a  cultural  unit  and  as  a  promoter  of 
civilisation,  stands  in  many  respects  not  on  the  same 


6        GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

level  on  which  nationality  stands,  but  above  it 

The  doctrine  embodied  in  the  principle  of  nationalities, 
and  the  doctrine  that  nations  have  the  right  to  dispose 
of  themselves,  are  theories  which  have  been  put  for- 
ward to  give  a  scientific  cloak  to  feeble  and  impotent 
obstructiveness. " 

These  two  extracts  serve  to  show  that  the  criminal 
methods  of  warfare  and  the  annexation  mania  of 
Germany  are  due  to  the  exaltation  of  Might  and  the 
contempt  for  Right  which  have  become  national  pecu- 
liarities in  Germany. 

In  order  to  facilitate  reference  to  the  original  work, 
every  quotation  has  appended  to  it  the  corresponding 
page  number  of  Grumbach's  work. 

J.  ELLIS  BARKER. 

June  1917. 


CHAPTER  II 
GERMANY'S  OFFICIAL  WAR  AIMS 

THE  most  authorised  exponents  of  Germany's  policy 
are,  in  the  order  of  their  importance,  the  Emperor,  the 
Sovereigns  of  the  individual  German  States,  the  Im- 
perial Chancellor  and  his  Secretaries  of  State,  and  the 
leaders  of  the  parliamentary  parties.  These  are  the 
official  spokesmen  of  Germany.  In  addition,  the  views 
of  eminent  retired  statesmen,  such  as  Prince  Biilow, 
the  former  Chancellor,  and  of  friends  and  favourites 
of  the  Emperor,  such  as  Herr  Albert  Ballin,  the  well- 
known  principal  Director  of  the  Hamburg-Amerika 
Line,  are  exceedingly  valuable. 

The  German  Emperor  declared  in  ringing  notes  in  a 
Proclamation  to  the  German  people  of  July  3ist,  1915 
(Grumbach,  p.  5)  : 

"  In  heroic  actions  and  sufferings  we  shall  persevere 
without  wavering  until  the  arrival  of  the  Peace,  of  a 
Peace  which  offers  us  the  necessary  military,  political, 
and  economic  securities,  and  which  fulfils  the  require- 
ments of  an  unhampered  development  of  our  creative 
powers  at  home  and  on  the  free  sea. " 

What  are  the  "  necessary  military,  political,  and 
economic  securities  "  which  the  Emperor  is  determined 
to  obtain  at  the  Peace  ?  That  question  will  be  an- 
swered in  the  course  of  the  following  pages,  for  the 
numerous  exponents  of  Germany's  war  aims  continually 
refer  to  the  "  securities  "  which  Germany  requires,  and 
describe  them  in  detail. 


8         GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

Prussia  is  the  largest  of  the  German  States.  Bavaria 
is  the  second  largest  in  territory  as  well  as  in  popula- 
tion. The  King  of  Bavaria  ranks  in  importance  im- 
mediately after  the  Emperor  of  Germany  and  King  of 
Prussia.  He  is  the  foremost  of  all  the  minor  German 
sovereigns.  Consequently  his  views  as  to  Germany's 
war  aims  are  particularly  important.  The  King  of 
Bavaria  stated  in  a  public  speech  delivered  on  June  7th, 
1915  (Grumbach,  p.  5) : 

"  Russia's  declaration  of  war  was  followed  by  that 
of  France,  and  when,  last  of  all,  the  English  also  fell 
upon  us,  I  said  to  myself :  '  I  am  very  pleased,  and 
I  am  very  pleased  for  this  reason,  because  we  can  now 
square  our  accounts  with  all  our  enemies,  and  because 
we  shall  now  at  last  be  able  to  obtain  a  direct  outlet 
from  the  Rhine  to  the  sea. '  Since  then  ten  months 
have  passed  by.  Much  precious  blood  has  been  spilt, 
but  it  shall  not  have  been  spilt  in  vain.  The  fruit  of 
this  war  shall  be  an  increase  of  Germany's  power  and 
an  expansion  beyond  its  present  frontiers,  as  far  as  such 
expansion  is  necessary  for  our  security  against  future 
attacks. " 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  King  of  Bavaria  explained 
a  little  more  closely  the  meaning  of  the  rather  vague 
word  "  securities  "  which  was  employed  by  the  German 
Emperor. 

On  June  8th,  1915,  the  day  following  that  on  which 
the  King  of  Bavaria  demanded  an  expansion  of  the 
German  Empire,  the  principal  Bavarian  paper,  the 
Munchner  Neueste  Nachrichten  commented  as  follows 
upon  the  speech  of  its  King  (Grumbach,  p.  85)  : 

"  For  our  King,  who  is  certainly  most  reliably  and 
most  exactly  informed  on  our  military  position,  there 
is  no  longer  any  doubt  that  we  shall  be  able  to  lay 


OFFICIAL  WAR  AIMS  9 

our  hands  upon  Belgium  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Peace, 
that  we  shall  certainly  do  this  as  far  as  is  necessary 
for  military  reasons,  and,  as  regards  the  mouths  of  the 
Rhine,  for  economic  reasons,  in  order  to  ensure  the 
future  of  the  German  people.  .  .  . 

"  In  what  form  this  shall  be  effected  is  a  matter  for 
discussion  later  on.  However,  so  much  is  clear,  that 
if  we  speak  of  the  German  mouths  of  the  Rhine  we 
view  only  Belgian  territory,  for  neutral  Holland,  which 
has  acted  correctly  towards  us,  should  in  no  way  be 
harmed.  .  .  .  The  consequence  of  the  present  war  will 
be  that  the  German  mouths  of  the  Rhine  will  lead  to 
the  German  Ocean.  And  this  will  be  a  purely  German 
affair. " 

The  principal  Munich  paper  was  no  doubt  directed 
by  the  King  and  his  official  advisers  to  expound  the 
Royal  views  in  so  authoritative  a  tone. 

While  the  German  Emperor  vaguely  demanded 
"  securities "  for  Germany,  and  while  the  King  of 
Bavaria  stated  that  the  war  must  lead  to  an  expansion 
of  Germany's  territory  and  particularly  to  the  absorp- 
tion of  part,  or  the  whole,  of  Belgium,  Duke  Johann 
Albrecht  of  Mecklenburg,  who  takes  a  considerable  in- 
terest in  Colonial  affairs,  telegraphed  on  June  29th,  1915, 
as  follows  to  the  Colonial  Society  of  Ruhrort  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  6)  :  -f 

"  I  share  your  hope  and  firm  confidence  that  after 
this  gigantic  war,  in  which  the  German  armies  wrestle 
in  Europe  against  the  masses  of  our  enemies  for  our 
existence,  we  shall  obtain  a  victorious  and  honourable 
Peace.  May  we  obtain  in  that  Peace  a  powerful' 
African  Colonial  Empire  and  a  sufficiently  large  number 
of  strong  bases  on  the  globe  for  our  Navy,  and  for  our 
Commerce,  for  coaling  stations  and  wireless  telegraphy,  j 


io       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

Then  only  shall  we  be  able  to  look  far  ahead  and  to 
expand  planfully  Germany's  Colonial  possessions  for 
the  benefit  of  future  generations  and  of  the  Homeland.  " 

The  Imperial  Chancellor,  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg, 
has  repeatedly  described  Germany's  war  aims  in 
terms  of  studied  moderation  and  deliberate  obscurity. 
In  his  speech  of  May  28th,  1915,  he  stated  (Grumbach, 
p.  6): 

"  The  greater  the  danger  is,  the  stronger  the  love  of 
our  country  seizes  our  hearts,  the  greater  must  be  our 
care  for  our  children  and  our  children's  children,  and 
the  more  must  we  persevere  until  we  have,  by  fighting, 
obtained  all  possible  real  guarantees  and  securities,  that 
none  of  our  enemies  will  ever  dare  again  to  fight  us 
either  singly  or  combined  with  others. " 

On  August  igth,  1915,  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  speak- 
ing once  more  with  the  same  diplomatic  vagueness  with 
which  the  German  Emperor  expounded  Germany's  war 
aims,  stated  (Grumbach,  p.  7)  : 

"  The  circumstances  of  the  buried  past  will  not  be 
revived  after  this  gigantic  world  war.  There  must 
be  a  change.  If  we  wish  that  Europe  shall  have 
peace,  it  can  be  done  only  by  giving  Germany  a  posi- 
tion of  inviolable  strength.  .  .  .  Germany  must  enlarge, 
fortify,  and  strengthen  its  position  to  such  an  extent 
that  the  other  Powers  will  never  again  think  of  en- 
circling us. " 

On  December  9th,  1915,  when  asked  to  explain 
Germany's  war  aims  more  fully,  the  Chancellor  stated 
(Grumbach,  p.  7)  : 

"  In  my  former  speeches  I  have  explained  Germany's 
general  war  aims.  To-day,  also,  I  cannot  discuss  these 


OFFICIAL  WAR  AIMS  n 

in  detail.  I  cannot  tell,  for  instance,  what  guarantee  the 
Imperial  Government  must  demand  regarding  Belgium, 
what  basis  of  power  is  considered  necessary  as  a 
guarantee.  But  our  enemies  must  say  to  themselves: 
The  longer  and  the  more  bitterly  we  fight  Germany, 
the  greater  will  be  the  guarantees  which  the  Germans 
will  have  to  demand. '  (Storm  of  applause  in  the  House 
and  hand-clapping  on  the  Tribunes.)  If  our  enemies 
wish  to  create  an  abyss  between  Germany  and  the  rest 
of  the  world,  then  they  cannot  be  surprised  if  we  make 
our  arrangements  for  the  future  accordingly.  (Re- 
newed lively  applause  and  hand-clapping  in  the  House 
and  on  the  Tribunes.)  Neither  in  the  East  nor  in  the 
West  shall  our  present  enemies  be  allowed  to  possess 
sally  ports.  " 

At  last  the  Chancellor  explained  that  the  mysterious 
word  "  guarantees "  signified  annexations  both  in  the 
East  and  in  the  West. 

Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  explained  once  more 
Germany's  war  aims  father  vaguely  on  April  5th,  1916. 
He  told  the  Reichstag  (Grumbach,  p.  8)  : 

"  Russia  must  not  for  a  second  time  be  allowed  to 
march  her  armies  across  the  open  frontier  of  Eastern 
Prussia.  It  must  never  again,  in  France's  pay,  invade 
unprotected  Germany.  And  if  anybody  believes  that 
we  shall  give  up  the  territories  which  we  have  occupied 
in  the  West  and  upon  which  the  blood  of  our  people 
has  been  spilt,  unless  we  have  complete  security  for 
our  future — we  shall  know  how  to  obtain  real  guar- 
antees that  Belgium  will  not  become  an  Anglo-French 
vassal-State,  that  it  will  not  be  employed  as  a  military 
and  economic  bulwark  against  Germany.  In  Belgium, 
also,  there  is  no  status  quo  ante.  Germany  cannot 


12       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

allow  that  the  Flemish  people,  who  so  long  have  been 
oppressed,  will  again  be  sacrificed  to  the  French. " 

Once  more  the  Chancellor  spoke  rather  vaguely  of 
"  guarantees "  with  regard  to  Belgium.  The  word 
sounded  perhaps  inoffensive  to  foreign  readers  of  the 
Chancellor's  speech,  but  its  real  meaning  was  imme- 
diately understood  by  the  Reichstag.  Herr  Spahn, 
the  leader  of  the  powerful  Roman  Catholic  Centre 
Party,  perhaps  the  most  influential  party  in  the  Reich- 
stag, stated  after  the  Chancellor's  speech  (Grumbach, 
P-  93) : 

"  We  must  demand  that  the  war  will  increase  Ger- 
many's power.  Peace  aims  must  be  power  aims. 
The  war  must  end  with  a  tangible  benefit.  Towards 
the  East  the  Chancellor  has  shown  us  the  tangible 
advantage.  However,  as  regards  the  West,  he  has 
talked  more  cautiously.  Referring  to  Belgium,  he 
has  told  us  that  care  would  have  to  be  taken  that 
that  country  should  no  longer  be  an  English  bulwark 
but  should — and  that  is  the  logical  sequel — fall  into 
Germany's  hands  politically,  militarily,  and  econom- 
ically. 

"  The  inner  political  organisation  of  Belgium  has 
so  far  not  been  discussed.  That  point  will  be  decided 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  Peace.  We  did  not  wish  for 
a  war  of  conquest.  In  this  I  am  of  one  opinion  with 
the  Chancellor.  But  now  we  must  correct  our  frontiers 
in  accordance  with  our  own  interests.  Our  enemies' 
political  and  military  power  cannot  remain  inviolate. 
Germany's  economic  basis  must  be  broadened  for  the 
preservation  of  our  economic  position  abroad.  We 
need  a  larger  territory  than  that  supplied  by  the  German 
Empire. " 


OFFICIAL  WAR  AIMS  13 

When  Herr  Spahn  thus  explained  the  meaning  of 
the  Chancellor's  vague  declaration,  Herr  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  did  not  immediately  rise  in  order  to  disavow 
him,  but  remained  significantly  silent.  The  leaders  of 
the  Centre  Party  had  obviously  correctly  interpreted 
the  Chancellor's  intentions.  Herr  von  Bethmann-Holl- 
weg  did  not  care  to  use  the  word  "  annexation  "  because 
he  would  have  destroyed  the  argument  that  Germany 
was  ready  to  conclude  a  Peace  on  '  reasonable  condi- 
tions, '  an  argument  which  was  useful  for  employment  in 
foreign  countries. 

While  the  German  Chancellor,  as  expounded  by  his 
most  influential  supporter,  demanded  the  fullest  control 
of  Belgium  and  a  great  increase  of  Germany's  territory 
in  the  East  and  in  the  West,  Doctor  Solf,  the  Colonial 
Secretary,  claimed  that  Germany  should  derive  terri- 
torial increment  from  the  war,  also  in  the  colonial 
sphere.  Doctor  Solf  stated  in  a  speech  on  May  nth, 
1915  (Grumbach,  p.  9)  : 

"  The  Empire  intends  by  no  means  to  give  up  its 
valuable  Colonies  at  the  Peace.  On  the  contrary,  it 
will  endeavour  to  regain  what  it  has  lost  and  to  increase 
and  enlarge  the  German  colonial  possessions  as  much 
as  possible.  " 

The  Colonial  Secretary  wrote  in  a  contribution  to  the 
Kolonial  Kalendar  of  1915  (Grumbach,  p.  9)  : 

"  Presumably  the  motto  after  the  war,  as  far  as 
colonial  policy  is  concerned,  will  be  the  acquisition  of 
colonial  empires  which  are  as  much  interconnected  and 
as  easily  defendable  as  possible,  and  which  complement 
the  domestic  economy.  " 

Doctor  Solf  stated  in  his  speech  at  Frankfurt  on 
May  29th,  1916  (Grumbach,  p.  10)  : 


14       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

"  Hitherto  Germany's  colonies  were  insufficiently 
productive.  We  were  not  able  to  make  ourselves 
independent  of  foreign  monopolies  of  production. 
Things  will  improve  if  we  should  succeed  in  filling  up 
the  gaps  of  our  present  colonial  empire  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace.  We  must  be  careful  and  shape  Ger- 
many's future  frontiers  in  such  a  manner  that  we  need 
no  longer  fear  a  hostile  attack.  Similarly,  we  must 
not  forget  to  mould  Germany's  colonial  estate  in  the 
most  appropriate  manner.  ...  In  the  course  of  time 
all  European  policy  has  become  world  policy.  The 
Great  Powers  endeavour  to  create  for  themselves  self- 
sufficing  economic  areas.  Germany  must  follow  this 
general  tendency.  |  The  independent  economy  of  a 
Great  Power  requires  the  possession  of  land  in  all 
climes.  It  is  therefore  vitally  necessary  for  Germany 
to  have  colonies  both  in  the  sub-tropical  zone  and  in 
the  tropics. " 

Among  the  most  influential  personages  in  Germany 
is  the  former  Imperial  Chancellor,  Prince  Biilow.  He 
was  probably  the  ablest  of  Bismarck's  successors.  He 
is  considered  by  many  Germans  to  be  Germany's  fore- 
most statesman  and  diplomat,  and  many  believe  that  he 
may  replace  the  present  Chancellor.  It  is  supposed  that 
he  owed  his  fall,  not  to  inefficiency  in  the  diplomatic 
and  in  the  political  domain,  but  to  personal  differences 
with  the  Emperor.  It  is  therefore  clear  that  Prince 
Billow's  views  regarding  Germany's  war  aims  are  of 
the  very  highest  importance,  particularly  if  they  are 
expressed  in  public  print.  In  his  book  Deutsche  Politik, 
which  was  published  in  Berlin  in  1916,  he  stated  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  15)  : 

"  We  require  considerably  increased  security  in  the 


OFFICIAL  WAR  AIMS  15 

East  to  protect  us  against  further  invasion.  Naturally 
we  cannot  desire  that  the  Russian  Empire  should 
once  more  become  strong.  However,  that  will  take 
place  in  view  of  the  rapid  increase  of  the  Russian 
population  and  the  national  and  religious  homo- 
geneousness  of  the  Russian  people,  unless  Russia 
disintegrates  politically  and  socially,  or  unless  she 
loses  the  Ukraine,  the  wealthy  corn-growing  district 
and  the  basis  of  the  national  industry.  It  is  an  open 
question  whether  the  loss  of  Poland  would  weaken 
Russia.  .  .  . 

"  Perhaps  the  French  people  will  in  course  of  time 
submit  to  the  stipulations  of  the  Peace  at  Frankfurt, 
when  it  recognises  that  they  are  unchangeable,  and 
particularly  if  we  should  succeed  in  improving  Ger- 
many's strategical  position  towards  France,  which 
still  is  unfavourable.  As  long  as  France  believes  it 
possible  to  regain  Alsace-Lorraine,  either  through  her 
own  strength  or  through  the  assistance  of  others,  the 
settlement  would  be  a  provisional,  not  a  permanent, 


Prince  Biilow  also  demanded  large  annexations  for 
Germany  both  in  the  East  and  in  the  West. 

The  views  and  intentions  of  the  German  Emperor 
may  be  gauged  by  his  own  political  pronouncements 
and  by  those  of  his  personal  friends  and  favourites. 
Among  these  Herr  Albert  Ballin,  the  Director  of  the 
Hamburg-Amerika  Line,  occupies  a  prominent  position. 
He  is  the  head  of  Germany's  largest  shipping  line,  and 
is  considered  in  Germany  as  the  creator  of  the  modern 
German  merchant  marine.  The  importance  of  political 
statements  made  by  Herr  Ballin,  who  very  naturally 
does  not  wish  to  lose  the  Emperor's  favour,  is  enhanced 
by  the  fact  that  he  has  been  frequently  employed  in 


16       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

the  past  as  the  Emperor's  mouth-piece  on  important 
occasions.  Herr  Ballin  wrote  in  the  Frankfurter 
Zeitung  on  January  4th,  1915,  with  regard  to  Germany's 
war  aims  (Grumbach,  p.  17)  : 

"  The  English  Fleet  has  been  able  to  molest  us  and 
to  bring  Germany's  oversea  trade  almost  to  a  standstill 
because  the  North  Sea  can  easily  be  closed  by  that 
country.  The  piratical  pressure  which  England  brings 
to  bear  at  present  upon  the  neutral  Scandinavian  States 
and  Holland  would  have  been  impossible  had  the  Ger- 
man Fleet  possessed  a  base  corresponding  to  its  strength 
and  to  the  bravery  of  its  officers  and  men.  It  follows 
that  we  must  go  forward  beyond  the  area  of  the  North 
Sea  and  establish  there  a  naval  base.  Its  possession 
will  secure  to  Germany  in  this  part  of  the  world  the 
Isame  possibilities  which  England  already  possesses,  and 
which  it  ruthlessly  exploits.  " 

Herr  Ballin  stated  in  a  speech  delivered  at  Hamburg 
on  October  2ist,  1915  (Grumbach,  p.  18)  : 

"Germany  can  best  provide  for  its  future  by  striving 
to  acquire,  in  the  first  place,  naval  bases  which  guar- 
antee that  we  can  thoroughly  make  up  for  the  deficiencies 
which  we  deplore  at  present.  We  require  naval  bases 
both  at  the  entrance  and  at  the  exit  of  the  Channel. 
We  require  strong  naval  bases  oversea." 

Germany  is  not  a  parliamentary  governed  country. 
The  German  Reichstag  cannot  choose,  or  get  rid  of, 
the  Imperial  Chancellor,  who  is  solely  responsible  to 
the  Emperor  and  who  has  the  power  of  appointing 
and  of  dismissing  him.  Although  the  German 
Reichstag  has  no  direct  influence  over  the  Imperial 
Government,  which  ought  to  be  called  the  Emperor's 


OFFICIAL  WAR  AIMS  17 

Government,  it  has  considerable  weight  and  power 
because  it  gives  expression  to  public  opinion,  or  at 
least  is  supposed  to  do  so,  and  because  it  votes  the 
funds  required  by  the  Emperor's  Government.  As 
the  Reichstag  holds  the  purse-strings  of  the  nation, 
and  as  it  represents,  more  or  less  faithfully,  public 
opinion  and  the  national  will,  the  war  aims  of  the 
Reichstag  and  of  the  leading  political  parties  are  of 
course  of  very  great  importance.  Although  the 
Reichstag  does  not  occupy  a  position  comparable  to 
the  British  Parliament,  it  is,  after  all,  one  of  the  gov- 
erning factors  of  Germany,  although  its  authority  is 
not  much  greater  than  was  that  of  the  English  Parlia- 
ment under  the  Tudor s.  Let  us  then  take  note  of  the 
war  aims  which  were  expressed  with  a  due  sense  of 
responsibility  by  the  Reichstag  and  by  the  great  German 
parties. 

On  December  5th,  1915,  when  the  Social  Democrats 
expressed  their  opposition  to  a  policy  of  annexation, 
Herr  Spahn,  the  leader  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Centre 
Party,  made  in  the  name  and  by  the  direction  of  all 
Parties,  the  Socialists  alone  excepted,  a  statement  in 
the  Reichstag  which  was  worded  as  follows  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  33) : 

"  In  the  name  of  all  the  members  of  this  House,  the 
Socialists  excepted,  I  wish  to  make  the  following  declara- 
tion. .  .  .  We  are  looking  forward  to  the  peace  negotia- 
tions in  which  the  military,  economic,  financial,  and 
political  interests  must  be  safeguarded  in  their  full 
extent,  and  with  all  means,  including  those  acquisitions 
of  territory  which  are  required  for  that  purpose." 

The  significance  of  this  statement,  made  on  behalf 
of  all  the  non-Socialist  parties,  is  enhanced  if  we  take 
note  of  similar  demands  for  annexations  which  were 
made  repeatedly  by  the  individual  parties  as  well.  The 


i8       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

Free  Conservative  Party  resolved  at  a  meeting  which 
took  place  on  December  5th  and  6th,  1915,  in  Berlin 
(Grumbach,  p.  39)  : 

"  The  German  nation  ...  is  firmly  and  unanimously 
convinced  that  the  heavy  sacrifices  in  blood  and 
treasure  which  it  has  brought  willingly  and  enthusi- 
astically must  have  not  been  made  in  vain.  The  sacri- 
fices made  demand,  as  a  peace  aim,  that  Germany's 
power  should  be  strengthened  in  every  direction,  that 
its  territories  should  be  considerably  enlarged  beyond 
the  present  frontiers,  that,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
occupied  territories  should  be  retained,  and  that  the 
country  should  be  indemnified  for  its  monetary 
expenditure. 

"  These  our  frontiers  must  be  secured  against  any 
attack  from  the  East  and  the  West,  and  the  freedom 
of  the  seas  must  be  absolutely  guaranteed.  Germany's 
national  power  must  be  strengthened  in  accordance  with 
the  greatness  of  the  stakes.  Until  this  peace  aim  is 
obtained  the  German  nation,  in  justified  confidence  in 
its  military  and  economic  strength,  knows  only  one 
maxim :  to  fight  on  until  the  decisive  victory  is  won. " 

The  German-Conservative  Party  resolved  in  October 
1915,  according  to  a  report  published  in  the  Alldeutsche 
Blatter  of  October  9th,  1915  (Grumbach,  p.  40)  : 

"  Expression  was  given  to  the  confidence  that  the 
glorious  successes  of  Germany's  arms  will  finally  break 
the  gigantic  power  of  Russia,  and  will  permanently 
guarantee  Germany's  national  security  in  the  East.  The 
Committee  of  the  Conservative  Party  is  aware  that, 
among  the  great  tasks  of  the  world-war,  the  most  im- 
portant is  to  bring  England  down  on  its  knees  with  all 


OFFICIAL  WAR  AIMS  19 

means,  for  that  country  has  caused  the  war  and  will 
never  cease  to  threaten  Germany's  development  in  the 
future.  The  Committee,  in  accordance  with  the  whole 
Conservative  Party,  is  resolved  not  to  be  deterred  by 
any  further  sacrifices  which  may  be  required  to  bring 
the  war  to  an  end,  and  to  establish  a  lasting  and  honour- 
able peace  which  will  secure  Germany's  future.  As  a 
matter  of  course  it  will  support  the  necessary  enlarge- 
ments of  territory  required  for  this  purpose.  " 

The  German  Centre  Party  resolved,  at  its  meeting  on 
October  24th  and  25th,  1915,  in  Frankfurt  (Grumbach, 

P-  35) : 

"  The  outer  conditions  required  for  the  wholesome 
development  of  the  German  nation  consist,  as  the 
experience  of  the  world-war  has  clearly  shown,  in  an 
increased  security  against  the  intention  of  our  enemies 
to  destroy  Germany  militarily  and  economically.  The 
terrible  sacrifices  which  the  war  has  demanded  from 
the  people  call  for  an  increased  protection  of  the  coun- 
try in  the  East,  and  in  the  West,  which  will  deter  our 
enemies  from  falling  upon  us  once  more,  and  which 
will  permanently  guarantee  the  economic  position  of 
Germany's  growing  population.  An  increased  security 
is  required,  not  only  for  Germany,  but  also  for  Ger- 
many's Allies. " 

At  a  meeting  which  took  place  in  the  beginning  of 
June  1915  in  Berlin,  the  National  Liberal  Party  stated, 
summing  up  its  parliamentary  activity  (Grumbach, 
P-  36)  : 

"  Expression  was  unanimously  given  to  the  demand 
that  the  enormous  successes  of  our  incomparable  army 


20       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

and  dauntless  fleet  should  politically  be  exploited  to  the 
full.  Particularly  it  was  declared  to  be  necessary  for 
the  protection  and  strengthening  of  Germany's  position 
on  land  and  sea,  to  attach  to  the  German  Empire  in 
the  West  the  necessary  territories,  politically,  militarily, 
and  economically.  We  should  acquire  in  the  East  not 
only  better  strategical  frontiers,  but  also  new  land  suit- 
able for  settlement.  Furthermore,  Germany's  overseas 
territories  should  be  enlarged  in  accordance  with  our 
interests  as  world-traders.  " 

On  August  I5th,  1915,  the  National  Liberal  Party 
resolved  (Grumbach,  p.  36)  : 

"The  result  of  the  war  can  only  be  a  peace  which 
enlarges  Germany's  territories  in  the  East,  in  the  West, 
and  overseas,  which  secures  Germany  politically,  mili- 
tarily, and  economically  against  new  surprise  attacks.  " 

On  May  21  st,  1916,  the  National  Liberal  Party  re- 
solved (Grumbach,  p.  37)  : 

"  The  Central  Committee  of  the  National  Liberal 
Party  energetically  restates  its  conviction,  which  it  ex- 
pressed on  August  1 5th,  1915,  and  which  has  been  con- 
firmed by  the  events  which  have  taken  place  since  then, 
that  only  an  expansion  of  Germany's  land  and  sea  fron- 
tiers in  the  East,  in  the  West,  and  oversea  can  give 
Germany  the  necessary  real  guarantee  for  its  future 
military,  political,  and  economic  security.  The  Central 
Committee  declares  that  such  security,  which  is  based 
not  only  upon  treaty  but  upon  a  real  expansion  of  power, 
is  particularly  necessary  with  regard  to  England,  Ger- 
many's principal  enemy. " 


OFFICIAL  WAR  AIMS  21 

The  Progressive  People's  Party  officially  declared, 
according  to  a  report  published  on  August  8th,  1915 
(Grumbach,  p.  34)  : 

"  The  Progressive  People's  Party  has  carefully  studied 
the  tasks  which  will  have  to  be  fulfilled  by  Parliament 
in  consequence  of  the  course  of  the  historic  events  of 
the  present.  It  has  carefully  examined  the  demands 
relating  to  the  establishment  of  the  future  frontiers  and 
the  new  formation  of  States,  demands  which  have  been 
put  forward  in  discussing  Germany's  war  aim.  How- 
ever, after  conscientious  consideration,  the  Party  be- 
lieves that  the  time  is  not  yet  ripe  for  laying  down  a 
definite  programme  with  sharply  defined  details  regard- 
ing the  conditions  to  be  made  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
peace.  It  opposes  equally  strongly  the  waiving  of  ter- 
ritorial acquisitions  on  general  principle  and  boundless 
plans  of  annexation.  The  party  considers  it  uncondi- 
tionally necessary  that  Germany's  future  should  be  safe- 
guarded by  military  and  economic  measures  and  by  the 
necessary  enlargements  of  territory.  Thus,  conditions 
will  be  created  for  peaceful  international  competition 
which  guarantees  to  the  German  people  the  free  devel- 
opment of  their  entire  strength  both  at  home  and  on  the 
free  seas. " 

In  a  resolution  of  December  4th,  1915,  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  Progressive  People's  Party  stated 
(Grumbach,  p.  35)  : 

"  The  Central  Committee  of  the  Progressive  People's 
Party  is  convinced  that  the  German  Empire  will 
demand  peace  conditions  which  will  not  re-establish 
the  status  quo  which  obtained  at  the  outbreak  of  the 


22       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

war  about  which  our  enemies  write  at  present,  but 
that  the  peace  will  yield  Germany  lasting  protection 
against  attacks  from  without  and  a  permanent  increase 
of  its  power  and  its  prosperity.  Furthermore,  the 
peace  should  bring  Germany  also  an  increase  of  its 
territory,  as  far  as  this  is  necessary  for  the  Empire's 
security. " 

It  will  be  noticed  that  all  the  non-Socialist  parties  of 
Germany,  Conservatives,  Liberals,  and  Radicals — the 
latter  call  themselves  the  Progressive  People's  Party — 
have  laid  down  with  deliberate  solemnity  that  they  are 
in  favour  of  a  policy  of  annexation.  The  German  So- 
cial Democrats  alone  form  an  exception  to  the  general 
rule.  However,  it  would  perhaps  be  an  over-statement 
to  say  that  they  are  opposed,  as  a  party,  to  the  policy 
of  annexation.  Their  attitude  has  been  a  curious  one. 
Although,  for  the  sake  of  consistency,  they  have  de- 
clared from  the  beginning  of  the  war  that,  in  accord- 
ance with  their  settled  view,  they  were  opposed  to  a 
policy  of  conquest,  they  have  voted  the  funds  demanded 
by  the  Government  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  al- 
though they  had  in  the  past  voted  against  every  Budget 
because  of  the  military  and  naval  expenditure  contained 
in  it. 

While  officially,  as  a  party,  opposing  the  policy  of 
annexation,  the  German  Social  Democrats  have  approved 
of  a  policy  of  conquest  not  only  by  their  parliamentary 
attitude  and  by  their  votes,  but  also  by  their  enthusiastic 
pronouncements  in  favour  of  a  policy  of  annexation 
which  many  Socialist  leaders  have  made  in  their  in- 
dividual capacity.  Some  of  these  views  will  be  found 
in  Chapter  V.  of  this  book  entitled,  "  The  War  Aims 
of  the  German  Socialists.  "  The  great  majority  of  the 
Socialist  Party  in  the  Reichstag  are  led  by  Herr  Scheide- 
mann,  who,  while  talking  Socialism  in  the  abstract,  has 
hitherto  acted  as  a  thorough-going  supporter  of  the 


OFFICIAL  WAR  AIMS  23 

Government,  and  of  the  Government's  policy.  Only  a 
relatively  small  Socialist  minority  has  consistently  acted 
in  accordance  with  Socialist  tradition  in  condemning 
the  war  and  condemning  unconditionally  a  policy  of 
conquest. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  GERMAN   BUSINESS   MEN 

IN  a  wealthy  country  with  highly  developed  industries 
and  an  extensive  commerce  the  political  views  held  in 
business  circles  are  of  very  great  importance.  In  Ger- 
many organisation  has  been  most  highly  developed,  not 
only  by  the  Government,  but  by  private  individuals  as 
well.  Nowhere  in  the  world  have  the  great  economic 
interests  been  more  firmly  united  in  voluntary  associa- 
tions than  in  Germany. 

The  war  aims  of  business  men  in  a  highly  developed 
industrial  State,  which  possesses  a  large  and  influential 
middle  class,  such  as  Germany,  are  always  important. 
They  are  particularly  important  if  they  are  expressed 
by  business  men  in  their  corporate  capacity.  Business 
men  are  apt  to  raise  wild  political  demands  when 
speaking  singly,  when  uttering  merely  their  personal 
opinions.  Powerful  associations  of  business  men,  on 
the  other  hand,  put  forward  demands  in  writing  only 
with  a  due  sense  of  responsibility.  Hence  powerful  com- 
mercial bodies  observe,  as  a  rule,  considerable  caution 
and  restraint  in  addressing  political  demands  to  their 
Government. 

On  May  2Oth,  1915,  the  six  leading  economic  associa- 
tions of  Germany  addressed  a  petition  to  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  in  which  they  stated  Germany's  peace  aims 
from  the  business  men's  point  of  view.  That  petition 
was  signed  by  the  League  of  Agriculturists,  the  Ger- 
man Peasant  League,  the  Westphalian  Peasant  Society, 
the  Central  Association  of  German  Industrialists,  the 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  BUSINESS  MEN      25 

League  of  Industrialists,  and  the  German  Middle-class 
Association.  The  importance  of  the  Societies  mentioned 
may  be  gauged  from  the  fact  that  the  first  of  the  six 
alone  has  a  membership  of  a  quarter  of  a  million.  The 
petition,  which  was  sent  to  the  Governments  of  the 
individual  German  States  as  well,  has  not  hitherto  been 
published  in  full  in  the  English  language.  That  most 
important  document  (Grumbach,  p.  123)  was  worded 
as  follows: 

"  PETITION    TO   THE    IMPERIAL    CHANCELLOR   BY   THE 
Six  GREAT  ECONOMIC  'ASSOCIATIONS 

"  BERLIN,    • 

"May  20th,  1915. 

"  YOUR  EXCELLENCY, 

"Together  with  the  whole  German  people,  the 
German  men  of  business  engaged  in  agriculture,  the 
manufacturing  industries,  commerce  and  trade,  are 
firmly  determined  to  persevere  in  the  struggle  for  life 
or  death  which  has  been  forced  upon  our  country.  They 
will  persevere  to  the  last,  and  at  whatever  cost,  so  that 
Germany  may  issue  from  the  struggle  externally  stronger, 
and  that  it  may  possess  the  guarantee  of  a  lasting  peace 
and  the  guarantee  of  an  assured  national  economic  and 
cultural  development. 

"  In  view  of  this  aim  and  the  readiness  of  the  whole 
nation  to  make  the  necessary  sacrifices,  it  is  only 
natural  that  the  people  have  been  alarmed  by  rumours 
regarding  peace  negotiations,  and  particularly  regard- 
ing the  conclusion  of  a  separate  peace  with  England 
which  was  to  be  based  upon  certain  English  wishes  and 
demands. 

"  In  these  circumstances  the  declaration  of  the  Nord- 
deutsche  Allgemelne  Zeltung  that  nobody  endowed  with 
common  sense  could  think  of  giving  up  the  advantages 


26       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

arising  from  the  favourable  military  position  by  a  pre- 
mature peace  with  any  one  of  our  enemies  has  been 
received  everywhere  with  satisfaction. 

"That  determination  should  not  be  affected  by  a 
less  favourable  or  a  less  secure  position  of  the  war. 
Otherwise,  the  external  and  internal  aims  which  have 
been  indicated  by  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  would 
be  lost  sight  of.  These  aims  can  be  obtained  only  by 
the  military  enforcement  of  a  peace  which  gives  us  a 
greater  security  for  our  frontiers  in  the  West  and  the 
East,  which  broadens  the  basis  of  Germany's  naval 
power,  and  which  gives  us  the  possibility  of  a  power- 
ful and  unhampered  development  of  our  economic  forces. 
Briefly,  peace  must  bring  us  such  an  increase  of  our 
political,  military,  maritime,  and  economic  power  that 
it  establishes  our  great  strength  against  the  nations 
without. 

"A  peace  which  does  not  yield  these  results  makes 
inevitable  the  renewal  of  the  struggle  at  an  early  date 
under  materially  less  favourable  conditions  for  Germany. 
Therefore,  no  premature  peace  must  be  concluded.  From 
such  a  premature  peace  no  adequate  fruits  of  victory 
can  be  derived. 

"  But  there  should  also  be  no  half-hearted  peace,  no 
peace  which,  through  the  defects  indicated,  does  not 
lead  to  the  full  political  exploitation  of  the  final  military 
success  for  which  we  hope! 

"  It  must  not  be  overlooked  that  the  full  exploita- 
tion of  the  favourable  military  position  is  necessary  not 
only  for  securing  Germany's  future  externally  and  for 
safeguarding  its  future,  but  that  the  full  exploitation 
of  victory  is  equally  necessary  during  the  ensuing 
years  of  peace  for  reasons  of  internal  policy.  Only 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  BUSINESS  MEN      27 

then  the  people  will  willingly  make  the  necessary 
sacrifices.  The  German  nation  does,  of  course,  not  ex- 
pect the  impossible.  Notwithstanding  its  patriotism, 
it  would  consider  reasonably  the  existence  of  insuper- 
able military  difficulties  which  would  make  impossible 
the  conclusion  of  a  satisfactory  peace.  However,  the 
consequences  upon  the  internal  position  of  Germany 
would  be  most  disastrous  if,  at  the  conclusion  of  peace, 
Germany  should  make  concessions  which  are  not  made 
necessary  by  the  military  situation,  if  the  country 
should  prematurely  end  the  struggle.  The  result  would 
be  that  the  returning  German  warriors  would  believe 
that  the  sole  result  of  their  bravery  was  an  unbearable 
load  of  taxation.  That  would  be  fatal  for  our  internal 
peace.  Germany's  gains  derived  from  its  victories  must 
correspond  to  the  sanguinary  sacrifices  made  by  hundreds 
of  thousands! 

"  The  detailed  demands  which  must  be  fulfilled  in 
the  opinion  of  the  signatories,  should  they  be  militarily 
obtainable,  and  which  are  necessary  to  strengthen 
Germany  politically,  militarily,  and  economically  to 
such  a  degree  that  the  country  can  with  confidence 
look  forward  into  the  future,  have  been  given  in  the 
petition  adjoined  which  has  been  placed  before  your 
Excellency  on  March  loth  of  this  year  by  the  League 
of  Agriculturists,  by  the  German  Peasant  League,  by 
the  Central  Association  of  German  Industrialists,  by 
the  League  of  Industrialists,  and  by  the  German 
Middle-class  Association.  Since  then  the  Christian 
German  Peasant  Associations  have  joined  the  associa- 
tions named.  The  Petition  before  mentioned  was  worded 
as  follows: 

'  The  undersigned  associations  have  considered  the 


28       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

question  how  to  carry  out  the  demand  which  has  so 
frequently  been  made  during  the  last  few  months,  that 
the  present  war  should  be  followed  by  an  honourable 
peace,  by  a  peace  which  corresponds  with  the  sacrifices 
made,  and  which  will  be  secure  and  lasting. 

" '  If  we  wish  to  answer  this  question  we  must 
never  forget  that  our  enemies  unceasingly  proclaim 
that  Germany  must  be  annihilated  and  must  disappear 
from  among  the  Great  Powers.  As  these  are  their 
aims,  Germany  cannot  find  security  in  treaties  which 
would  be  trodden  underfoot  as  soon  as  convenient. 
On  the  contrary,  we  can  find  security  only  by  weaken- 
ing our  enemies  economically  and  militarily  to  such  a 
degree  that  peace  will  remain  secure  for  an  indefinite 
time. 

" '  We  demand  the  possession  of  a  Colonial  Empire 
which  corresponds  with  the  many-sided  economic  inter- 
ests of  Germany.  We  demand  security  for  Germany's 
colonial  policy  and  for  her  customs  policy  in  the  future. 
We  demand  a  sufficient  war  indemnity  in  a  suitable 
form.  We  believe  that  our  principal  aim  should  be 
to  secure  and  improve  the  European  basis  of  the  German 
Empire,  in  view  of  the  war  which  has  been  forced  upon 
us.  Germany's  position  in  Europe  should  be  improved 
as  follows: 

" '  BELGIUM  must  be  placed  under  German  law  in 
order  to  secure  Germany's  naval,  military,  and  economic 
power  in  the  future,  especially  as  towards  England. 
Besides,  we  must  remember  the  close  connection  which 
exists  between  the  economically  so  important  Belgian 
territory  and  the  principal  industrial  districts  of  Ger- 
many. For  these  reasons  Belgium  must  be  placed  under 
the  German  Empire  with  regard  to  military  affairs, 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  BUSINESS  MEN      29 

Customs  matters,  the  Mint,  Bank,  and  Postal  arrange- 
ments. The  Belgian  railways  and  waterways  must  be- 
come part  of  the  German  transport  system.  In  th$ 
Government  and  the  administration  of  Belgium  the 
Walloon  and  Flemish  districts  must  be  kept  apart.  At 
the  same  time,  the  industrial  undertakings  and  landed 
properties  which  are  so  important  for  dominating  the 
country  must  be  transferred  from  Belgian  to  German 
hands  and  arrangements  must  be  made  which  ensure  that 
the  inhabitants  of  the  country  will  obtain  no  political 
influence  upon  the  German  Empire. 

" '  As  regards  FRANCE.  For  the  reasons  given 
above,  with  regard  to  Germany's  relations  to  England, 
the  possession  of  the  French  shore  and  coast  districts 
up  to  the  Somme  must  be  considered  as  a  question  of 
life  or  death  for  Germany's  future  position  on  the 
sea,  for  we  must  have  access  to  the  Atlantic.  The 
Hinterland,  which  would  have  to  be  acquired  at  the 
same  time,  must  secure  the  fullest  economic  and 
strategical  exploitation  of  the  newly  acquired  Channel 
ports.  All  further  acquisitions  of  French  territory 
must  be  exclusively  based  upon  military  and  strategical 
considerations.  The  acquisition  of  the  mining  district 
of  Briey  will,  however,  form  an  exception  to  the 
principle  indicated.  In  view  of  the  experiences  of 
the  present  war,  it  may  be  considered  a  matter  of 
course  that  we  can  never  again  expose  our  frontiers 
to  hostile  invasion.  We  can  therefore,  in  particular, 
not  allow  our  opponents  to  retain  Verdun  and  Belfort 
and  the  western  slopes  of  the  Vosges  which  lie  between 
these  two  points.  By  acquiring  the  line  of  the  Meuse 
and  the  French  coast  of  the  Channel,  Germany  would 
obtain  not  only  the  ore  deposits  of  Briey,  which  have 


30      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

already  been  mentioned,  but  also  the  coal  districts  of 
the  Department  du  Nord  and  of  the  Department  Pas- 
de-Calais. 

" '  In  view  of  the  experiences  made  in  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, it  may  be  considered  a  matter  of  course  that  the 
population  of  the  annexed  French  territory  will  not  be 
allowed  to  obtain  political  influence  in  Germany,  and 
that  here  also  the  important  economic  factors,  including 
large  and  medium-sized  properties,  will  be  placed  into 
German  hands,  while  France  should  undertake  to  re- 
ceive and  to  indemnify  the  original  owners. 

"  '  As  REGARDS  THE  EAST.  In  the  first  place,  we  should 
be  guided  by  the  principle  that  the  vast  increase  of 
industrial  power  which  we  may  expect  to  receive  in 
the  West  must  be  balanced  by  equivalent  acquisitions 
of  agricultural  territory  in  the  East.  The  present  eco- 
nomic structure  of  Germany  has  proved  so  fortunate  in 
the  course  of  the  war  that  the  necessity  of  preserving 
its  happy  balance  for  all  time  may  be  described  as  in- 
dispensable according  to  the  general  conviction  of  the 
German  people. 

" '  In  view  of  the  necessity  of  strengthening  not  only 
the  industrial,  but  also  the  agricultural  basis  of  Ger- 
many, a  comprehensive  policy  of  colonisation  with 
German  agricultural  colonists  is  indicated.  The  German 
peasants  living  abroad,  and  particularly  those  domiciled 
outside  Germany,  and  especially  in  Russia,  who  have 
been  deprived  of  their  rights  in  consequence  of  the 
war,  must  be  enabled  to  return  to  Germany.  Their 
return  will  greatly  increase  the  population  and  the 
military  strength  of  the  country.  In  view  of  the  re- 
quirements mentioned,  a  considerable  expansion  of  Ger- 
man territory  is  needed  towards  the  East.  At  least 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  BUSINESS  MEN      31 

part  of  the  Baltic  Provinces  and  of  the  territories  to 
the  south  of  them  must  be  annexed.  The  aim  to  make 
the  Eastern  frontier  of  Germany  more  easily  defendable 
must  constantly  be  kept  in  mind. 

"'Recreated  Eastern  Prussia  requires  more  secure 
frontiers.  The  provinces  of  Western  Prussia,  Posen 
and  Silesia  also  must  no  longer  be  allowed  to  remain 
in  their  present  exposed  position.  The  necessary  pro- 
tection can  best  be  created  by  acquiring  large  territories 
farther  east. 

" '  With  regard  to  the  granting  of  political  rights  to 
the  inhabitants  of  the  annexed  territories  and  with  re- 
gard to  securing  within  these  new  districts  Germany's 
economic  supremacy,  the  principles  laid  down  with 
regard  to  France  should  apply.  The  war  indemnity  to 
be  demanded  from  Russia  should  largely  consist  of 
land. 

"  '  Of  course  these  demands  depend  on  the  assump- 
tion that  military  results  will  enable  us  to  carry  them 
out.  However,  in  view  of  the  successes  obtained  so 
far,  we  are  full  of  confidence  that  our  armies  and 
their  leaders  will  obtain  a  victory  which  guarantees 
the  fulfilment  of  these  our  wishes.  The  aims  indi- 
cated must  be  striven  for,  not  from  love  of  conquest, 
but  because  a  lasting  peace  can  be  secured  only  by 
achieving  them.  In  view  of  the  sacrifices  made  by 
them,  the  German  people  expect  such  a  peace.  Besides, 
the  voluntary  surrender  of  enemy  lands  which  have 
been  drenched  with  so  much  German  blood,  and  which 
contain  innumerable  graves  of  the  best  Germans, 
would  not  correspond  with  the  sentiments  of  the  people, 
and  with  their  ideas  of  what  constitutes  an  honourable 
peace. 


32       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

"  '  Lack  of  harbours  on  the  Channel  would  strangle 
Germany's  oversea  development,  as  it  has  done  in  the 
past.  An  independent  Belgium  would  continue  to  be 
an  English  tete  de  pont,  a  hostile  base.  It  would  mean 
a  constant  threat  on  the  part  of  our  enemies  if  the 
natural  line  of  fortresses  of  France  should  be  allowed 
to  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  French.  Russia,  on  the 
other  hand,  would  under-estimate  Germany's  strength 
for  action  and  power  should  she  experience  no  loss  of 
territory.  Besides,  if  we  should  not  acquire  agricultural 
territory  on  our  Eastern  frontier,  we  should  diminish 
the  possibility  of  strengthening  Germany's  military 
power  by  an  adequate  increase  of  the  national  popula- 
tion in  case  of  a  war  with  Russia. 

"  *  We  have  the  honour  of  acquainting  your  Excel- 
lency with  these  our  views,  which  are  held  by  vast 
numbers  of  Germans  who  do  not  belong  to  the  under- 
signed Associations,  although  there  may  be  differences 
of  opinion  with  regard  to  certain  details.  At  the 
same  time,  we  would  respectfully  point  out  that  we 
have  sent  copies  of  the  present  document  to  the 
Ministries  of  the  individual  States  of  the  German 
Empire. ' — 

"  It  is  necessary  to  supplement  the  petition  given 
in  the  foregoing.  It  should  expressly  be  pointed  out 
that  the  political,  military,  and  economic  aims  which 
the  German  nation  has  in  view  in  order  to  safeguard 
its  future  are  closely  interconnected,  and  cannot  be 
treated  separately.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  clear  that 
success  in  obtaining  our  great  political  aims  depends 
on  the  efficacy  and  success  of  the  German  armies. 
However,  the  experiences  of  the  present  war  teaches 
us  that  in  the  last  resort  Germany's  military  successes 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  BUSINESS  MEN      33 

and  the  exploitation  of  our  victories  to  the  fullest  extent 
depend  on  the  economic  strength  and  efficiency  of  the 
German  nation.  Had  Germany's  agriculture  not  been 
able  to  feed  the  people,  despite  all  the  efforts  of  our 
enemies  to  starve  us,  had  not  the  German  manufactur- 
ing industries,  German  inventiveness,  and  German 
technical  skill  been  able  to  maintain  our  independence 
from  foreign  countries,  we  should  at  last  be  defeated, 
notwithstanding  the  glorious  successes  of  our  victorious 
troops,  and  possibly  we  would  by  now  have  been  van- 
quished. 

"  It  follows  that  our  demands  which,  at  first  sight, 
seem  to  be  dictated  by  purely  economic  motives,  must 
be  considered  from  a  larger  point  of  view.  They  spring 
from  the  necessity  of  increasing  Germany's  national 
and  military  power  to  the  utmost.  Our  demands  must 
therefore  be  considered  from  the  military  point  of 
view.  This  is  particularly  the  case  with  regard  to  the 
acquisition  of  agricultural  territory  upon  which  stress 
has  been  laid  in  the  petition,  and  with  regard  to  the 
seizure  of  the  ore-bearing  territories  of  the  Meurthe 
and  Moselle,  and  of  the  French  coal  districts  of  the 
Departments  du  Nord  and  Pas-de-Calais,  and  the  Bel- 
gian coal  districts. 

'''  The  acquisition  of  adequate  lands  suitable  for 
agricultural  colonisation  is  indispensable  not  only  with 
a  view  to  broadening  the  basis  to  Germany's  national 
economy.  It  is  necessary  not  only  in  order  to  maintain 
the  happy  balance  of  Germany's  national  economy, 
the  importance  of  which  the  present  war  has  plainly 
disclosed,  but  also  in  order  to  secure  the  powerful 
stream  of  national  strength,  and  of  man-power  which 
is  provided  by  a  mighty  agriculture.  This  is  partic- 


34       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

ularly  necessary  if  we  wish  to  increase  the  number  of 
the  people  and  thereby  Germany's  military  strength. 

"  Acquisitions  in  the  ore  and  iron  districts  mentioned 
are  required  not  only  by  our  economic  interests,  but 
also  by  military  necessity.  That  will  appear  clearly 
from  the  following  details: 

"  Since  August  1914,  Germany's  production  of  raw 
iron  has  increased  again  to  nearly  1,000,000  tons  per 
month,  or  has  approximately  doubled,  and  Germany's 
steel  production  has  increased  to  more  than  1,000,000 
tons  per  month.  Nevertheless,  iron  and  steel  are  not 
abundant,  but  are  scarce  in  Germany,  and  are  still 
more  scarce  in  neutral  countries.  The  German  shell 
works  require  quantities  of  iron  and  steel,  which 
formerly  would  have  been  considered  incredible.  For 
cast  grey  shells  alone,  which  are  an  inferior  substitute 
for  drawn  shells  and  steel  shells,  at  least  4,000  tons 
of  raw  iron  have  been  used  every  day  during  the  last 
few  months.  At  the  moment,  the  exact  figures  cannot 
be  given.  However,  it  is  certain  that  the  continuation 
of  the  war  would  have  been  impossible  had  the  Ger- 
man iron  and  steel  production  not  been  doubled  since 
August  1914. 

"  The  basis  of  the  German  iron  and  steel  production 
is  minette  ore,  the  preponderant  importance  of  which 
is  constantly  increasing.  This  ore  alone  can  be 
obtained  in  rapidly  increasing  quantities  within 
Germany's  frontiers.  The  production  of  the  other 
German  iron  districts  is  very  limited,  and  the  importa- 
tion of  ire  ore  from  overseas,  even  from  Sweden, 
has  become  so  difficult  that  at  many  works,  even  those 
outside  the  Luxemburg-Lorraine  district,  minette  ore 
furnishes  from  60  to  80  per  cent,  of  the  iron  and  steel 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  BUSINESS  MEN      35 

produced.  It  follows  that  the  war  would  be  as  good 
as  lost,  should  the  production  of  minette  ore  be  inter- 
fered with. 

"  How  does  the  production  of  minette  ore  stand  in 
the  present  war,  and  how  would  it  stand  in  a  future 
war? 

"  If  the  fortress  of  Longwy  and  the  numerous  French 
furnaces  in  the  neighbourhood  should  be  given  back 
to  the  French,  France  would  be  able  in  a  new  war  to 
destroy  from  Longwy,  the  following  iron  works  in  Ger- 
many of  Luxemburg  in  a  few  hours  by  means  of  long- 
distance gun-fire: 

Kilometres  dis- 
tance from  Longwy. 

Rodingen 7 

Differdingen 10 

Esch  .        .        .        .  16  to  17 

Oettingen 21 

Riimelingen 21 

Diidelingen 25 

Thus,  approximately  20  per  cent,  of  the  German  raw 
iron  and  steel  production  could  be  eliminated  by  France 
acting  from  Longwy. 

"  A  glance  at  the  map  shows  further  that  Jarny, 
the  minette  mine  of  the  Phoenix  Company,  is  situated 
at  a  distance  of  from  13  to  15  kilometres  from  Verdun, 
and  that  the  western  ore  concessions  near  Landres 
and  Conflans  are  no  farther  than  26  kilometres  from 
Verdun.  To-day  we  bombard  Dunkirk  from  a 
distance  of  38  kilometres.  Can  any  one  believe  that 
the  French  would  in  the  next  war  abstain  from  putting 
long-distance  guns  into  Longwy  and  Verdun,  in  order 


36       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

not  to  disturb  Germany's  ore  production  and  iron  in- 
dustry ? 

"  In  passing,  it  should  be  said  that  only  the  vast 
production  of  steel  from  minette  ore  enables  Germany 
to  provide  agriculture  with  the  necessary  phosphoric 
acid  since  the  importation  of  phosphates  has  come  to 
an  end. 

"  Germany's  security  in  a  future  war  urges  us  com- 
pellingly  to  acquire  the  whole  of  the  minette  territories, 
including  the  fortresses  of  Longwy  and  Verdun,  for 
without  their  possession  the  district  described  cannot  be 
held. 

"  The  possession  of  vast  supplies  of  coal,  and  partic- 
ularly of  coal  rich  in  bitumen,  such  as  that  which  is 
found  in  Northern  France,  is  at  least  as  decisive  for 
the  issue  of  the  war  as  is  the  possession  of  iron  ore. 
Belgium  and  Northern  France  together  produce  more 
than  40,000,000  tons  of  coal  per  annum.  Besides, 
coal  is  nowadays  one  of  the  determining  political 
factors.  That  may  be  seen  by  the  English  coal  ex- 
port prohibition  of  May  I5th.  The  industrial  neutral 
nations  must  act  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  that 
combatant  Power  which  can  guarantee  to  them  the 
necessary  supply  of  coal.  Germany  can  at  present 
not  provide  the  coal  required.  Hence  we  are  com- 
pelled to  make  use  of  Belgium's  coal  production,  for 
otherwise  our  neutral  neighbours  would  fall  entirely 
under  England's  control.  It  is  very  probable  that  the 
deliberate  expansion  of  the  Belgian  coal  production 
has  been  of  the  greatest  importance,  that  it  has  induced 
several  of  Germany's  neighbour  States  to  maintain  their 
neutrality. 

"  It    is    generally    known    that    our    most    important 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  BUSINESS  MEN       37 

explosives  are  derived  from  coal,  their  constituents 
being  obtained  during  the  coking  process,  and  that 
coal  is  important  also  for  the  production  of  ammonia. 
Coal  can  provide  us  with  benzol,  the  only  product 
with  which  we  can  replace  the  benzine  which  we  lack. 
Lastly,  coal  furnishes  us  with  tar,  which  can  be  con- 
verted into  oil  fuel,  which  is  indispensable  for  naval 
purposes,  and  into  lubricants.  It  should  be  pointed 
out  that  the  large  expansion  of  our  torpedo-boat  flotilla 
and  of  our  submarine  arm  is  impossible  unless  we  have 
a  vast  supply  of  liquid  fuel.  The  course  of  the  present 
war  has  demonstrated  the  superiority  of  oil  fuel  over 
coal  in  the  case  of  torpedo-boats,  and  its  advantages 
are  so  striking  that  it  would  be  criminal  levity  to  dis- 
regard the  lesson  in  the  future.  If  our  enemies  secure 
for  themselves  oil-wells  abroad,  Germany  must  take 
care  to  obtain  the  necessary  gas  coal  at  home.  In  time 
of  peace  she  must  provide  an  inexhaustible  supply  of 
oil,  benzol,  toluol,  ammonia,  and  naphthaline,  not  only 
in  order  to  increase  the  national  prosperity,  but  also 
because  their  possession  is  an  indispensable  part  of  Ger- 
many's armament  for  war. 

"  In  summing  up,  we  would  say  that  the  war  aims 
indicated  will  secure  permanently  Germany's  national 
economy,  and  at  the  same  time  guarantee  her  military 
strength  and  her  political  independence  and  power. 
In  addition,  they  will  expand  Germany's  economic 
opportunities.  They  will  provide  work  for  the  workers, 
and  will  therefore  be  of  advantage  to  labour  as  a 
whole. " 

The  importance  of  the  petition  of  the  six  great 
economic  Associations  can  scarcely  be  overstated.  It 


38       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

may  be  said  that  it  expresses  the  views  of  German  trade, 
industry,  commerce,  and  agriculture.  The  petition  was 
widely  circulated  in  Germany  as  a  confidential  docu- 
ment, but  the  German  newspapers  were,  according  to 
Grumbach,  prohibited  to  reprint  it  lest  its  contents  should 
become  known  abroad. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  GERMAN  INTELLECTUALS . 

THE  most  important  factors  of  public  opinion  in  Ger- 
many are  three:  the  governing  circles,  the  business  men, 
and  the  intellectuals.  The  war  aims  of  the  governing 
circles  and  of  the  business  men  have  been  given  in 
Chapters  II  and  III.  In  the  present  chapter  the  de- 
liberate war  aims  of  the  intellectuals  will  be  rendered. 
These  were  authoritatively  stated  in  a  petition,  similar 
to  the  petition  of  the  six  great  Economic  Associations. 
This  petition  also  was  treated  as  a  confidential  docu- 
ment, and  sent  to  the  Imperial  Chancellor.  Appended 
to  it  were  1,341  signatures.  Among  the  signatories 
were  352  University  Professors,  158  educationalists 
and  clergymen,  145  high  officials,  burgomasters,  and 
councillors,  148  judges  and  lawyers,  40  Parliamen- 
tarians, 1 8  retired  admirals  and  generals,  182  business 
men,  52  agriculturists,  252  artists,  authors,  and  pub- 
lishers. In  view  of  the  great  prestige  enjoyed  by  the 
German  professors  and  their  vast  influence  upon  public 
opinion,  the  importance  of  the  professorial  demands  is 
very  great.  The  weight  of  the  professorial  petition  was 
vastly  increased  by  the  signatures  of  eminent  practical 
men  which  also  were  appended  to  the  document.  Among 
the  non-professorial  signatories  was  Herr  Kirdorf,  the 
principal  director  of  the  Gelsenkirchener  Bergwerk, 
Germany's  leading  coal  and  iron  undertaking.  Herr 
Kirdorf  was  for  many  years  the  President  of  the  power- 
ful organisation  which  represents  the  German  coal  and 
iron  industry. 

39 


40       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

Petitions  which  are  intended  to  be  signed  by  many 
of  the  most  influential  men  are  drawn  up  carefully 
and  cautiously.  They  are  as  a  rule  worded  with  a 
good  deal  of  reserve  and  restraint  in  order  to  avoid 
discussion  and  opposition.  Therefore,  the  petition  of 
the  professors  must  not  be  treated  as  if  it  were  a  rash 
statement  made  by  some  irresponsible  hotheads.  The 
document  (p.  132  of  Grumbach's  book)  was  worded  as 
follows : 

"THE  PETITION  OF  THE  PROFESSORS  TO  THE 
IMPERIAL  CHANCELLOR 

"  The  German  nation  and  its  Emperor  have  kept  the 
peace  during  forty-four  years.  They  have  kept  it 
until  its  maintenance  became  incompatible  with  the 
demands  of  national  honour  and  of  self-preservation. 
In  spite  of  the  growing  strength  and  number  of  its 
population,  Germany  has  never  thought  of  over- 
stepping the  narrow  limits  of  its  continental  territories 
as  a  conqueror.  Its  genius  merely  compelled  the  nation 
to  enter  the  world's  markets  in  order  to  secure  there 
its  economic  existence  in  peaceful  competition  with  the 
other  nations. 

"  However,  Germany's  enemies  wished  to  reduce 
our  narrow  territories  and  to  hamper  our  indispensable 
activities  in  the  world's  markets.  They  made  plans 
which  went  as  far  as  the  destruction  of  the  German 
Empire.  When  they  recognised  their  danger,  the 
Germans,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  rose  like 
one  man,  knowing  that  they  had  to  defend  not  only 
their  country,  but  also  their  individuality,  their 
spiritual  and  moral  treasures,  the  culture  of  Germany 
and  that  of  Europe,  against  the  flood  of  barbarians 
comirlg  from  the  East  and  the  desire  of  vengeance  and 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  INTELLECTUALS     41 

the  lust  of  domination  of  the  nations  of  the  West. 
Victoriously,  with  God's  help,  hand  in  hand  with  our 
faithful  Allies,  we  have  been  able  to  defend  ourselves 
against  half  the  world. 

"  Now,  when  in  Italy  a  new  enemy  has  arisen  to 
Germany,  mere  defence  is  no  longer  sufficient.  Our 
enemies  have  forced  the  sword  into  our  hands  and 
have  compelled  us  to  make  enormous  sacrifices  in 
blood  and  treasure.  Now  we  must  protect  ourselves 
against  a  similar  surprise  attack  from  all  sides,  against 
a  whole  succession  of  wars  waged  with  our  enemies 
when  they  have  regained  their  strength.  To  prevent 
this,  we  mean  to  establish  ourselves  so  firmly  and  so 
broadly  in  a  secured  and  enlarged  homeland  that  our 
independent  existence  is  guaranteed  to  us  for  genera- 
tions. 

'  The  people  are  unanimous  and  resolved  in  pursu- 
ing this  principal  aim.  The  plain  truth  which  we  meet 
wherever  we  look  is  this :  There  is  only  one  fear  among 
all  the  classes  of  the  people,  and  that  fear  is  particu- 
larly broad  and  deep  among  the  masses  of  the  people. 
It  is  the  fear  that,  through  the  delusive  idea  of  foolish 
conciliatoriness,  or  through  nervous  impatience,  a  pre- 
mature, doubtful,  and  transient  peace  might  be  concluded. 
It  is  feared  that  once  more  the  diplomat's  pen  might 
give  up  what  the  sword  victoriously  won,  as  happened 
a  century  ago.  And  that  might  happen  in  the  most 
fateful  hour  of  destiny  known  to  German  history,  when 
peoples'  minds  display  a  greatness  and  unanimity  such 
as  have  never  been  known  in  the  past  and  may  never  be 
known  in  the  future. 

"  Of  a  truth  we  do  not  strive  after  the  domination 
of  the  world.     However,  we  mean  to  possess  a  share 


42       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

of  world-power  proportionate  to  the  greatness  of 
Germany's  cultural,  economic,  and  warlike  strength. 
Perhaps  it  will  not  be  possible  to  achieve  simultaneously 
all  the  aims  of  national  security.  This  may  not  be 
feasible  because  of  the  number  of  our  enemies.  Still, 
the  utmost  limit  of  the  possible  should  be  obtained. 
Otherwise,  the  great  sacrifices  of  the  nation  and  our 
great  military  efforts  during  the  war  will  have  been  vain. 
This  is,  we  repeat  it,  the  firm  determination  of  the  Ger- 
man nation. 

"  It  is  the  duty  and  the  right  of  those  who,  through 
their  learning  and  position,  have  become  the  intellectual 
leaders  and  protagonists  of  public  opinion,  to  give  clear 
expression  to  the  resolution  and  to  the  firm  will  of  the 
nation,  and  to  place  the  national  wishes  before  the  Gov- 
ernment. It  is  their  duty  to  give  powerful  support  to 
the  Government  in  its  heavy  task  of  enforcing  Ger- 
many's necessary  claims  against  the  faint-hearted  in- 
dividuals within  the  country  and  against  its  tenacious 
enemies  abroad. 

"  We  invite  all  leaders  of  public  opinion  to  fulfil  this 
duty. 

"  We  know  full  well  that  one  must  discriminate  be- 
tween the  desirable  aims  of  the  war  and  the  final  con- 
ditions obtainable  at  the  peace,  that  everything  depends 
on  the  ultimate  success  of  our  arms,  and  that  it  cannot 
be  our  task  to  discuss  the  war  objects  of  Austria-Hungary 
and  Turkey.  Hence  we  have  in  the  following  merely 
briefly  expressed  our  opinion  in  giving  utterance  to  our 
conviction  that  Germany  must  have  certain  guarantees 
for  a  lasting  peace,  and  that  there  are  certain  aims 
which  must  be  reached  by  the  blood-sodden  road  of 
the  present  war. 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  INTELLECTUALS     43 

"  (i)  France. — We  wish  to  abolish  for  all  time  the 
French  menace.  We  have  been  threatened  by  France 
for  centuries.  We  have  been  assailed  with  French  cries 
of  vengeance  from  1815  to  1870  and  from  1871  to  1915. 
All  classes  of  the  German  people  are  convinced  of  this 
necessity.  We  cannot  abolish  this  danger  through  use- 
less efforts  at  conciliation,  to  which  France  has  always 
replied  with  the  utmost  fanaticism. 

"We  would  warn  all  Germans  most  seriously  not  to  in- 
dulge in  self-deception.  Even  after  the  terrible  lesson 
of  this  disastrous  war  of  revenge,  France  will  con- 
tinue thirsting  for  vengeance  as  long  as  she  possesses 
the  necessary  strength.  For  the  sake  of  our  own 
existence  we  must  enfeeble  that  land  politically  and 
economically,  without  scruple  or  compunction,  and  im- 
prove Germany's  military-strategical  position  towards 
France.  To  achieve  this  end  a  thorough-going  improve- 
ment of  Germany's  western  frontier  from  Belfort  to  the 
coast  is  needed. 

"  In  addition  we  must,  if  possible,  conquer  part  of 
the  French  Channel  coast  in  order  to  increase  our  strate- 
gical security  against  England  and  to  obtain  better  access 
to  the  ocean. 

"  Special  measures  will  have  to  be  taken  so  that 
the  German  Empire  should  not  be  internally  weakened 
by  its  external  acquisitions.  In  order  to  avoid  a  posi- 
tion similar  to  that  which  obtains  in  Alsace-Lorraine, 
the  undertakings  and  landed  properties  in  the  conquered 
districts  which  secure  to  their  owners  power  and  in- 
fluence should  be  transferred  from  hands  hostile  to 
Germany  to  German  hands,  and  the  indemnification  of 
the  original  owners  should  be  left  to  France.  No  in- 
fluence whatever  upon  the  Empire  should  be  allowed 


44       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

to  that  part  of  the  French  population  which  has  been 
taken  over  by  us. 

"  Furthermore,  it  is  necessary  that  France — and 
France  among  all  our  enemies  in  the  first  place — 
should  have  imposed  upon  it  a  high  war  indemnity, 
and  that  no  mercy  should  be  shown  to  it,  although  it 
has  financially  been  terribly  bled  through  its  own  folly 
and  British  selfishness.  Details  will  be  given  further 
on. 

"  We  should  also  remember  that  France  has  a  dis- 
proportionately large  Colonial  Empire,  and  that  England 
might  enrich  itself  by  seizing  the  French  Colonies  un- 
less we  seize  them  ourselves. 

"  (2)  Belgium. — Belgium,  which  we  have  won  with 
so  much  of  the  best  German  blood,  we  must  firmly  hold 
politically,  militarily,  and  economically,  whatever  rea- 
sons may  be  urged  against  such  a  step.  On  no  point 
is  the  unanimity  of  popular  opinion  greater.  To  the 
nation  it  is  beyond  a  doubt  a  question  of  honour  to  hold 
on  to  that  country. 

"  From  the  political  and  military  points  of  view  it 
is  clear  that  an  independent  Belgium  would  be  nothing 
but  an  English  base  for  a  very  dangerous  attack,  a  shield 
behind  which  our  enemies  would  gather  anew.  Econ- 
omically the  acquisition  of  Belgium  would  mean  a  vast 
accession  of  power  to  Germany. 

"  Nationally  also  Belgium  can  become  a  great  gain 
to  Germany.  The  Flemish  population,  which  is  so  closely 
related  to  the  Germans  by  their  culture,  may  free  itself 
in  course  of  time  from  its  French  shackles  and  may 
remember  its  Germanic  origin  and  character. 

"Of  the  problems  which  we  have  to  solve  when  we 
have  acquired  Belgium  we  mention  only  this,  that  the 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  INTELLECTUALS     45 

inhabitants  must  be  allowed  no  political  influence  within 
the  Empire.  As  in  France,  the  undertakings  and  landed 
properties  which  give  power  and  influence  to  their 
owners  must  be  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  persons  hostile 
to  Germany  and  be  placed  into  the  possession  of  German 
owners. 

"  (3)  Russia. — On  Germany's  eastern  frontier  the 
population  of  Russia  grows  with  the  greatest  rapidity, 
increasing  by  from  2,500,000  to  3,000,000  per  year. 
Within  a  generation  Russia's  population  will  come  to 
250,000,000.  As  this  overwhelming  colossus  threatens 
our  eastern  flank,  constituting  undoubtedly  the  greatest 
danger  to  Germany  and  to  Europe  in  the  future,  Ger- 
many can  maintain  its  place  in  the  world  only  by  con- 
structing a  firm  wall  which  will  protect  us  both  against 
the  stealthy  progress  of  Slavism  in  peace-time  and  against 
menacing  inroads  in  case  of  war.  Besides,  the  healthy 
growth  of  Germany's  national  strength  and  man-power 
must  be  secured  by  all  means. 

"  A  firm  wall  of  protection  and  a  basis  for  an  in- 
crease of  the  German  race  must  be  created  on  the  land 
which  Russia  will  have  to  cede  to  us.  We  must  have 
land  suitable  for  agricultural  settlement,  land  where 
can  be  reared  healthy  peasants  who  are  an  inexhaustible 
source  of  national  and  racial  power.  We  must  have 
land  which  will  receive  part  of  our  surplus  popula- 
tion and  which  will  afford  new  homes  to  those  Ger- 
mans abroad  who  wish  to  turn  their  back  on  the  hostile 
countries  to  which  they  had  formerly  migrated.  We 
must  have  land  which  increases  Germany's  economic 
independence,  which  supplies  us  with  food,  which 
affords  the  necessary  counterpoise  to  the  progressive 
industrialisation  and  townification  of  the  German 


46       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

people,  which  preserves  that  balance  of  economic 
activities  which  has  proved  so  valuable  during  this 
war  and  which  prevents  the  dangerous  development  of 
a  one-sided  national  economy  such  as  that  of  England. 
We  must  have  land  which  counteracts  the  reduction 
in  the  birth-rate  in  the  towns,  which  prevents  emigra- 
tion and  provides  housing  for  the  needy.  We  must 
have  land,  the  colonisation  and  Germanisation  of  which 
gives  new  chances  even  to  the  learned  proletariat  Such 
land,  which  is  needed  for  our  physical,  moral,  and  in- 
tellectual welfare,  is  before  all  to  be  found  towards  the 
east  of  Germany. 

"  The  military  needs,  and  particularly  our  strategi- 
cal requirements,  will  determine  how  far  Germany's 
eastern  frontier  should  be  pushed  forward.  Along 
the  eastern  limits  of  Posen  and  Silesia,  and  along 
the  southern  frontier  of  East  Prussia  a  belt  of  terri- 
tory must  be  created  which,  as  far  as  possible,  is  free 
from  non-German  owners  of  land,  which  would  there- 
fore be  open  for  settlement  to  German  colonists.  This 
German  frontier  belt  will  separate  the  Prussian  Poles 
from  the  Russian  Poles  and  protect  them  against  the 
direct  influence  of  the  latter,  who  may  achieve  their 
independence.  We  do  not  hesitate  to  point  out  that 
the  Baltic  provinces  of  Russia,  which  Germans  have 
cultivated  for  700  years,  which  possess  a  fruitful  soil 
and  which  are  thinly  populated,  are  a  promising  land 
suitable  for  colonisation  by  German  settlers.  The  in- 
habitants, Lithuanians,  Esthonians,  and  Letts,  who  are 
racially  not  related  to  the  Russians,  will  become  useful 
as  agricultural  labourers  for  temporary  work  in  Germany 
proper. 

"  We  demand  colonial  land   from  Russia  on  which 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  INTELLECTUALS     47 

we  can  erect  a  frontier  wall  and  create  conditions  for 
promoting  the  growth  of  our  population.  The  colonial 
land  demanded  should,  however,  have  a  third  function. 
It  should  be  Russia's  war  indemnity  paid  to  us.  After 
the  war  it  will  probably  be  impossible  to  obtain  from 
Russia  an  indemnity  paid  either  in  cash  or  in  securi- 
ties. The  disappointment  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
after  which  no  indemnity  was  paid,  might  repeat  itself. 
But  Russia  can  very  easily  pay  an  indemnity  in  kind. 
The  country  is  overburdened  with  riches  in  land,  and 
we  demand  that  the  territory  which  is  to  be  ceded  to 
us  should  to  a  large  part  be  handed  over  without 
their  owners.  In  view  of  Russia's  administrative 
practice  this  is  by  no  means  a  novel  development.  In 
Russia  the  people  are  not  so  deeply  rooted  in  the  soil 
as  they  are  in  Central  and  in  Western  Europe.  Over 
and  over  again  Russia  has  transplanted  large  portions 
of  its  populations  from  one  district  to  other  districts 
far  away.  The  possibility  of  removing  a  settled 
population  must  not  be  measured  with  the  insufficient 
standard  of  German  civilisation.  If  the  political 
acquisition  of  Russian  land  is  to  bring  to  us  the  neces- 
sary increase  in  power,  we  must  be  able  to  dispose 
freely  of  the  bulk  of  it.  A  peace  with  Russia  which 
does  not  bring  about  the  waning  of  the  Russian  in- 
cubus and  which  fails  to  supply  the  land  necessary  to 
Germany,  would  mean  that  a  great  opportunity  of 
improving  Germany's  political,  economic,  and  social 
health  had  been  thrown  away.  The  final  decision 
between  Germany  and  Russia  would  then  be  adjourned 
to  some  future  date.  Another  struggle  for  the  exist- 
ence of  Germany  and  for  European  culture  would  then 
be  certain. 


48       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

"  (4)  England,  the  East,  the  Colonies,  Oversea  Mat- 
ters.— Although  the  struggle  with  Russia  has  been  par- 
ticularly grand  and  exceedingly  glorious,  and  although 
we  must  remember  how  dangerous  the  enormous  bulk 
of  Russia  will  remain  unless  we  succeed  in  bringing 
about  its  decomposition,  we  must  not  forget  for  a  mo- 
ment that  this  war  has  been  in  the  last  resort  England's 
war  against  the  industrial,  commercial,  maritime,  and 
colonial  power  of  Germany. 

"  The  cause  of  England's  hostility  must  determine 
Germany's  war  aims  with  regard  to  England.  This 
means  that  we  must  assert  our  position  in  the  world's 
trade  and  assert  Germany's  sea  power  and  oversea  power 
as  against  England. 

"  We  must  admit  that  England  has  taught  us  a  valu- 
able lesson  by  blockading  Germany  during  the  war,  and 
by  forcing  us  to  organise  the  country  so  as  to  make 
it  a  self-supporting  State.  We  have  learned  in  the  first 
place — and  this  has  particularly  been  shown  in  this 
petition — that  we  require  a  broader  and  better  secured 
basis  in  Europe,  so  that  we  shall  be  independent  of 
other  nations  from  the  political,  military,  and  economic 
points  of  view.  We  mean,  therefore,  to  create  on  the 
Continent  and  about  our  national  frontiers  a  conti- 
nental economic  sphere  which  should  be  as  large  as 
possible,  and  which  will  make  us  independent  of 
England  and  of  other  world  empires.  In  this  respect 
Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey  must  be  considered  in 
the  first  place.  They  will  unlock  to  us  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  and  Asia  Minor.  Therefore  it  is  necessary 
to  secure  permanently,  against  Russian  and  English 
cupidity,  Austria-Hungary,  the  Balkan  Peninsula, 
Turkey,  and  Asia  Minor  as  far  as  the  Persian  Gulf. 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  INTELLECTUALS     49 

The  commercial  relations  with  our  political  friends 
should  be  made  closer  with  all  means  in  our  power. 

"  Henceforward,  in  spite  of  England's  hostility  and 
notwithstanding  the  security  of  our  continental  position, 
we  must  enter  again  upon  the  world-trade  and  become 
active  in  the  lands  across  the  sea.  A  substantial  part 
of  Germany's  international  trade  will  no  doubt  have 
to  be  established  in  totally  different  directions.  Old- 
established  commercial  and  maritime  relations  must 
be  regained.  In  future  we  must  learn  to  stand  on 
our  own  feet.  We  must  eliminate  English  media- 
tion in  finance  and  commerce,  English  arbitrage  and 
English  insurance.  We  have  lost  confidence  in  Eng- 
land. Hence  England  must  lose  the  profit  which  she 
has  formerly  derived  from  Germany's  commerce.  We 
mean  to  recreate  our  colonial  empire.  It  should  be 
more  closely  jointed  and  stronger  than  it  has  been 
hitherto.  Central  Africa  would  give  us  large  territories, 
but  they  are  of  insufficient  value.  We  must  therefore, 
in  addition,  acquire  colonies  elsewhere.  Herein  lies 
the  importance  of  Germany's  permanent  connection 
with  the  world  of  Islam  and  the  necessity  of  a  secure 
sea-route.  Those  who,  disregarding  Germany's  security 
against  England's  naval  tyranny,  desire  the  acquisition 
of  colonies,  while  being  in  favour  of  giving  up  Bel- 
gium, under-estimate  not  merely  the  importance  of  se- 
curing Germany's  European  basis.  They  make  the 
more  serious  political  mistake  of  striving  after  colonial 
possessions  without  securing  a  safe  connection  oversea. 
They  would  once  more  place  Germany  at  the  mercy 
of  England. 

"  We  require  the  freedom  of  the  sea.  We  fight 
England  with  the  object  of  obtaining  that  freedom 


50       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

for  all  nations.  In  order  to  enforce  the  freedom  of 
the  sea,  it  is  in  the  first  place  necessary  that  Germany 
should  obtain  a  strong  position  on  the  Channel  coast. 
We  must,  as  has  previously  been  stated,  have  Belgium 
firmly  in  our  grasp,  and  we  must,  if  possible,  obtain 
in  addition  part  of  the  coast  of  the  French  Channel. 
Besides,  it  is  necessary  either  to  break  the  chain  of 
naval  bases  which  England  has  created  around  the 
world,  or  to  neutralise  them  by  calling  into  existence 
corresponding  and  equivalent  German  bases.  Egypt, 
which  connects  England  with  English  Africa,  and 
English  Asia  on  the  one  hand,  and  with  Australia  on 
the  other,  and  which  makes  the  Pacific  Ocean  an 
English  lake,  Egypt,  which,  to  use  Bismarck's  words, 
is  to  the  British  Empire  what  the  nerve  at  the  back 
of  the  neck  is  to  a  man,  is  at  the  same  time  the  iron 
clamp  which  firmly  connects  England's  Eastern  and  her 
Western  possessions  and  the  instrument  with  which 
England  subdues  both.  In  Egypt  England's  vital  nerve 
can  be  severed.  If  we  succeed  in  this,  we  take  the 
great  trade-route  which  leads  through  the  Suez  Canal 
out  of  the  hands  of  a  single  Power.  In  doing  this  the 
rights  of  Turkey  should  as  far  as  possible  be  respected 
and  preserved. 

"  England's  power  is  based  in  the  main  upon  its  over- 
whelming influence  upon  Governments  and  the  Press 
throughout  the  world.  We  are  in  bitter  need  of  elim- 
inating the  English  cable  and  telegram  monopoly.  Our 
best  ally  against  England's  influence  throughout  the 
world  is  the  freedom  which  w£  shall  bring  to  all.  In 
fighting  for  our  own  deliverance  from  the  English  yoke 
we  fight  for  the  liberty  of  the  universe.  We  do  not 
mean  to  exploit  the  nations  of  the  world,  as  the  English 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  INTELLECTUALS     51 

have  been  doing,  but,  while  protecting  our  own  inter- 
ests, to  act  as  the  pioneers  and  leaders  of  Europe  who 
respect  and  secure  the  individuality  and  the  free  de- 
velopment of  all  nations. 

"  (5)  War  Indemnity. — We  desire  as  far  as  possible 
to  obtain  a  war  indemnity  which  compensates  us  for 
the  cost  of  the  struggle,  which  enables  us  to  rebuild 
what  has  been  destroyed  in  East  Prussia  and  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  which  allows  us  to  form  a  fund  from  which 
pensions  will  be  paid  to  war  invalids,  war  widows,  and 
orphans,  which  permits  us  to  make  good  the  losses 
suffered  by  private  German  citizens,  and  allows  us  to 
replace  and  to  improve  the  national  armaments. 

"  We  are,  of  course,  aware  that  the  question  of 
war  indemnities  depends  not  only  upon  our  military 
successes,  but  also  upon  the  financial  ability  of  our 
enemies.  Should  we  be  in  the  position  of  exacting 
an  indemnity  from  England,  which  has  always  been 
so  thrifty  in  devoting  English  blood  to  the  war,  no 
amount  of  money  that  he  could  be  exacted  would  be 
sufficiently  large.  England  has  raised  the  world 
against  Germany  chiefly  with  its  money.  If  we  wish 
to  strike  at  the  most  sensitive  part  of  this  nation  of 
hucksterers,  we  must  strike  at  its  purse.  Before  all, 
we  must  hit  England  as  hard  as  possible  by  striking 
at  its  money-bags,  if  we  have  the  power.  However, 
it  is  more  probable  that  France,  either  alone,  or,  in  the 
first  place,  must  be  counted  upon  to  furnish  an  indem- 
nity. We  should  not  hesitate  to  put  upon  that 
country  the  heaviest  financial  burden.  Philanthropic 
sentimentalism  would  be  totally  out  of  place.  If  the 
French  wish  to  find  relief,  they  may  address  them- 
selves to  their  Allies  on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel. 


52       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

If  these  refuse  to  help  their  Allies  financially,  we  should 
obtain  at  least  a  political  result  with  which  we  may 
be  satisfied.  [The  authors  intimate  that  England's 
refusal  to  help  France  paying  the  indemnity  demanded 
by  Germany  would  lead  to  hostility  between  the  two 
countries.] 

"  Before  all,  we  believe  that  it  is  less  important  to 
find  compensation  for  the  damage  suffered  than  to 
open  to  the  German  nation  new  roads  for  its  power- 
ful development  in  the  future.  Hence  a  monetary 
indemnity  which  compensates  us  for  the  cost  of  the 
war  is  of  comparatively  inferior  importance.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  clear  that,  should  we  not  be  able  to 
obtain  an  adequate  monetary  compensation,  our  de- 
mands for  the  surrender  of  land,  of  industrial  values, 
and  of  colonies,  stated  in  the  foregoing,  would  gain 
both  in  political  and  in  moral  justification.  We  must 
not  come  out  of  the  war,  when  it  has  come  to  a  vic- 
torious end,  with  a  loss.  Otherwise  posterity  will  still 
consider  Germany  defeated,  her  victories  notwith- 
standing. 

"  We  abstain  from  deciding  how  the  important  prob- 
lem of  compensating  Germany  for  its  outlay  should  be 
solved,  but  we  would  point  out  that  it  would  be  valuable 
to  have  part  of  the  monetary  indemnity  paid  in  securi- 
ties, the  possession  of  which  would  strengthen  Germany's 
economic  position  in  the  countries  of  her  political  friends 
and  which  would  deliver  these  from  the  undue  influence 
exercised  hitherto  by  England  and  France.  [The  sig- 
natories advocate  that  England  and  France  should  be 
compelled  to  hand  over  to  Germany  their  investments 
in  neutral  countries.] 

"  (6)  Kultur  and  Force. — If  the  signatories  of  this 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  INTELLECTUALS      53 

petition,  and  especially  the  representatives  of  science, 
art,  and  the  Church  among  them,  should  be  reproached 
that  in  the  present  petition  they  have  raised  only 
political  and  economic  demands,  relying  upon  force, 
and  that  they  have  forgotten  the  spiritual  problems 
of  Germany's  future,  there  should  be  a  threefold 
answer : 

"  The  care  of  the  German  spirit  is  no  part  of  Ger- 
many's war  aims  or  of  Germany's  peace  conditions. 

"  The  German  spirit  is  for  us  the  treasure  of  treasures, 
the  most  precious  possession  of  the  nation  and  the 
root  cause  of  its  superiority  among  the  other  nations. 
Still,  it  is  clear  that  before  attending  to  Germany's  spirit 
we  must  enable  the  country  to  live  in  political  and 
economic  security.  Only  then  can  we  cultivate  our 
spiritual  treasures  with  the  necessary  freedom. 

"  Lastly,  we  would  say  to  those  who  think  of  the 
German  spirit  as  an  abstraction  divorced  from  power, 
to  those  who  wish  to  pursue  what  is  called  a  policy 
of  culture  pure  and  simple,  that  we  do  not  wish  for 
a  spirituality  which  means  disintegration  and  decay, 
that  we  do  not  wish  for  an  unnational  cosmopolitan- 
ism, which  everywhere  vainly  tries  to  find  a  home,  and 
which  falsifies  the  national  character  because  it  lacks 
a  healthy  national  body.  With  our  demands  we  wish 
to  create  a  healthy  body  within  which  the  German 
spirit  may  dwell.  The  enlargement  of  the  German 
body  politic  which  we  demand  will  not  harm,  but  will 
benefit,  the  German  spirit,  provided  that  the  increase 
is  effected  under  the  precautions  which  we  have 
indicated. 

"  We  are  aware  that  we  have  put  forth  great 
aims,  and  that  they  are  obtainable  only  if  we  are  de- 


54       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

termined  to  make  all  the  necessary  sacrifices,  and  to 
negotiate  with  the  utmost  energy.  We  appeal  to  the 
Bismarckian  principle :  '  In  political  matters  faith  can 
indeed  remove  mountains.  In  political  matters  courage 
and  victory  do  not  stand  in  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect,  for  the  two  are  identical/  " 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  German  intellectuals,  like 
the  business  men  in  their  petition  given  in  the  previous 
chapter,  demand  not  only  far-reaching  annexations  in 
the  East  and  in  the  West,  and  vast  monetary  indem- 
nities designed  to  enrich  Germany,  but  that  they  like- 
wise urge  that  a  large  part  of  the  population  dwelling 
within  the  conquered  territories  should  be  expropriated 
and  expelled,  and  that  the  owners  of  land,  industrial 
undertakings,  etc.,  should  be  compensated  at  the  cost 
of  Germany's  victims. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  GERMAN  SOCIALISTS 

IN  Chapters  II,  III,  and  IV  the  annexationist  aims 
of  the  governing  classes,  of  the  business  men,  and  of 
the  intellectuals  have  been  described  in  the  words  of 
authorised  exponents.  In  Chapter  VI  it  will  be  shown 
that  German  annexationists,  belonging  to  all  classes 
of  society,  have  formed  almost  boundless  plans  of 
conquest  in  Europe  and  on  the  continents  beyond. 
It  is  frequently  asserted  that  the  German  Socialists 
are  opposed  to  a  policy  of  annexations,  a  policy  which 
is  irreconcilable  not  only  with  the  democratic  idea  but 
also  with  the  tenets  of  the  Social  Democratic  faith. 
It  has  been  pointed  out  in  Chapter  II  that  the  German 
Social  Democratic  t  party  has  pursued  a  double  aim 
during  the  war.  While  doing  lip-service  to  the 
principles  of  democracy  and  of  Socialism,  the  majority 
of  Social  Democratic  politicians  and  publicists  have 
unswervingly  supported  Germany's  official  policy  of 
conquering  imperialism,  of  aggressiveness  and  of  an- 
nexation. 

Some  Socialists,  feeling  keenly  the  awkwardness  of 
the  dilemma  of  having  to  preach  democracy  and  at  the 
same  time  to  support  a  policy  of  conquest  and  of  annexa- 
tion, have  tried  to  reconcile  their  action  with  their  avowed 
principles  by  advocating  a  policy  of  annexation  in 
which  that  awkward  word  "annexation"  is  replaced  by 
some  other  term.  For  instance,  Herr  Max  Schippel 
wrote  in  the  Socialistische  Monatshefte  on  April  I5th, 
1915  (Grumbach,  p.  261): 

S3 


56      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

"  Even  if,  in  case  of  a  decisive  Austrian  victory,  Serbia 
should  not  become  Austrian,  one  might  well  think  of 
strictly  limiting  that  country  in  its  foreign  policy,  in 
its  right  to  conclude  alliances,  and  in  its  railway  and 
commercial  policy.  This  should  be  done  for  preserving 
the  vital  interests  of  Austria-Hungary  and  preventing 
the  progress  of  Russia's  influence. 

"  Without  annexing  Belgium  one  can  make  it  im- 
possible that  under  the  cloak  of  neutrality  that  country 
will  ever  again  become  a  tool  of  England's  hostility 
to  Germany.  One  can  arrange  that,  by  attaching 
Belgium  to  the  German  body  economic  and  to  the 
German  traffic  lines,  that  country  grows  together  with 
the  German  interests,  and  detaches  itself  from  Eng- 
land." 

While  some  Socialists  have  tried  to  reconcile  their 
conscience  to  the  policy  of  annexation  by  circum- 
scribing that  awkward  word,  by  speaking  of  "  attach- 
ing "  Belgium  to  Germany  and  by  "  limiting "  the 
policy  of  Serbia  in  favour  of  Austria,  as  Herr  Max 
Schippel  did  in  the  extract  given  above,  other  Socialists 
have  taken  a  more  honest  and  a  more  straightforward 
course  and  have  recommended  annexation  for  some 
reason  or  other.  Some  Socialists  have  expressed 
themselves  in  favour  of  annexations  for  moral  reasons. 
For  instance,  the  editor  of  the  Socialist  Chemnitzcr 
Volksstimme  wrote  on  July  2nd,  1915  (Grumbach, 
p.  112): 

"  A  defensive  war  does  not  become  a  war  of  con- 
quest because  one  has  been  victorious  and  gains  by  one's 
victory.  It  would  not  be  policy,  but  suicidal  madness, 
to  give  to  bandits  a  charter  according  to  which  they 
may  take  you  by  the  throat  without  fear  of  loss.  On 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  SOCIALISTS  57 

the  contrary,  we  must  tell  our  enemies  that  they  have 
lost  the  game,  that  they  must  pay  dearly  for  every  day 
they  continue  fighting.  " 

Other  Socialists  have  not  merely  defended,  but  have 
boldly  advocated,  the  policy  of  annexation.  They 
have  denied  the  right  of  nations  to  govern  themselves 
and  to  dispose  of  themselves,  and  they  have  recom- 
mended the  forcible  creation  of  large  empires  for  So- 
cialist reasons  and  for  reasons  of  material  advantage. 
For  instance,  Doctor  Paul  Lensch  wrote  in  the  Socialist 
weekly  Die  Glocke  on  January  1st,  1916  (Grumbach, 
P-  259)  : 

"  The  cry  *  no  annexations '  badly  requires  Marxian 
criticism.  ...  It  is  really  high  time  to  free  oneself 
from  these  unsocialist  phrases  which  are  used  by  petty 
middle-class  men,  especially  as  they  expose  the  Socialist 
party  to  the  terrible  danger  of  becoming  a  helpless 
derelict  in  the  storm  of  the  present  world  revolution. 
.  .  .  The  interests  of  the  working  class,  which  are 
supposed  to  be  in  the  keeping  of  Social  Democracy, 
do  not  demand  that  every  three  miles  a  new  '  nation ' 
should  begin.  That  would,  in  practice,  be  the  conse- 
quence of  the  right  of  self-determination  on  the  part 
of  nations.  On  the  contrary,  the  interests  of  the  work- 
ing class  demand  the  largest  possible  closed  economic 
area  within  which  capitalism  and  the  proletariat  may 
develop  to  the  full.  "'•• 

There  is  practically  no  difference  between  the  Social 
Democracy  of  Doctor  Paul  Lensch  and  the  views  and 
aims  of  the  German  Emperor. 

The  well-known  Reichstag  Deputy,  Doctor  Landsberg, 
demanded,  according  to  a  report  in  the  Frankfurter 
Volksstimme  on  January  6th,  1916  (Grumbach,  p.  113), 


58       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

while  addressing  the  members  of  the  Social  Democratic 
Party : 

"  Would  any  German  protest  if,  for  the  better  defence 
of  Germany  in  the  East,  the  annexation  of  territory  up 
to  the  river  Narev  should  be  demanded  ?  " 


It  might  be  added  that,  in  commenting  upon  this 
demand,  Herr  Ledebour,  of  the  Socialist  Minority, 
pointed  out  that  the  annexation  demanded  by  his  So- 
cialist colleague  of  the  Majority  Section  of  the  party, 
would  lead  to  the  incorporation  of  at  least  4,000,000 
or  5,000,000  non-German  people  in  Germany.  He 
protested  against  this  advocacy  of  a  policy  of  annexa- 
tion on  the  part  of  men  who  describe  themselves  as 
Social  Democrats,  and  against  their  duplicity  of  advo- 
cating and  supporting  the  policy  of  annexation  while 
pretending  to  honour  the  principles  of  Socialism  and  of 
Democracy. 

The  Socialist  Reichstag  Deputy,  Geek,  in  a  speech 
delivered  on  February  2nd,  1916,  at  Karlsruhe,  stated 
(Grumbach,  p.  113): 

"  With  regard  to  the  question  of  annexations,  the 
German  Government  has  adopted  a  point  of  view  with 
which  we  may  be  contented.  It  has,  under  the  assent 
of  all  parties  in  the  Reichstag,  refused  to  annex  entire 
States.  Of  course,  if  frontier  regulations  should  have 
to  take  place  in  order  to  protect  Germany  against  sur- 
prise attacks  in  the  future,  that  policy  will  find  our 
support.  After  all,  precautions  may  have  to  be  taken 
to  close  the  opening  in  the  Vosges  Mountains.  Besides, 
measures  will  have  to  be  taken  to  prevent  Thorn  being 
bombarded  from  the  Russian  fortresses  by  means  of 
long-distance  fire. " 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  SOCIALISTS  59 

On  the  same  day  Herr  Marum,  another  Socialist,  and 
a  member  of  the  Diet  of  Baden,  said  at  Karlsruhe  in 
a  public  speech  (Grumbach,  p.  114)  : 

"  It  is  a  matter  of  course  that  we  must  obtain,  after 
the  war,  certain  securities  by  means  of  frontier  altera- 
tions. Otherwise  this  war  will  end  like  a  fool's  play, 
notwithstanding  the  gigantic  sacrifices  made  in  blood 
and  treasure. " 

The  editor  of  the  Social  Democratic  Rheinische 
Zeitung  said  in  a  speech  delivered  on  February  6th, 
1916,  in  Cologne  (Grumbach,  p.  114)  : 

"  I  would  express  a  warning  against  the  use  of 
meaningless  maxims.  For  instance,  the  formula  *  no  j 
annexations '  is  entirely  un-Marxian.  Poland  must 
no  longer  be  Russian.  Macedonia  must  no  longer 
be  Serbian.  From  both  the  Socialist  and  the  ethical 
point  of  view,  our  motto  should  be,  '  Resistance  against 
the  Violation  of  Foreign  Nations ! '  On  the  other  hand, 
social  democracy  must  demand  conquests  under  certain 


Herr  Scheidemann,  who  was  originally  the  leader  of 
the  entire  Social  Democratic  Party,  and  who  is  now 
the  leader  of  the  Governmental  Socialist  Majority,  stated 
in  a  speech  in  the  name  of  the  Majority,  which  was 
delivered  on  April  6th,  1916,  in  the  Reichstag  (Grum- 
bach, p.  114)  : 

"Is  it  violation  if  we  succeed  at  the  Peace  in  en- 
abling the  Flemish  people  to  cultivate  their  own  language 
and  their  own  civilisation?  We  should  determinedly 
oppose  any  violation  which  could  take  place  in  this 


60       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

respect.  The  Imperial  Chancellor  has  said :  '  The  Europe 
which  will  arise  after  the  present  war  will  not  resemble 
the  old  Europe  in  many  respects.  After  terrible  events 
the  re-establishment  of  the  status  quo  ante  is  unknown 
to  history. '  Only  a  child  in  political  things  can  per- 
suade itself  that  when  a  whole  Continent  stands  in  flames, 
when  millions  bleed  and  are  destroyed,  not  a  single 
frontier  stone  shall  be  removed  because  some  decayed 
diplomat  has  placed  it  in  position.  " 

The  Socialist  Frankfurter  Volksstimme  stated  on  June 
22nd,  1915  (Grumbach,  p.  117): 

"  Opposition  to  all  demands  of  annexation  is  in  itself 
not  a  sufficient  peace-programme.  Our  social  democ- 
racy must  put  forward  positive  demands,  and  these 
demands  can,  and  even  must,  include  changes  of  the 
map.  It  is  impossible  that  everything  shall  remain  as 


In  the  Socialist  Chemnitzer  Volksstimme  of  April  I4th, 
1916  (Grumbach,  p.  117),  it  was  stated: 

"  According  to  the  Leipziger  Volkszeitung,  Mr.  As- 
quith's  last  speech  may  be  summarised  in  a  single 
phrase.  He  demands  the  re-establishment  of  the  status 
quo  ante  bellum,  international  disarmament,  and  inter- 
national arbitration.  .  .  .  We  believe  that  Mr.  Asquith's 
speech  has  been  erroneously  summarised  in  this  way. 
However,  in  order  that  there  should  not  be  any  doubt 
in  the  matter,  we  wish  to  declare  explicitly  that  any 
peace  proposals  based  on  the  principles  put  forward 
by  Mr.  Asquith  would  appear  unacceptable  to  us  as 
regards  the  East.  We  absolutely  support  Herr  Scheide- 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  SOCIALISTS          61 

mann's  declaration  in  the  Reichstag  that  the  re-establish- 
ment of  the  status  quo  after  a  war  like  the  present  one 
is  simply  impossible.  " 

Among  the  Socialist  writers  may  perhaps  be  counted 
Herr  Richard  Calwer.  This  is  a  very  interesting  per- 
sonage. He  is  an  eminent  economist  and  statistician. 
He  is  a  great  expert  on  commercial  and  financial  affairs. 
For  many  years  he  was  the  pride  of  the  German  Social 
Democratic  Party.  He  disagreed  with  the  old  Socialist 
leaders  on  some  points  of  Marxian  doctrine.  He  recog- 
nised that  certain  Socialist  teachings  were  irreconcilable 
with  economic  fact.  He  left  the  party  with  regret,  but 
remained  in  touch  with  many  of  its  leaders  and  con- 
tinued to  influence  German  Socialists.  Although  he  did 
no  longer  officially  belong  to  the  German  Social  Demo- 
cratic Party,  he  considered  himself  only  semi-detached 
and  was  considered  so  by  others.  Since  the  beginning 
of  the  war  Herr  Calwer  has  used  his  great  talents  for 
converting  the  German  Socialists  to  Prussian  Imperial- 
ism. He  wrote  on  January  5th,  1915,  in  the  Berlin 
newspaper  Der  Tag  (Grumbach,  p.  161): 

"If  in  the  present  war  Germany  should  be  victorious 
it  must,  in  the  interest  of  the  peace  of  Europe  and  of 
Germany's  future,  protect  itself  as  far  as  possible 
against  the  repetition  of  such  a  systematically  prepared 
surprise  attack.  It  must  particularly  prepare  itself 
against  England  and  Russia.  To  obtain  that  security, 
territorial  acquisitions  can  perhaps  not  be  excluded. 
It  would  be  fundamentally  wrong  to  leave  the  door 
open  for  the  renewal  of  the  war  against  Germany  by 
excluding  annexations,  as  is  done  by  those  Social 
Democrats  who  base  their  ideas  upon  mistaken  theo- 
retical principles.  No  party  can  demand  this  except 
one  domiciled  in  Utopia.  Happily,  we  may  hope  that 


62       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

these  antiquated  views  will  soon  disappear.  It  is  not 
in  the  interest  of  the  German  workers  that  a  peace 
should  be  concluded  which  re-establishes  the  former 
status  quo.  On  the  contrary,  the  welfare  of  the  workers 
demands  a  peace  which  brings  the  security  that  Ger- 
many's enemies  will  be  incapacitated  from  recommencing 
the  struggle.  In  order  to  obtain  that  security  it  is  nec- 
essary that  we  take  guarantees  regarding  England  and 
Russia,  which  under  certain  circumstances  must  take  the 
form  of  territorial  acquisitions. 

"  The  opposition  to  the  policy  of  annexation  on 
the  part  of  Social  Democracy  is  not  Social  Democratic. 
It  is  at  best  the  echo  of  ancient  democratic  views  which 
are  still  heard  within  the  Social  Democratic  Party  of 
to-day.  What,  then,  is  the  peace  aim  which  Socialism 
should  pursue?  The  last  few  decades  have  brought 
about  the  formation  of  a  few  large  economic  areas 
which  are  provided  with  a  centralised  political  organ- 
isation. This  process  has  been  called  Imperialism. 
Although  the  object  of  concentration  may  be  obtained 
by  capitalistic  means,  it  is  an  aim  by  way  of  which 
humanity  can  arrive  at  Socialism.  After  all,  a  few 
great  empires  are  more  likely  to  maintain  the  peace 
than  numerous  politically  independent  States  existing 
side  by  side,  such  as  are  found  in  Western  Europe. 
The  greater  a  political  organisation  is,  the  greater  will 
be  its  efficiency,  the  greater  will  be  the  territory  within 
which  war  will  be  abolished,  and  the  smaller  will  be 
the  number  of  States  which  can  go  to  war  with  each 
other.  .  .  . 

"  Where,  after  all,  has  it  been  written  that  every 
nation  and  every  fragment  of  a  nation  has  a  right  to 
political  independence?  That  is  a  parochial  policy. 


WAR  AIMS  OF  THE  SOCIALISTS          63 

History  indicates  that  the  men  of  Western  Europe 
must  try  to  achieve-  the  unification  of  their  political 
organisation  by  other  means  than  those  adopted  by 
the  United  States  and  England.  If  our  military  suc- 
cesses are  to  benefit  Germany  permanently,  we  must 
not  rely  upon  the  soft  words  and  the  good-will  of  our 
Western  opponents,  France  and  Belgium,  but  we  must 
obtain  substantial  guarantees  which  will  make  impos- 
sible another  attack  of  the  English  in  Western  Europe. 
That  is  the  minimum  which  must  be  demanded.  Be- 
sides, we  must  obtain  frontiers  which  are  as  favour- 
able as  possible  to  Germany  as  against  Russia.  This 
question  also  is  one  which  must  be  decided  principally 
from  the  military  point  of  view.  It  is  clear  that  it 
would  be  treason  to  our  own  people  if  we  should  retain 
the  Socialist  point  of  view  with  regard  to  our  peace 
aims  if  territorial  annexations  or  additions  are  required 
for  the  protection  of  the  Fatherland.  /  The  peace  aim 
of  Socialism  is  clear.  We  must  secure  Germany's  ter- 
ritory against  another  surprise  attack.]:  We  must  elimi- 
nate English  and  Russian  influence  in  Western  Europe 
and  deliberately  aim  at  unifying  the  West  European 
States  in  accordance  with  their  historical  development, 
making  use  of  all  the  chances  for  such  action  yielded 
by  the  war.  " 

The  extracts  given  suffice  to  show  that  there  is  a 
curious  discrepancy  between  the  professions  of  political 
faith  made  by  the  German  Social  Democrats  and  their 
action. 


CHAPTER  VI  - 

HOW    GERMANY    WOULD    TREAT    THE    CONQUERED    PEOPLE 

IN  the  weighty  petition  signed  by  1,341  professors, 
burgomasters,  judges,  high  officials,  and  other  intel- 
lectuals which  has  been  given  in  full  in  Chapter  IV, 
the  extraordinary  demand  was  repeatedly  made  that  the 
annexed  territories  should  be  handed  over  to  Germany 
by  its  defeated  enemies  with  vacant  possession,  that  the 
owners  of  land,  industrial  undertakings,  etc.,  should  be 
expelled  as  a  condition  of  the  peace  and  be  compen- 
sated for  their  losses  by  Germany's  vanquished  op- 
ponents. Besides,  it  was  advocated  by  the  eminent 
signatories'  of  the  petition  that  the  manual  labourers 
and  other  men  of  foreign  nationality  who  chose  to  re- 
main in  the  annexed  provinces  should  be  given  no 
political  rights,  that  they  should  be  treated  as  Helots. 
These  outrageous  demands  of  robbing  the  owners  of 
their  property  and  of  enslaving  the  propertyless  politi- 
cally, and  probably  economically  too,  seem  so  revolting 
to  the  ordinary  sense  of  justice  that  one  would  be- 
lieve that  they  had  rashly  been  included  in  the  petition, 
and  that  these  demands  would  find  no  support  among 
the  German  people.  Unfortunately,  that  is  not  the 
case.  A  large  number  of  Germans  have  enthusi- 
astically supported  them,  as  the  following  examples 
will  show: 

Herr  Leopold  von  Vietinghoff  wrote  in  Die  Sicher- 
heiten  der  deutschen  Zukunft,  Leipzig,  1915  (Grumbach, 
P-  355) : 

"  Lack  of  land  can  be  cured  only  by  the  taking  of 

64 


TREATMENT  OF  CONQUERED  PEOPLE    6^ 

land.  .  .  .  The  State  which  acquires  land  and  gives  to 
the  inhabitants  the  option  of  remaining  or  emigrating 
has  the  duty  of  expropriating  those  who  wish  to  retain 
their  original  nationality.  These  have,  of  course,  to 
emigrate.  The  sense  of  justice,  as  developed  in  modern 
nations,  demands  that  this  duty  will  be  taken  over 
by  the  victors.  Besides,  such  a  measure  is  one  of  the 
necessary  securities.  A  State  wastes  a  great  deal  of 
strength  in  struggling  with  its  obstinate  alien  subjects. 
It  is,  therefore,  only  a  wise  measure  of  security  to 
make  it  as  easy  as  possible  for  such  people  to  leave  the 
country.  .  .  . 

"  Among  the  securities  required  for  a  truly  German 
future  is  the  thorough  improvement  of  Germany's 
military  position.  .  .  .  The  frontier  must  be  shaped  in 
such  a  way  that,  should  the  enemy  on  the  other  side 
ever  again  dare  to  attack  us,  we  could  by  a  short  leap 
not  merely  take  him  by  the  throat  but  be  able  to  strike 
at  his  heart.  In  other  words,  the  frontier  should  so 
be  drawn  that  we  dominate  militarily  our  possible  op- 
ponents. " 

Herr  Arthur  Dix,  a  well-known  publicist,  wrote  in 
Z  wise  hen  Krieg  und  Frieden,  Leipzig,  1914  (Grumbach, 
P-  319) : 

''  The  problem  how  to  attach  to  Germany  territories 
occupied  by  a  non-German  and  hostile  population  and 
to  secure  for  ourselves  the  riches  of  the  soil  which 
we  require  for  agricultural  purposes  must  be  consid- 
ered. As  the  idea  of  '  evacuating '  the  native  population 
has  been  put  forward,  I  would  herewith  give  some 
proposals  which  emanate  from  eminent  and  experi- 
enced leaders  of  the  German  colonial  movement  and 


66       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

of  Germany's  economic  life.     With  regard  to  Belgium 
such  an  authority  stated: 

"  '  Wherever  the  population  has  struck  at  the  Ger- 
man Army  by  armed  resistance  and  guerrilla  warfare, 
the  people  should  be  expropriated.  Compensations,  if 
any,  should  be  paid  to  the  expropriated  families  from 
the  war  indemnity,  and  the  dispossessed  people  should 
be  compelled  to  live  henceforth  outside  the  German 
Empire.  The  land  thus  freed  from  ownership  should 
be  distributed  among  the  families  of  those  German  regi- 
ments which  have  suffered  from  the  cowardly  hostility 
of  the  former  population.  .  .  . 

'  Factories  and  industrial  properties  whose  owners 
or  directors  have  participated  in  the  resistance  against 
the  German  Army  should  be  seized  and  be  given  to  suit- 
able German  workmen  belonging  to  the  Army  who 
should  co-operatively  manage  these  properties.  They 
should  absolutely  possess  them. 

"  *  All  mines  should  become  the  State  property  of  the 
new  German  Duchy  of  Belgium. 

"  'Every  Belgian  who  fails  to  declare  within  four 
weeks  from  the  official  incorporation  of  the  former  king- 
dom that  he  wishes  to  become  a  German  subject  must 
leave  the  German  Empire  with  his  family. 

"  '  During  ten  years  every  former  Belgian  who  breaks 
the  German  laws  may  be  expelled  from  the  Empire. 

" '  In  accordance  with  these  principles  a  broad  belt 
along  the  whole  Belgian  frontier  should  be  settled  with 
a  purely  German  population  drawn  from  the  war  army. '  " 

Another  authority  complemented  the  foregoing  pro- 
posals approximately  as  follows: 

"  It  is  not  sufficient  that  in  the  East  and  West  terri- 


TREATMENT  OF  CONQUERED  PEOPLE    67 

tories    should   be    placed    under    the    authority   of    the 
German  Empire.     The  direct  acquisition  of  land  by  the 
State  is  necessary.    The  great  aim  is  not  merely  a  war 
indemnity  in  cash,  but  particularly  a  war  indemnity  ia. 
men. 

"The  Russian  Government  transplants  year  by  year, 
and  by  force,  hundreds  of  thousands  of  the  rural 
population,  as  we  know  from  the  history  of  Siberia. 
.  .  .  The  only  thing  to  be  done  is  to  withdraw  the 
German  settlers  from  Russia  and  to  establish  them  on 
the  territories  on  our  eastern  frontier  which  have  been 
made  vacant  for  them.  In  any  case,  we  do  not  wish 
to  expropriate  the  present  owners  of  the  land  with 
German  money.  On  the  contrary,  we  mean  to  compel 
our  enemies  to  cede  us  the  land  and  to  impose  on  them 
the  duty  to  cede  to  us  landed  property  with  vacant 
possession  and  free  for  German  settlement.  .  .  .  One 
of  our  foremost  aims  must  be  a  war  indemnity  in  the 
form  of  land.  Unless  we  receive  it  we  may  consider 
ourselves  defeated!  Both  in  the  West  and  in  the  East 
the  territories  acquired  should  be  placed  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Empire  politically,  militarily,  and  econ- 
omically; but  they  should  not  be  represented  in  the 
Federal  Council  and  Parliament. " 

Herr  Adolf  Bar  wrote  in  Die  Entwicklung  der  grossen 
osteuropdischen  und  orientallschen  Fragen,  Weimar,  1915 
(Grumbach,  p.  328)  : 

"  A  successful  war  must  give  us  free  land  in  the 
East.  We  do  not  want  a  cash  indemnity  from  the 
Russians,  because  we  cannot  obtain  it;  but  we  can  get 
property  in  land.  We  see  a  future  Germany  arising, 
a  Greater  Germany,  a  firmly  knit  national  State  within 


68       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

enlarged  frontiers,  an  unselfish  leader  of  a  new  Central 
Europe  stretching  from  the  Meuse  and  the  Adria  to 
the  Bug  and  the  Black  Sea.  " 

Herr  Wolfgang  Eisenhart  wrote  in  Was  lehrt  uns  der 
Kricg,  Naumburg  1915  (Grumbach,  p.  329)  : 

"  Before  all,  we  must  fight  for  better  and  more  easily 
defendable  frontiers  in  the  East  and  in  the  West,  and 
settle  the  conquered  frontier  districts  with  German 
settlers.  It  would  be  recommendable  to  introduce  a 
system  of  military  colonies  which  the  Romans  employed 
in  their  conquests.  Part  of  the  hostile  population  should 
be  expropriated  at  the  cost  of  our  present  enemies  and 
should  be  replaced  by  our  German  soldiers,  j 

"  Furthermore,  England's  world  dominion  must  be 
finally  broken.  We  hope  to  obtain  from  this  war  the 
strengthening  and  increase  of  our  colonies.  " 


CHAPTER  VII 
GERMANY'S  GENERAL  WAR  AIMS 

THE  Germans  have  gone  to  war  with  the  intention,  and 
in  the  hope,  of  profiting  vastly.  That  hope  and  desire 
was  only  natural  in  view  of  their  recent  history.  The 
wars  of  1864,  J866,  and  1870-71  were  almost  bloodless 
if  compared  with  the  present  struggle.  They  lasted 
only  a  very  short  time,  and  they  yielded  truly  gigantic 
results  both  territorially  and  economically. 

Immediately  after  the  opening  of  hostilities  the 
leaders  of  German  thought,  German  politicians,  German 
publicists,  etc.,  formed  vast  plans  regarding  Germany's 
future.  Every  one  raised  demands  according  to  his 
bent.  Some,  whose  interests  were  confined  by  the  limits 
of  Europe,  merely  demanded  large  annexations  in  the 
East  and  the  West,  and  a  monteary  indemnity  which 
would  yield  a  large  cash  profit  to  the  State.  Those 
who  were  particularly  interested  in  Germany's  naval 
development  and  colonial  future  demanded  acquisitions 
oversea.  Some  proclaimed  that,  as  the  result  of  the 
war,  Germany  should  establish  a  Federal  State  reach- 
ing from  Antwerp  or  from  Calais  to  Bagdad  and  to 
the  Persian  Gulf  which  would  dominate  Europe.  Others, 
endowed  with  a  still  more  exuberant  imagination,  de- 
manded that,  as  the  result  of  the  war,  Germany  should 
become  the  foremost  Power  in  the  world,  should  rule 
the  world. 

As  those  who  demanded  local,  Central  European, 
trans-maritime,  and  world-wide  expansion  did  not 
always  specialise  in  the  war  aims  they  put  forward, 
it  is  somewhat  difficult  to  classify  their  pronounce- 

69 


70       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

ments  according  to  the  aims  desired.  Special  chapters 
have  been  devoted  to  Germany's  war  aims  regarding 
Belgium,  regarding  France,  regarding  Central  Europe, 
etc.,  because  in  the  extracts  given  in  them  the  demand 
for  the  acquisition  of  French  or  Belgian  soil  or  for  the 
creation  of  a  Central  European  Federation  undef  Ger- 
man leadership  was  particularly  emphasised. 

Owing  to  the  variety  of  war  aims  there  is,  of  course, 
a  good  deal  of  overlapping. 

Many  Germans  did  not  specialise  in  putting  forward 
their  war  aims,  but  demanded  acquisitions  in  every 
direction  and  if  possible  in  all  directions.  A  number 
of  pronouncements  of  the  kind  are  given  in  the  follow- 
ing pages.  They  will  show  the  comprehensiveness  and 
the  universality  of  Germany's  desire  for  territorial  ac- 
quisitions wherever  possible. 

Herr  Paasche,  a  National  Liberal  Deputy  and  the 
Vice-President  of  the  Reichstag,  stated  on  April  i8th, 
1915,  at  Kreuznach  (Grumbach,  p.  71): 

"We  may  not  discuss  our  peace  aims,  but  expres- 
sion should  be  given  to  the  desire  which  lives  in  the 
heart  of  every  German :  '  We  shall  not  give  up  the  land 
of  our  enemies  which  we  have  conquered  with  so  much 
German  blood. '  We  must  get  to  the  English  Channel, 
even  if  we  should  have  to  begin  all  over  again,  and  if 
we  have  to  conquer  once  more  all  the  old  strongholds. 
The  German  nation  also  demands  that  we  should  be 
protected  against  new  inroads  of  the  Russian  hordes 
in  the  East.  The  pen  must  not  give  up  what  the  sword 
has  won. " 

Herr  Basserman,  the  leader  of  the  National  Liberal 
Party,  stated  in  December  1914  (Grumbach,  p.  71): 

"The  victorious  German  eagle  will  unfold  its  wings 


GENERAL  WAR  AIMS  71 

and  rise  to  higher  altitudes  than  ever  before.  And 
we  shall  know  how  to  retain  for  all  future  the  lands 
which  have  been  fertilised  with  German  blood.  Ardent 
love  of  the  Fatherland  enables  us  to  make  the  great- 
est sacrifices.  Let  us,  then,  hold  on  to  that  which  we 
have  gained  and  acquire  in  addition  that  which  we 
need. " 

The  two  eminent  parliamentarians  mentioned  spoke 
with  statesmanlike  reserve  and  self-restraint.  Their 
demands  were  made  in  a  manner  resembling  that  of 
the  Imperial  Chancellor.  Of  course  no  similar  restraint 
was  observed  by  other  leading  Germans  who  did  not 
attempt  to  imitate  the  detachment  and  the  deliberate 
vagueness  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor.  For  instance, 
Professor  Ernst  Haeckel,  the  celebrated  scientist,  wrote 
in  Das  Monistische  Jahrhundert  (Grumbach,  p.  255)  on 
November  i6th,  1914: 

"  In  my  opinion,  the  following  fruits  of  victory  are 
desirable  for  the  future  of  Germany  and  of  allied 
Central  Europe:  (i)  Liberation  from  England's  tyr- 
anny. (2)  Invasion  of  the  British  Pirate  State 
through  the  German  Army  and  Navy,  occupation  of 
London.  (3)  Partition  of  Belgium,  the  larger  part 
west,  up  to  Ostend-Antwerp,  to  become  a  German 
Federal  State;  North  Belgium  to  fall  to  Holland  and 
South-East  Belgium  to  Luxemburg,  which  also  should 
become  a  German  Federal  State.  (4)  Germany  to 
receive  a  large  part  of  the  British  Colonies  and  the 
Congo  State.  (5)  France  to  cede  part  of  its  north- 
eastern provinces.  (6)  Russia  to  be  incapacitated  by 
reconstituting  the  Kingdom  of  Poland,  which  is  to  be 
connected  with  Austria-Hungary.  (7)  The  Baltic  Prov- 
inces of  Russia  to  fall  to  Germany.  (8)  Finland  to 


72       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

be    made     independent,    and    to    be     connected     with 
Sweden.  " 

With  an  exuberant  enthusiasm  similar  to  that  dis- 
played by  the  aged  Professor,  but  with  fuller  details, 
Herr  A.  Oelzelt-Newin  demanded  in  Welche  Strafe  soil 
die  treffen,  die  Schuld  am  Weltkrieg  T  rag  en?  "  Leipzig, 
1915  (Grumbach,  p.  340) : 

"  We  should  still  have  to  prepare  for  war  unless 
Russia  be  deprived  of  all  influence  on  the  Continent. 
That  country  wishes  to  dominate  the  Balkan  Peninsula 
and  through  it  the  Mediterranean.  The  aim  of  the 
peace  settlement  must  be  to  preserve  Russia's  Asiatic 
character  and  to  destroy  its  position  as  a  European 
Great  Power.  That  can  be  done  only  by  cutting  off 
its  western  parts  which  culturally  and  economically  are 
most  valuable,  and  at  the  same  time  keep  Russia  away 
from  all  European  seas.  The  latter  cannot  be  achieved 
merely  by  treaty.  The  separating  line  should  be  drawn 
from  Kronstadt  via  Brest-Litovsk  and  Taganrog  to 
Baku.  Finland  would,  of  course,  be  separated  from 
Russia.  All  fortresses,  especially  those  on  the  sea, 
would  have  to  be  destroyed  and  Finland,  Esthonia, 
Livonia,  Courland,  Poland,  Volhynia,  Podolia  Bessa- 
rabia, and  parts  of  Little  Russia  and  South  Russia, 
Taurida  and  Caucasia  would  have  to  be  ceded.  The 
provinces  to  be  ceded  would  comprise  about  one-fifteenth 
of  Russia's  territory,  and  about  one-fourth  of  its  in- 
habitants, and  these  would  be  Russia's  best  and  richest 
citizens.  .  .  . 

"  As  regards  the  Balkans,  Serbia  and  Montenegro 
should  be  wiped  off  the  map.  .  .  . 

"  There    can    be    no    united    and    powerful    Central 


GENERAL  WAR  AIMS  73 

Europe  as  long  as  France  remains  a  strong  Great  Power. 
Its  greatness  and  strength  must  be  destroyed.  That 
must  be  our  aim  at  the  peace.  This  can  be  done  not 
only  by  territorial  adjustments,  for  indemnities  and 
commercial  treaties  also  can  destroy  a  State.  ...  It  is 
too  early  to  discuss  whether  the  northern  harbours  of 
France  should  be  ceded  to  Germany.  Possibly  the  States 
of  Central  Europe  require  a  Mediterranean  port  such 
as  Toulon.  In  connection  with  this,  the  possession  of 
Nice  would  probably  be  indispensable. 

"  It  is  certain  that  France  would  have  to  lose  North 
Africa,  because  it  would  be  insufficiently  injured  by 
a  mere  war  indemnity.  It  would  also  not  suffice  to 
insist  on  the  cession  of  the  French  Fleet.  All  the  forti- 
fications, especially  the  harbour  fortifications,  would 
have  to  be  destroyed,  and  one  of  the  most  important 
conditions  of  peace  would  have  to  be  a  permanent 
undertaking  of  the  French  not  again  to  have  a  merchant 
marine.  France  should  be  given  a  position  similar  to 
that  occupied  by  Spain.  .  .  . 

"It  is  extremely  important  for  Europe  to  make 
England  innocuous.  This  can  be  done  without  a  naval 
victory  provided  the  Central  Powers  are  victorious 
on  land.  England's  hardest  punishment  would  be  its 
complete  exclusion  from  the  Mediterranean.  That 
can  be  done  in  part  by  Turkey  after  it  has  acquired 
Egypt  and  the  Suez  Canal.  Besides,  England  would 
be  cut  off  from  Malta  and  the  other  islands  when 
Gibraltar  has  been  taken  and  Tangiers  has  ceased  to 
be  neutral.  " 

Professor  Doctor  Hermann  Schumacher  demanded  in 
Meistbegiinstigung  und  Zollunterscheidung,  Leipzig,  1915 
(Grumbach,  p.  346)  : 


74       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

"  The  war  can  compensate  us  for  our  huge  sacrifices 
to  some  extent  if  we  succeed  in  pushing  forward  our 
frontiers  in  the  East,  so  as  to  acquire  settlement  colonies 
for  our  agriculture,  and  if  we  protect  more  efficiently 
the  wealthiest  and  most  highly  developed  portion  of 
the  country  in  the  West. " 

On  July  29th,  1915,  the  Preussiche  Kreuzzeitung 
wrote  (Grumbach,  p.  60)  : 

"  By  our  heavy  and  sanguinary  sacrifices  we  have 
purchased  the  knowledge  of  the  points  where  the  political, 
military,  and  economic  power  of  Germany  requires  , 
completion.  We  have  learned  to  know  the  spots  on 
our  frontiers  which  require  increased  protection.  The 
knowledge  gained  will  and  must  bear  fruit.  The  terri- 
tories which  Germany  has  conquered  with  the  blood 
of  its  best  sons  cannot  be  handed  back  if  they  are  neces- 
sary for  strengthening  its  position.  " 

Doctor  Oppenheimer  stated  in  Das  Monistische  Jahr- 
hundert,  on  December  10,  1914  (Grumbach,  p.  256)  : 

"  I  desire  to  see  a  union  of  States  comprising  all  the 
civilised  nations  of  Europe.  Germany  should  be  the 
leading  State,  and  the  German  Emperor  the  representa- 
tive  head.  .  .  .  We  should  prepare  for  such  an  ideal. 
If,  as  we  hope  and  believe,  we  shall  be  victorious,  we 
must  before  all  completely  overthrow  England,  our  most 
dangerous  enemy,  and  deprive  it  of  its  Colonies  and 
Fleet.  One  might  also  take  the  Fleet  from  France  and 
exact  from  it  ample  indemnities.  Belgium  should  be- 
come part  of  the  German  Empire,  a  second  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  and  the  King  be  eliminated.  " 


GENERAL  WAR  AIMS  75 

Professor  Martin  Spahn  wrote  in  the  monthly  Hoch- 
in  October  1914  (Grumbach,  p.  24) : 


"  Germany  cannot  embark  upon  world  policy  on  a 
footing  of  equality  with  other  nations  as  long  as  we 
are  restricted  to  our  present  geographical  position.  We 
must  strive  to  improve  our  position  towards  the  coun- 
tries oversea.  England  must  no  longer  be  allowed  to 
close  them  to  us.  The  coast  of  all  Continents,  except 
the  American,  which  can  protect  itself,  must  henceforth 
be.  dominated  by  German  naval  guns.  .  .  .  This  demand 
signifies  that  our  conquests  made  at  the  dawn  of  the 
war  must  permanently  be  retained. 

"  Particularly  we  must  get  to  the  Channel.  Having 
suffered  so  much  from  Belgium,  that  country  cannot 
redeem  itself  by  handing  over  to  us  the  Congo  State. 
However  much  self -administration  the  Empire  may 
grant  to  Belgium,  it  is  indispensable  for  us  to  dispose 
completely  of  the  southern  part  of  the  Netherlands.  We 
have  occupied  Belgium  against  France,  and  we  require 
that  country  against  England.  The  Channel  is  by  far 
the  most  important  European  trade  route.  As  one  of 
its  two  shores  cannot  be  taken  away  from  England,  we 
must  have  the  other.  " 

Professor  Doctor  Max  von  Gruber  wrote  in  October 
1915  in  the  Suddeutsche  Monatshefte  (Grumbach, 
p.  242) : 

"  However  one  -  depicts  to  oneself  the  future  of  the 
German  nation,  it  is  clear  that  even  those  who  think 
it  most  desirable  that  Germany  should  expand  as  vastly 
as  possible  her  world  commerce,  her  world  shipping, 
and  her  Colonies,  it  is  clear  that  all  these  things  can 


76       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

be  obtained  and  preserved  only  if  we  have  made  Ger- 
many an  unassailable  fortress  in  Europe.  Expansion 
oversea  is  possible  only  if  we  can  force  Russia  to  limit 
its  expansion  for  all  time  to  Asia,  and  to  seek  access 
to  the  open  sea  on  the  Chinese  coast  and  on  the  Persian 
Gulf.  .  .  .  Only  two  hundred  million  Germans  will 
be  strong  enough  to  protect  German  liberty  in  the  year 
2000.  " 

Doctor  Adolf  Grabowsky  wrote  in  Das  Neue  Deutsch- 
land  of  October  28th,  1914  (Grumbach,  p.  213)  : 

"  At  present  nothing  is  more  urgent  than  that  the 
whole  German  nation  should  be  seized  by  the  will  to 
conquest. 

"  Only  then  we  rise  and  become  an  Imperial  Power. 
Then  only  can  we  hold  our  own  against  England.  .  .  . 

"  We  must,  at  whatever  price,  enlarge  Germany's  ter- 
ritory on  the  Continent.  It  does  not  suffice  if  we  con- 
nect the  new  territories  merely  by  a  Customs  Union, 
for  we  must  be  their  master  diplomatically  and  militarily 
as  well.  .  .  . 

"  Csesarism  was  the  principle  of  ancient  Rome.  Fed- 
eralism is  the  principle  of  the  new  world.  The  best 
connection  is  the  federal  tie.  .  .  . 

"  Look  at  Belgium.  If  we  should  simply  annex  it, 
we  should  have  a  second  Poland  in  the  West,  and  this 
new  Poland  would  be  much  worse  than  the  old,  for 
all  the  people  would  be  insurgents.  Now,  should  we 
retain  only  the  strategical  line  Liege-Namur,  take  Ant- 
werp in  addition,  allow  the  rest  of  Belgium  to  administer 
itself,  and  bring  the  country  into  a  favourable  con- 
nection with  Germany,  we  should  have  all  security  for 
its  preservation.  The  Belgian  coast  would  always  be 


GENERAL  WAR  AIMS  77 

for  us  a  military  position  and  tete  de  pont  against 
England.  At  the  same  time,  the  Belgians  would  not 
feel  that  they  are  Germany's  subjects.  Hence,  the 
danger  of  insurrections  would  be  avoided.  If  we  re- 
tain Antwerp,  it  would  be  wise  to  make  an  exchange 
with  Holland  whereby  Germany  would  receive  the  mouth 
of  the  Scheldt  while  Holland  would  get  the  Belgian 
part  of  Limburg.  .  .  . 

"If  people  should  ask  whether  we  intend  to  become 
a  World-Power  which  overtops  the  other  World-Powers 
so  greatly  that  Germany  would  be  the  only  real  World- 
Power,  the  reply  must  be  that  the  will  to  world-power 
has  no  limits.  A  World-Power  has  less  right  ever  to 
consider  itself  satisfied  than  has  a  Great  Power.  The 
principle  of  the  balance  of  power  on  land  and  sea  is 
absolutely  irreconcilable  with  the  ideal  of  world- 
power.  ..." 

Professor  Doctor  E.  Brandenburg  demanded  in  Die 
Reichsgrundung,  Leipzig,  1916  (Grumbach,  p.  358)  : 

"  May  our  frontiers  be  extended  as  far  as  is  required 
in  the  interest  of  our  future  security,  and  as  far  as 
we  can  advance  them  without  diminishing  our  ability 
of  defending  our  territories.  However,  our  conquered 
territories  must  be  given  no  influence  upon  the  inner 
structure  of  the  State  until  they  have  firmly  grown  into 
Germany. " 

Professor  Doctor  Heinrich  Sieveking  wrote  in  Unsere 
Aufgaben,  Berlin,  1915  (Grumbach,  p.  347)  : 

"If  we  bring  the  war  to  a  victorious  end,  it  is  our 
good  right  to  demand  stronger  points  for  the  better 


78       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

security  of  our  frontiers.  We  must  attach  to  Germany 
the  districts  necessary  for  increasing  the  stock  of  our 
raw  materials,  such  as  the  ore  deposits  of  Lorraine. 
We  must  obtain  positions  on  the  sea  which  are  of 
decisive  importance  for  our  maritime  tasks.  .  .  . 
Would  not  an  internally  independent  Belgium  and 
Poland  find  their  greatest  advantage  by  being  attached 
to  Germany?" 

Professor  Doctor  Conrad  Bornhak  stated  in  Die 
Grenzboten  on  February  23rd,  1916  (Grumbach,  p.  203) : 

"  Germany's  peace  will  presumably  not  be  concluded 
under  the  sign  of  the  principle  of  nationalities.  There 
should  be  no  deception.  The  States  composed  of 
various  nationalities,  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey,  have 
become  more  strongly  consolidated  than  ever  during 
the  war.  The  attempt  to  partition  them  would  be 
hopeless.  Germany  has  only  one  war  aim:  security 
for  the  future.  We  must  struggle  on  and  create  all 
possible  guarantees  and  securities  that  none  of  our 
enemies,  either  separately  or  united  with  others,  will 
dare  ever  again  to  fight  Germany.  That  was  declared 
by  the  Imperial  Chancellor  in  his  speech  of  May  28th, 
1915.  If  this  aim  can  be  supported  here  and  there, 
for  instance,  in  the  Baltic  Provinces  and  in  the  Flemish 
lands,  by  putting  forward  the  principle  of  nationalities, 
we  can  only  be  pleased.  But  Germany's  only  aim  is 
future  security.  " 

Doctor  Albert  Gottlieb,  explained  in  the  Grenzboten 
on  December  3Oth,  1914  (Grumbach,  p.  193) : 

"  Domination  may   be   founded   either  on  power  or 


GENERAL  WAR  AIMS  79 

on  wise  calculation.  Leadership  requires  more  than 
mere  force.  It  requires  superiority  in  culture  and 
morality  and  the  ability  to  understand  the  peculiarities 
of  others.  The  world-power  of  the  future  must  fall 
into  the  hands  of  a  nation  which  has  these  qualities, 
and  that  nation  is  the  German  nation.  .  .  .  The  limits 
of  German  vision  are  expanded.  The  eye  surveys 
the  countries  from  the  North  Cape  to  the  Indian 
Ocean,  it  surveys  an  empire  which  geographically, 
economically,  and  politically  possesses  unlimited  possi- 
bilities. " 

On  May  3Oth,  1916,  Herr  Wolfgang  Eisenhart  wrote 
in  the  Preussische  Kreuzzeitung  (Grumbach,  p.  164)  : 

"  The  great  question  is :  Is  the  basis  of  power  which 
Bismarck  has  given  us  in  his  time  sufficient  to  secure 
vigorous  development  to  German  culture  and  to  Ger- 
man morality?  If  this  question  should  be  answered  in 
the  negative,  and  that  answer  seems  dictated  by  the 
experiences  of  the  present  war,  then  a  policy  of  force 
(Machtpolitik)  is  justified  which  gives  to  German  culture 
that  secure  and  broad  political  foundation  without  the 
possession  of  which  Germany  and  the  German  nation 
will  be  weighed  down  by  the  great  World-Powers, 
England,  Russia,  and  North  America,  notwithstanding 
our  great  intellectual  position.  Herein  lies  the  moral 
right  to  a  policy  of  conquest  in  the  present  war  which 
has  been  forced  upon  us. 

"  It  should  not  be  objected  that  such  a  policy  of 
violence  cannot  be  carried  out  except  at  the  cost,  and 
to  the  injury,  of  other  nations  which  have  as  much 
right  to  live  their  own  lives  as  has  the  German  nation. 
This  idea  expresses  one  of  the  greatest  fallacies  of  the 


80      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

present  time.  It  is  not  true  that  all  nations  have  an 
equal  right  of  existence,  that  all  nations  have  an  equal 
claim  to  develop  their  culture  and  to  live  their  own  lives. 
There  is  no  equality  among  men,  nor  is  there  equality 
among  nations.  There  are  rising  and  declining  nations. 
There  are  youthful  nations  for  which  it  is  a  blessing 
if  they  are  tutored  and  taught  by  a  foreign  nation  pos- 
sessed of  a  higher  morality.  There  are  declining  nations, 
nations  which  are  in  a  state  of  moral  decay,  which  have 
lost  their  right  to  national  existence,  and  which  there- 
fore must  make  room  for  the  higher  civilisation  of  the 
men  whom  Destiny  has  made  a  master  nation.  " 


CHAPTER  VIII 
GERMANY'S  WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  BELGIUM 

IN  the  following  pages  a  number  of  representative 
extracts  will  be  given  which  show  Germany's  war  aims 
towards  Belgium.  Many  further  references  to  Belgium 
are  of  course  to  be  found  in  other  chapters,  such  as 
those  which  deal  with  Germany's  war  aims  regarding 
France,  regarding  England,  etc.  A  full  list  of  references 
to  Belgium  will  be  found  in  the  Analytical  Index  at  the 
end  of  this  book. 

Many  Germans  have  demanded  the  annexation  of 
Belgium  for  the  sake  of  ensuring  Germany's  security 
against  another  attack.  Sometimes  this  demand  is 
put  forward  with  a  show  of  judicious  moderation. 
For  instance,  in  a  speech  made  by  Herr  Stresemann, 
one  of  the  leading  members  of  the  National  Liberal 
Party,  and  delivered  in  the  name  of  and  on  behalf  of 
that  Party,  it  was  stated  (Grumbach,  p.  69)  on  April 
6th,  1916: 

"  The  Belgium  problem  has  an  important  political 
aspect.  Unless  we  wish  that  that  country  should  once 
more  become  a  base  for  a  hostile  attack  on  the  part 
of  our  enemies,  the  status  quo  ante  with  regard  to  Bel- 
gium must  be  ruled  out  and  Germany's  supremacy  in 
Belgium  must  be  guaranteed  militarily,  politically,  and 
economically.  " 

Si 


82      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

Another  very  prominent  Liberal  politician,  Doctor 
Miiller-Meiningen,  the  well-known  leader  of  the  Radical 
People's  Party,  wrote  in  Belgische  Eindrucke  und 
Ausbliche,  published  in  Munich  in  1916  (Grumbach, 
p.  294) : 


"  The  complete  reconstitution  of  the  old  political 
position  in  Belgium  is  in  my  opinion  impossible.  No 
one  acquainted  with  the  circumstances  doubts  that 
Belgium's  independence  and  liberty  are  things  of  the 
past  as  far  as  the  Entente  Powers  are  concerned.  After 
the  present  war,  Belgium  would  be  no  more  and  no 
less  than  a  French  or  English  colony  without  political 
independence.  .  .  . 

"  The  so-called  guarantee  of  Belgium's  independence 
by  the  five  Great  Powers  has  been  that  country's 
misfortune.  That  arrangement  bore  in  it  the  germ 
of  continuous  conflicts.  The  security  of  peaceful 
internal  development  of  that  wealthy  country,  which 
is  the  tete  du  pont  of  Europe,  can  be  assured  only  by 
the  guarantee  of  a  single  powerful  State.  Guarantors 
who  are  at  the  same  time  opponents  and  competitors 
cannot  offer  any  protection  to  Belgium.  On  the 
contrary,  they  are  a  constant  cause  of  fear  and  danger. 
A  country  so  protected  is  like  a  volcano  which  may 
erupt  at  any  moment.  Protection  can  be  given  only 
by  a  single  neighbour  Power  of  vastly  preponderant 
strength  which  can  guarantee  the  peaceful  develop- 
ment of  the  country  not  merely  on  paper,  but  in  actual 
fact.  " 

Many  Germans,  acting  on  the  maxim  divide  et 
impera,  wish  to  divide  the  Belgians  into  Flemish  and 
Walloons,  to  play  out  the  one  section  against  the  other, 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  BELGIUM         83 

and  to  attach  in  some  form  or  other  the  Walloons  to 
Germany  largely  because  of  their  supposed  racial 
affinity.  Many  references  to  the  Walloons  will  be 
found  in  other  chapters.  Their  position  can  easily 
be  ascertained  by  reference  to  the  Index  at  the  end 
of  this  volume.  Advocating  the  separation  of  the 
Flemish  Belgians  and  of  the  Walloons,  Professor 
Doctor  Conrad  Borchling  wrote  in  Das  Belgische 
Problem,  published  in  Hamburg  in  1914  (Grumbach, 
p.  286) : 

"If  Germany  is  able  to  speak  the  decisive  word  at 
the  conclusion  of  peace  with  regard  to  Belgium's  future 
then  the  disastrous  connection  between  the  Walloons  and 
the  Flemish  should  cease.  " 

Guided  by  similar  motives,  Doctor  Hermann  Losch 
wrote  in  Der  Mitteleuropaische  Wirtschaftsblock,  Leip- 
zig, 1915  (Grumbach,  p.  286)  : 

"  The  present  war  is  being  fought  not  only  in  Belgium 
but  also  about  Belgium.  The  precious  German  blood 
which  has  been  spilt  in  huge  quantities  on  Belgian  soil 
must  be  revenged.  No  German  Chancellor,  and  not 
even  the  German  Emperor  in  person,  can  to-day  con- 
vince the  German  nation  that  Belgium  should  remain 
after  the  war  as  it  would  have  remained  had  it  fulfilled 
Germany's  first  wish,  or  Germany's  second  wish,  to  allow 
a  free  passage  to  the  German  troops.  For  reasons  of 
military  security  the.  whole  Belgian  coast  and  all  for- 
tresses, particularly  the  threatening  fortress  of  Liege, 
must  remain  in  German  hands. 

"  The  unnatural  connection  of  the  Walloons  and  of 
the  Flemish  parts  must  be  ended. 


84       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

"  The  whole  territory  must  be  included  within  the 
Central  European  economic  union  of  the  future.  .  .  . 

"  All  Belgian  State  railways  and  the  Belgian  post, 
telegraphs,  and  cables  must  come  into  the  possession  of 
Germany. 

"  The  National  Bank  of  Belgium  must  be  closed  and 
German  currency  be  introduced.  .  .  . 

"  The  problem  whether  Belgium  should  remain  a 
State,  the  future  of  the  Congo  State,  the  question  what 
languages  may  be  used,  etc.,  are  of  comparatively  minor 
importance.  It  is  also  a  secondary  question  whether 
the  small  and  purely  German  language  districts  in  the 
east  of  Belgium  should  be  attached  to  the  Rhenish 
Province,  what  the  nature  of  Belgium's  future  Parlia- 
ment should  be,  etc.  In  view  of  the  mixture  of  na- 
tionalities in  Belgium,  it  would  be  out  of  the  question 
to  put  matters  to  the  popular  vote.  The  remarks  which 
in  connection  with  this  have  been  addressed  to  us  by 
the  United  States  do  not  apply,  as  we  have  not  heard 
that  the  North  American  Indians,  the  population  of 
Panama,  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines  have 
assented  to  their  incorporation  in  the  United  States  by 
means  of  a  plebiscite.  " 


While  many  Germans  wish  for  the  annexation  of 
Belgium  because  they  see  in  it  a  powerful  bulwark 
against  France,  by  far  the  greater  number  desire  its 
acquisition  because  the  Belgian  harbours  would  increase 
Germany's  sea  power  and  its  offensive  strength  against 
England.  Professor  Doctor  Max  Apt  wrote,  for  in- 
stance, in  Zwischen  Krieg  und  Frieden,  published  in 
Leipzig  in  1914  (Grumbach,  p.  284)  : 

"As  Germany,  notwithstanding  its  peacefulness,  has 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  BELGIUM        85 

not  been  spared  this  terrible  ordeal,  we  must  with  the 
utmost  energy  and  without  compunction  exploit  the 
victories  of  our  armies  to  the  full.  We  must  not  give 
up  the  strong  positions  which  we  hope  to  conquer  on 
the  north  coast  of  Belgium  and  in  France,  because 
their  possession  alone  will  guarantee  Germany's  future 
development  as  a  world  and  sea  Power.  The  question 
whether  Belgium  should  be  annexed  or  not  should  be 
subordinated  to  higher  considerations.  The  annexa- 
tion of  Belgium  would  have  to  be  considered  not  as 
an  expansion  of  Germany's  territory,  but  only  from 
the  point  of  view  whether  annexation  is  necessary  in 
order  to  be  able  to  hold  the  conquered  coast  districts. 
If  it  is  strategically  necessary,  we  must  annex  Belgium 
even  if  we  do  not  desire  it." 

The  Preussische  Kreuzzeitung  wrote  on  March  24th, 
1915  (Grumbach,  p.  59)  : 

"  Belgium's  re-establishment  would  not  merely 
create  the  same  state  of  affairs  which  obtained  before 
the  war,  but  would  make  the  position  materially  worse. 
At  the  commencement  of  a  new  war  the  combined 
armies  of  the  three  States  would  invade  the  Rhenish 
Province.  .  .  . 

"  We  are  of  opinion  that  the  possession  of  the  Belgian 
coasts  would  place  into  our  hands  an  instrument  of 
power  which  we  cannot  abandon.  Without  these  Ger- 
many would  be  considerably  weakened  in  case  of  a 
future  war  with  England,  with  which  we  ought  to  reckon 
with  certainty.  " 

Professor  Doctor  Martin  Spahn  wrote  in  Im  Kampf 


86      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

um   unsere   Zukunft,   M.    Gladbach    1915    (Grumbach, 
P-  350) : 

"  It  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  German  people  to  strive 
beyond  the  limits  of  its  present  power.  Rightly  con- 
sidered, it  has  never  fitted  into  the  narrow  circumstances 
of  the  Western  Continent  as  a  State  among  other  States. 
A  thousand  years  ago  the  Germans  became  the  bearers 
of  the  Empire  of  the  West.  .  .  . 

"  Our  frontier  towards  France  was  in  the  Middle 
Ages  farther  westward  than  it  is  now.  .  .  .  However, 
far  more  important  than  the  correction  of  the  German- 
French  frontier  is  the  question  of  the  future  of  the 
mouths  of  the  Rhine,  as  far  as  that  territory  directly 
faces  the  English  coast.  The  corresponding  question 
arises  what  limits  should  be  put  to  the  Great  Serbian 
aspirations.  May  Belgium  remain  an  English  strong- 
hold on  the  Continent?  ...  If  we  and  England  were 
placed  coast  against  coast,  Germany  would  be  England's 
equal.  " 

In  Kontinentalpolitik  by  "A  Large  Rhenish  Manu- 
facturer, "  published  in  Bonn  in  1915,  we  read  (Grum- 
bach, p.  330) : 

"  Belgium  is  in  German  hands.  The  treacherous 
way  in  which  Belgium  sold  itself  to  France  and  England 
behind  Germany's  back  and  gave  up  its  neutrality 
does  not  allow  compassion  for  this  country.  England 
has  created  Belgium,  and  has  now  become  its 
executioner.  One  thing  is  certain:  We  shall  not  give 
up  the  coast  with  its  valuable  harbours  which  make 
us  England's  direct  neighbours  on  the  other  side  of  the 
big  ditch.  .  .  . 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  BELGIUM         87 

"  We  shall  do  a  great  service  to  the  Russians  proper 
if  we  confine  them  after  a  lost  war — a  lesson  which 
they  absolutely  required  for  curing  them  of  their 
megalomania — to  districts  inhabited  by  a  homo- 
geneous population  with  whom  all  the  nations  will  be 
at  peace. " 

Some  Germans  demand  the  incorporation  of  Belgium 
into  Germany,  not  only  in  order  to  obtain  a  position 
whence  France  may  be  invaded  and  England  more  easily 
be  attacked,  but  also  because  the  acquisition  of  Belgium 
would  bring  with  it  that  of  the  Congo  State,  which 
would  furnish  an  admirable  basis  for  striking  at  the 
French  and  British  possessions  in  Africa.  Herr  Alfred 
Ruhemann  wrote,  for  instance,  on  October  7th,  1914,  in 
the  well-known  weekly  Die  Grenzboten,  which  is  fre- 
quently governmentally  inspired,  under  the  heading 
"The  Belgian  Problem"  (Grumbach,  p.  187): 

"  In  redrawing  the  map  of  Europe  we  must  remember 
that  the  Belgians  do  not  sufficiently  exploit  the  natural 
wealth  of  their  country,  that  we  have  in  England  an 
interested  and  dangerous  rival  in  the  Belgian  market, 
and  that  in  future  we  must  in  Belgium  not  again  stumble 
over  the  English. 

'  The  demand  has  been  put  forward  that  Germany 
should  act  thoroughly  and  incorporate  Belgium  with 
the  Empire  as  a  punishment  for  its  breach  of  neutrality. 
In  that  case  many  Belgians  would  presumably  prefer 
to  emigrate  to  France  or  England.  That  would  be  an 
advantage  for  Germanising  the  country.  I  am  firmly 
convinced  that  the  Belgians,  both  Walloons  and  Flemish, 
who  remained  would  soon  submit  to  German  organisa- 
tion, discipline,  and  civilisation,  particularly  if  they 
should  find  out  that,  owing  to  the  introduction  of  the 


88      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

German  coinage,  their  earnings  should  be  increased  by 
20  per  cent.  However,  Belgian  taxation  might  have  to 
be  raised  under  German  rule. 

"  It  would  have  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  Bel- 
gium there  is  scarcely  any  room  for  German  emigrants, 
for  Belgium  is  the  most  densely  populated  land  in 
Europe.  .  .  . 

"  I  have  already  pointed  out  the  importance  of 
Antwerp  and  of  the  Belgian  coast.  The  acquisition  of 
Belgium  would  render  up  to  Germany  the  huge  African 
Congo  State.  If,  at  the  same  time,  Morocco  was  taken 
away  from  France,  Germany  would  at  last  possess  a 
Central  African  Empire,  having  access  to  three  seas, 
an  Empire  which  we  ought  to  have  acquired  long  ago, 
and  which  is  necessary  for  us  in  order  to  break  England's 
power  in  Africa.  .  .  . 

"  The  desire  which  has  been  expressed  in  Germany 
that  Belgium  should  under  no  circumstances  be  allowed 
to  preserve  its  present  shape  is  justified.  It  is  a*  matter 
of  course  that  Liege,  which  has  been  conquered  at 
such  heavy  sacrifice,  should  not  be  given  up.  The 
province  of  Liege  is  economically  extremely  important, 
and  it  adjoins  directly  the  industrial  districts  of  the 
Rhenish  Provinces.  Militarily,  it  would  constitute  an 
unconquerable  bulwark  against  France,  for  it  domi- 
nates the  whole  of  the  Ardennes.  Besides,  it  may  be 
argued  that,  as  Antwerp  owes  its  prosperity  to  German 
intelligence  and  German  industry,  it  should  be  incor- 
porated in  Germany  as  a  matter  of  justice.  It  cannot 
be  doubted  that,  under  German  control,  Antwerp  would 
soon  become  the  greatest  European  harbour.  The  Bel- 
gian coast,  with  Antwerp  and  Liege,  might  be  taken 
from  Belgium,  leaving  to  the  country  the  coal  district 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  BELGIUM         89 

as  its  only  resource,  and  allow  that  part  to  survive  as  a 
buffer  State  against  France. 

"  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
Holland  and  Luxemburg  adjoin  Belgium,  and  that  both 
these  States  have  preserved  their  neutrality  although 
they  do  not  love  Germany. " 


CHAPTER  IX 
GERMANY'S  WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  FRANCE 

EXTRACTS  illustrating  Germany's  war  aims  regarding 
France  will  be  found  not  only  in  the  present  chapter, 
but  also  in  many  others.  A  full  list  of  these  extracts 
is  contained  in  the  Analytical  Index  at  the  end  of  this 
book. 

Many  Germans,  animated  by  a  spirit  of  deep  ani- 
mosity and  blind  hatred,  advocate  that  France  should 
be  humbled  to  the  dust,  that  it  should  be  treated  with 
the  utmost  severity,  that  it  should  be  reduced  to  a  Power 
of  the  third  or  fourth  rank.  For  instance,  Doctor  Albert 
Bovenschen  wrote  in  Deutschland  an  der  Zeitenwende, 
Leipzig,  1916  (Grumbach,  p.  357)  : 

"  It  would  be  foolish  sentimentality  did  we  not  do 
everything  in  our  power  to  defeat  France  in  such  a 
manner  with  our  armies  that  that  country  will  never 
again  dare  to  act  as  a  disturber  of  the  peace.  France 
will  never  forget  that  the  German  Empire  has  been 
erected  upon  the  ruins  of  the  French  l  gloire. '  There- 
fore it  will  continue  to  side  with  Germany's  enemies 
unless  it  should  decline  and  become  a  State  of  the  third  \ 
or  fourth  rank. 

"  Russia  must  not  be  allowed  to  retain  its  former 
frontiers,  but  must  be  limited  to  its  true  Great  Russian 
kernel.  Its  face  must  be  turned  towards  the  East.  " 

90 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  FRANCE          91 

While  some  Germans  passionately  advocate  that 
France  should  be  destroyed  as  a  Great  Power,  that 
that  country  should  be  treated  without  mercy  and 
without  consideration,  other  Germans,  taking  a  larger 
view  of  political  matters,  desire  Germany  to  conclude 
a  generous  peace  with  that  country,  ally  Germany 
with  France,  and  employ  France  as  a  German  vassal 
against  Germany's  enemies.  For  instance,  the  well- 
known  Liberal  leader  Herr  Friedrich  Naumann,  the 
author  of  the  much-discussed  book  on  Central  Europe, 
wrote  in  Der  Deutsche  Krieg,  Berlin,  1914  (Grumbach, 
p.  288)  : 

"  It  is  possible — let  us  say  no  more  than  this — it  is 
possible  that  France,  bending  under  the  material  and 
moral  sufferings  inflicted  upon  it,  frees  itself  in  the 
midst  of  the  present  war  from  the  disastrous  policy 
of  alliances  which  it  has  followed  hitherto.  If  this 
should  be  the  case,  then,  but  only  then,  we  must  build 
for  the  French  bridges  of  gold.  We  must  act  approxi- 
mately in  the  same  manner  in  which  Bismarck  acted 
in  1866  towards  the  Austrians.  At  the  time  his  action 
was  considered  to  be  due  to  weakness.  Yet  it  was  an 
expression  of  strength.  It  was  one  of  the  best  and 
greatest  of  Bismarck's  actions.  ...  At  present  the 
French  need  pay  only  a  war  indemnity  in  respect  of 
their  own  war,  supposing  they  conclude  peace.  If  they 
should  continue  fighting,  and  if  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  should  remain  victorious,  they  would  have  to 
pay  the  Russian  war  indemnity  as  well.  At  the  present 
moment  the  effect  of  this  additional  exaction  cannot 
be  expressed  in  land  and  territory.  However,  the  fact 
itself  is  perfectly  clear.  " 

Herr   Naumann    alludes    to   the    fact   that    Bismarck 


92       GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

could  conclude  an  alliance  with  Austria,  having  treated 
that  country  comparatively  leniently  after  its  defeat. 

The  idea  of  making  a  comparatively  generous  peace 
with  France  on  the  condition,  or  at  least  under  the  pre- 
sumption, that  France  would  consent  to  ally  itself  with 
Germany  and  against  Germany's  opponents,  was  ex- 
pressed more  plainly  by  the  eminent  political  writer 
Doctor  Paul  Rohrbach.  He  wrote  in  Zum  Weltvolk 
hindurch,  Stuttgart,  1915  (Grumbach,  p.  301): 

•   •  -7       >•• 

"  Russia  and  England,  claiming  universal  dominion, 
are  necessarily  Germany's  irreconcilable  opponents 
until  their  power  has  been  broken.  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  may  ally  themselves  easily  with 
France,  but  never  with  England  or  Russia.  Germany 
and  France  combined  would  be  able  to  embark  upon 
a  truly  great  policy  in  Europe  and  oversea.  Of  course, 
the  colonial  question  would  have  to  be  comprehensively 
regulated,  especially  with  France.  The  French  would 
have  to  give  up  in  tropical  Africa  large  districts,  but 
for  these  they  might  receive  compensation  without  diffi- 
culty. .  .  . 

"  When  the  French  have  been  defeated  we  shall  be 
ready  to  make  peace  and  to  co-operate  with  them 
politically.  Towards  England  our  maxim  will  be  the 
destruction  of  the  English  domination  of  the  sea.  To- 
wards Russia,  the  destruction  of  Czarism.  " 

Some  Germans  are  so  anxious  to  detach  France  from 
the  Alliance  and  to  attach  it  to  Germany  that  they 
have  spoken  of  the  Franco-German  War  in  tones  of 
anguish  and  distress.  They  have  praised  France  for 
her  gallantry,  and  have  expressed  regret  that  she  has 
been  misguided  enough  to  attack  Germany,  although 
England  is  the  true  enemy  of  that  country.  For  in- 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  FRANCE          93 

stance,  Professor  G.  von  Schultze-Gaevernitz,  a  leading 
German  economist,  whose  name  is  widely  known  in 
France,  wrote  in  La  Mer  Libre,  Stuttgart,  1915  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  307) : 

"  Germany  considers  it  contrary  to  civilisation  that 
a  single  Power  should  freely  dispose  of  the  world's 
trade,  be  ready  to  strike  at  the  heart  of  other  nations, 
and  bring  starvation  and  misery  into  the  humblest 
homes.  Germany  fights  for  the  liberty  of  the  seas,  for 
mankind  in  general,  and,  therefore,  also  for  France. 
Germany  does  not  aim  at  supremacy  on  the  sea,  but 
only  at  a  maritime  balance  of  power.  .  .  .  Germany, 
being  an  industrial  and  creditor  State,  demands  suffi- 
cient territory  not  too  far  away  from  the  homeland. 
The  Belgian  Congo  would  fulfil  this  double  need  with- 
out compromising  the  colonial  interests  either  of  France 
or  of  England. " 

The  Professor's  essay,  though  published  in  Germany, 
was  printed  in  French.  The  reason  for  this  is  obvious. 

Some  Germans  advocate  that  Germany  should  tear 
away  from  France  the  north-eastern  districts,  whence 
both  Paris  and  London  could  be  dominated.  For  in- 
stance, Herr  Konrad  von  Winterstetten  wrote  in  Der 
Organische  Aufbau  Europas,  Berlin,  1916  (Grumbach, 
P-  367)  : 

"If  it  is  our  war  aim  to  give  Germany  permanent 
security  from  France  and  to  establish  the  freedom  of 
the  seas,  then  North-Eastern  France  up  to  the  mouth 
of  the  Somme — that  is,  up  to  the  line  Vignacourt- 
Bapaume- Verdun- St.  Mihiel-Pont  a  Mousson  must  be 
annexed  to  Germany,  as  a  considerable  number  of 
eminent  politicians  have  demanded.  When  this  has 


94      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

been  achieved,  Paris  and  London  will  be  compelled  to 
act  as  good  neighbours  to  us.  There  is  no  other  possi- 
bility to  force  England  to  keep  the  peace  honestly. 
Hence  the  creation  of  this  frontier  and  the  acquisition 
of  Belfort  and  surroundings  for  the  protection  of  South 
Germany  is  thoroughly  justified.  This  is  by  no  means 
an  arbitrary  conquest.  It  must  be  considered  as  the 
minimum  of  security.  No  words  need  be  lost  about 
the  attaching  of  Belgium  to  Central  Europe.  That  is  a 
matter  of  course.  Linguistically  the  majority  of  the 
inhabitants  belong  to  Central  Europe. 

"  Similarly,  the  geographical  frontier  in  the  south- 
west must  be  extended  so  that  Trieste  will  be  safe  from 
hostile  attack.  Upper  Venetia,  up  to  a  line  from  the 
southern  end  of  the  Lago  di  Garda  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Piave  is  indispensable  to  Austria. " 

While  some  Germans  wish  to  humble  France  to  the 
dust,  or  to  make  it  a  German  vassal,  others,  who  look 
upon  matters  rather  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
economist  than  from  that  of  the  statesman  or  the 
soldier,  think  that  Germany's  principal  war  aims  with 
regard  to  France  should  consist  in  acquiring  the  vast 
coal  and  iron  ore  deposits  which  occur  in  North- 
Eastern  France  and  in  neighbouring  Belgium.  For 
instance,  the  well-known  economist  Professor  Schu- 
macher, following  closely  the  arguments  given  in  great 
length  in  the  Petition  of  the  Six  Great  Economic  Asso- 
ciations of  Germany,  which  is  printed  in  full  in  Chapter 
III  of  this  book,  stated  in  a  lecture  delivered  on  June 
2Oth,  1915,  which  was  circulated  as  a  pamphlet  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  172)  : 

"The  whole  western  frontier  of  Germany,  from 
south  to  north,  must  be  improved  as  far  as  circum- 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  FRANCE          95 

stances  permit.  It  is  no  less  important  to  provide  for 
the  German  war  industries  upon  which  successful  war- 
fare must  be  based.  We  must  protect  these  against  the 
danger  of  destruction  with  all  our  power.  Our  frontier 
must  so  be  drawn  that  the  great  iron- works  of  Lor- 
raine, which  at  present  are  indispensable  for  producing 
our  war  material  and  which  will  be  still  more  indis- 
pensable to  us  in  the  future,  will  be  beyond  the  reach 
of  modern  long-distance  guns  in  the  French  fortresses. 
Before  all,  we  must  secure  for  Germany  the  possession 
of  the  raw  materials  necessary  for  the  war  industries, 
and  at  the  same  time  deprive  our  enemies  of  the  pos- 
session of  these. 

"  The  iron  deposits  are  most  important.  Without 
the  minette  ore  of  Lorraine  we  cannot  maintain  our 
iron  and  steel  production  on  a  scale  sufficiently  large 
for  the  conduct  of  the  war.  Happily,  we  can  boast 
of  the  possession  of  the  largest  iron  deposits  in  Europe. 
These  we  have  obtained  in  consequence  of  the  victori- 
ous war  of  1870-1871.  The  Peace  of  Frankfort  was  to 
give  Germany  the  entire  iron  ore  deposits  of  Lorraine. 
We  did  not  succeed  in  getting  them  because  the  geolo- 
gists, whom  Bismarck  consulted  at  the  time  when  the 
frontier  was  delimited,  made  a  mistake.  Since  the 
eighties  we  know  that  the  larger  portion  of  the  ore 
deposits  of  the  plateau  of  Briey  has  been  left  to  France, 
though  Bismarck  imagined  that  the  bulk  of  the  iron 
ore  had  been  obtained  by  Germany.  To-day  we  can 
rectify  that  serious  error  because,  happily,  Germany 
seized  the  French  ore  district  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  and  is  holding  it  firmly  in  its  grasp. 

"  Second  in  importance  for  Germany's  war  industries 
is  coal,  especially  that  kind  of  coal  which  can  readily 


96      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

be  converted  into  coke  and  which  yields  the  principal 
explosives.  We  could  not  continue  the  war  success- 
fully if  we  did  not  obtain  the  necessary  supply  of  iron 
ore  from  the  soil  of  Lorraine,  and  we  could  also  not 
hope  to  succeed  had  not  nature  endowed  Germany,  and 
particularly  the  Rhenish  Province  and  Westphalia,  and 
the  neighbouring  districts  of  Belgium  and  North  France, 
with  excellent  coke-coal.  Similar  quantities  of  that 
precious  raw  material  do  not  occur  elsewhere  in  Europe, 
and  their  quality  is  of  the  best.  Now,  when  we  have 
learned  how  important  the  question  of  munitions  is  for 
the  issue  of  the  war,  and  when  we  are  already  com- 
pelled to  employ  Belgian  coal  for  Germany's  own  re- 
quirements, we  must  declare  that  the  vital  needs  of  the 
German  national  in  war  and  in  peace  make  it  impossible 
to  render  up  once  more  to  the  enemy  these  mainsprings 
of  military  and  economic  power. 

"If  we  wish  to  secure  the  wealth  of  the  soil,  the 
mere  political  possession  of  the  new  territory  is  not 
sufficient.  On  the  contrary,  we  must  connect  with  their 
political  incorporation  the  entire  disposal  of  the  econ- 
omic factors  which  can  be  converted  into  power.  Nowa- 
days, an  increase  of  territory  means  a  real  increase  of 
strength  only  for  the  national  war  industries  if  the 
properties  acquired  are  entirely  at  one's  disposal. 

"  In  order  to  obtain  the  necessary  control  of  the  in- 
dustries established  on  land  which  hitherto  was  French, 
the  indemnification  for  the  properties  which  must  be 
acquired  should  be  part  of  the  war  indemnity  which 
France  will  have  to  pay.  France,  which  has  so  often 
boasted  that  it  is  the  banker  of  the  world,  will  have 
to  employ  its  financial  strength  in  the  first  place  for 
repairing  the  economic  damage  done.  We  must  not 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  FRANCE          97 

hesitate  to  place  upon  France  a  burden  which  presses 
the  country  down  to  the  utmost  If  it  wishes  for  relief, 
it  may  obtain  it  from  its  Allies  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Channel,  whose  wealth  can  scarcely  be  directly  touched. 
As  we  have  to  reckon  in  the  first  place  with  France 
for  obtaining  a  war  indemnity  in  money,  we  must  retain 
only  so  much  French  soil  as  is  absolutely  required  for 
our  security. " 


CHAPTER  X 
GERMANY'S  WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  ENGLAND 

GERMANY'S  war  aims  with  regard  to  England  are  ex- 
plained, not  only  in  the  present  chapter,  but  also  in 
many  passages  which  have  necessarily  been  included  in 
other  chapters  of  this  volume.  A  few  principal  opinions 
are  given  in  the  next  few  pages.  Those  who  wish  to 
study  the  remaining  important  references  to  England 
and  the  British  Empire  should  turn  for  guidance  to 
the  Index  at  the  end  of  this  book.  Germany's  war 
aims  with  regard  to  the  oversea  portions  of  the  British 
Empire  will  particularly  be  found  in  Chapters  XIII, 
XIV,  XV,  and  XVI,  which  treat  of  Germany's  colonial 
war  aims,  Germany's  war  aims  in  the  Far  East,  and  of 
world-conquest. 

Some  Germans,  writing  with  severe  self-restraint, 
advocate  merely  in  a  vague  and  general  way  that 
Germany  must,  in  consequence  of  the  war,  secure  for 
itself  such  a  powerful  position  with  regard  to  England 
that  it  need  no  longer  fear  an  English  attack  and  will 
be  able  to  enforce  and  maintain  the  freedom  of  the 
sea.  For  instance,  Freiherr  von  Mackay,  a  former 
diplomat,  who  writes  frequently  in  periodicals  and  in 
the  Press  on  matters  of  statesmanship,  stated  in  the 
Magdeburgische  Zeitung  of  January  4th,  1916  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  167) : 

"  If  Germany  wishes  to  enjoy  the  right  of  freedom 
on  the  sea,  then  it  must  leave  the  narrow  corner  where 

98 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  ENGLAND        99 

the  Elbe  falls  into  the  North  Sea  which  prevents  its 
breathing.  It  must  conquer  a  favourable  broad  front 
on  the  North  Sea  up  to  the  Channel.  There  lie  the 
keys  of  the  problem  of  the  freedom  of  the  sea.  That 
territory  it  must  conquer  and  secure  for  itself  militarily, 
politically,  juridically. " 

The  National  Liberal  Deputy,  Fuhrmann,  wrote  in 
the  Tagllche  Rundschau  of  August  2ist,  1915  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  79) : 

"  In  days  of  hatred  and  in  days  of  calm  reflection 
Germany  remains  convinced  that  peace  is  possible 
between  Germany  and  England  only  on  a  base  estab- 
lished by  fighting,  a  base  which  strengthens  so  greatly 
militarily,  politically,  and  economically  Germany's 
position  in  Europe  and  in  the  world,  on  the  free  seas 
and  in  our  future  Colonial  Empire,  that  any  further 
English  attack  would  in  advance  be  condemned  to 
failure. " 

While  some  Germans  declare,  with  philosophic  de- 
tachment that  something  must  be  done  to  strengthen 
Germany's  position  as  against  England  and  to  make 
another  English  attack  on  Germany  impossible,  others 
put  forward  more  definite  proposals,  and  some  adopt 
a  truly  Napoleonic  tone,  and  demand,  in  the  very  words 
used  by  the  Great  Corsican,  that  Belgium  must  become 
a  military  base  for  use  against  England  and  Antwerp 
a  pistol  aimed  at  England's  breast.  For  instance,  the 
Leipzig er  Neueste  Nachrichten,  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant German  dailies,  wrote  editorially  on  March  24th, 
1915  (Grumbach,  p.  80)  : 

"  We    must    obtain    the    aim    which    the    Imperial 


ioo      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

Chancellor  has  indicated  in  his  speech  in  the  Reichstag. 
We  must  be  protected  for  all  future  against  attack.  We 
require  an  increment  of  power.  We  require,  before 
all,  an  outlet  from  the  '  Wet  Triangle '  to  the  sea,  we 
require  a  pistol  aimed  at  England's  breast — Antwerp. 
Otherwise  the  old  trouble  will  continue.  " 


Many  similar  demands  will  be  found  throughout  the 
present  volume.  They  can  be  easily  located  by  refer- 
ring to  the  title  "  Belgium "  in  the  Index  at  the  back 
of  the  book. 

While  some  Germans  consider  that,  with  regard  to 
England,  it  is  most  important  that  Germany  should 
dominate  the  Channel,  and  that  for  this  purpose  the 
Belgian,  and  a  large  portion  of  the  North-French, 
coast  should  be  annexed  to  Germany,  others  believe 
that  the  key  to  the  British  Empire  is  to  be  found  not 
at  Calais,  but  at  Suez,  that  Germany  should  strive  be- 
fore all  to  control  the  Suez  Canal  and  thus  control 
the  British  Empire.  Herr  Ernst  Jackh  wrote  in  Das 
Grossere  Deutschland  on  June  26th,  1915  (Grumbach, 
p.  226) : 

"  Calais  lies  on  the  outer  circumference  of  the 
German  Empire.  Suez  lies  in  its  very  centre.  From 
Calais  England  can  be  molested  and  can  be  fired  upon. 
At  Suez  it  can  be  vanquished  and  killed.  The  seizure 
of  Calais  does  not  affect  England.  It  touches  merely 
the  south  coast  and  does  not  touch  in  any  way  the 
vast  Empire  itself.  It  threatens  only  one  of  the  roads 
which  lead  to  England.  Suez  is  the  only  direct  con- 
nection of  European  England  and  the  African,  Asiatic, 
and  Australian  portions  of  the  British  world-empire. 
Here  the  vital  nerve  can  be  struck  at.  Calais  is  a  blow 
with  the  fist  which  stuns.  At  Suez  we  can  stab  England 


WAR  AIMS  REGADING:.  ^NG^A^P;  /  101 

through  the  heart  and  kill  it.     Therefore  Suez  is  an 
aim  which  is  most  strongly  to  be  desired. 

"  The  world-war  is  now  being  fought  for  securing 
the  territories  situated  between  the  Dardanelles  and 
Suez,  for  organising  a  wealthy  and  powerful  Turkey, 
for  securing  the  growing  Germany  against  England's 
hostility,  for  threatening  permanently  the  centre  of  Eng- 
land's world-power  about,  or  in,  Suez. " 

The  distinguished  publicist,  Doctor  Paul  Rohrbach, 
who  enjoys  great  prestige  in  Germany,  wrote  in  Das 
Grosser e  Deutschland  on  September  nth,  1915  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  225)  : 

"  Many  people  say :  '  Of  course  it  is  impossible  to 
destroy  England's  power  in  a  single  war. '  That  is 
not  impossible,  but  is  quite  feasible.  That  may  be 
done  in  Egypt.  The  construction  of  the  Suez  Canal 
was  England's  misfortune.  English  statesmanship 
foresaw  the  danger.  Hence  it  opposed  its  building. 
.  .  .  When  the  English  troops  in  Egypt  capitulate 
to  the  Turks  the  blow  will  resound  from  Gibraltar  to 
Singapore.  When  the  keystone  is  withdrawn  the  whole 
vault  of  English  world-power  will  tumble  down.  The 
day  on  which  England  recognises  its  downfall  in  Egypt 
and  in  the  world  will,  unless  it  asks  in  time  for  peace 
and  declares  its  readiness  to  pay  the  price  demanded, 
be  the  birthday  of  the  new  Oversea  Germany.  On  that 
day  we  shall  write  our  gratitude  to  our  brave  colonial 
warriors  upon  the  map  of  the  world,  and  we  shall  set 
our  border-stones  upon  territories  across  the  sea  wherever 
we  want. " 

Doctor  Paul  Rohrbach  is  not  only  one  of  the  leading 


102      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

German  authors  and  journalists  who  deal  with  politics, 
and  especially  with  world-politics,  but  he  has  travelled 
very  largely,  and  he  has  been  entrusted  with  Govern- 
ment missions,  etc.  At  one  time  he  acted  as  Imperial 
Commissioner  in  South-West  Africa.  His  opinion 
should,  therefore,  not  be  treated  as  that  of  an  ordinary 
journalist. 

Some  Germans  wish  not  merely  that  Germany  should 
dominate  the  Suez  Canal  and  drive  the  English  out  of 
Egypt,  but  they  advocate  that  English  merchant  shipping 
should  not  be  allowed  to  make  use  of  the  Suez  Canal 
in  peace  time.  Doctor  Carl  Anton  Schafer  wrote  in 
Das  Grosser e  Deutschland  on  November  6th,  1915 
(Grumbach,  p.  228) : 

"  As  soon  as  we  have  the  Suez  Canal  in  our  hands 
we  can  say,  answering  the  Morning  Post:  '  We  for- 
bid you,  England,  to  make  use  of  the  Suez  Canal  with 
your  merchant  marine  even  in  peace  time.  .  .  . '  We 
must  never  allow  England  to  wrest  from  our  hand  the 
Egyptian  scourge  by  diplomatic  trickery.  Our  ceterum 
censeo  must  be  the  maxim :  '  We  must  conquer  the  Suez 
Canal. ' " 

The  distinguished  economist,  Professor  Doctor  Her- 
mann Schumacher,  who  teaches  at  Bonn  University, 
stated  in  a  lecture  delivered  on  June  2oth,  1916,  which 
was  later  on  circulated  in  the  form  of  a  pamphlet 
(Grumbach,  p.  171)  : 

"  We  must  have  Belgium,  not  only  for  the  protection 
of  the  German  Homeland,  but  also  for  the  protection 
of  our  world-trade  and  of  our  colonies.  We  cannot 
deprive  England  of  the  geographical  advantage  of  its 
insular  position.  It  will  always  be  difficult  for  us  to 
attack  it  with  our  armies  as  long  as  the  English  remain 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  ENGLAND       103 

on  their  islands.  But  we  can  increase  the  possibility 
of  attacking  it  by  sea.  If  we  permanently  establish 
ourselves  on  the  coast  opposite  England  which  has  so 
often  been  fought  for,  if  we  establish  ourselves  either 
at  Zeebrugge  or  farther  west,  at  the  opening  of  the 
English  Channel  and  of  the  Atlantic  at  a  spot  opposite 
the  mouth  of  the  Thames  and  of  England's  capital, 
and  station  there  entire  fleets  of  torpedo-boats,  sub- 
marines, and  flying  machines  which  are  always  ready 
for  war,  then  the  advantages  of  England's  insular  posi- 
tion will  gradually  be  balanced  to  an  ever-increasing 
degree  by  corresponding  disadvantages.  Thus  we  can, 
with  one  blow,  materially  improve  our  position  as  against 
the  English  Fleet. 

"  England's  position  in  the  world's  trade  is  based  not 
so  much  upon  her  vast  colonial  possessions  as  upon 
the  domination  of  the  principal  trade-routes  of  the  globe 
which  lead  from  the  English  coast  to  the  Mediterranean 
and  the  Suez  Canal,  and  thence  to  the  Red  Sea,  to 
India,  to  Australia,  and  to  Eastern  Asia.  On  this  im- 
portant route  England  has  placed  her  sentinels  long 
ago.  We  shall  scarcely  be  able  to  drive  it  out  of  these 
positions,  but  we  must  follow  its  wise  example.  It  is 
not  impossible  that  we  may  obtain  from  France  and 
from  Italy,  and  with  the  assistance  of  Turkey,  harbours 
by  the  position  of  which  the  English  bases  on  the  great 
trade-route  described  may  be  checkmated.  I  think,  for 
instance,  of  French  Somaliland  at  the  southern  opening 
of  the  Red  Sea,  with  Djibutil  which  lies  opposite  Aden, 
of  a  harbour  in  North  Morocco  opposite  Gibraltar,  of 
a  Turkish  base  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  situated 
as  near  as  possible  to  the  Suez  Canal.  It  is  a  question 
to  be  considered  whether  such  positions  should  forth- 


104      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

with  be  converted  into  harbours  for  the  use  of  Germany's 
merchant  marine  and  into  bases  for  her  submarines. 
However,  such  positions  should  be  acquired  whenever 
an  opportunity  offers  as  long  as  the  English  bases  are 
not  effectively  neutralised. " 

There  are  many  references  to  Germany's  war  aims 
in  the  direction  of  India,  Eastern  Asia,  and  the  British 
world-empire  as  a  whole  throughout  the  present  book. 
They  will  be  found  particularly  in  Chapters  XIII,  XIV, 
XV,  and  XVI,  but  for  a  full  list  of  the  references  the 
Alphabetical  Index  should  be  consulted. 


CHAPTER  XI 

GERMANY'S  WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  RUSSIA  AND 
POLAND 

PRUSSO-GERMANY'S  Polish  policy  and  that  country's 
Russian  policy  are  closely  interwoven.  Since  the  time 
of  Frederick  the  Great,  Prussia's  Polish  policy  has  been 
part  of  its  Russian  policy  and  the  former  has  been  sub- 
ordinated to  the  latter.  Therefore  Germany's  war  aims 
towards  Russia  and  towards  Poland  should  not  be  treated 
separately  but  jointly. 

In  Germany,  the  land  of  specialisation,  some  ex- 
pansionists occupy  themselves  with  the  western 
countries,  some  with  the  countries  oversea,  and  some 
with  the  Eastern  States.  Herr  Georg  Cleinow  has 
specialised  in  Russian  and  Polish  affairs  on  which  he 
has  written  compendiously  and  more  or  less  pro- 
foundly. He  is  supposed  to  be  perhaps  the  highest 
authority  on  Russian,  and  especially  on  Polish,  affairs. 
In  addition  to  being  a  distinguished  author  and 
journalist,  he  is  the  editor  of  the  famous  weekly  Die 
Grenzboten,  a  periodical  which  has  very  frequently 
been  inspired  by  the  German  Government  both  in  Bis- 
marck's time  and  afterwards.  It  is  no  doubt  the  fore- 
most political  German  weekly.  Herr  Cleinow  wrote 
in  Die  Vernichtung  der  englischen  Weltmacht  und  des 
Russischen  Zarismus,  published  in  Berlin  in  1915  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  281)  : 

''  The  German  language  frontier  must,  with  the  help 
of  Germans,  Letts,  Esthonians,  Jews,  Lithuanians,  and 

105 


io6      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

Poles,  be  pushed  several  hundred  kilometres  farther  to- 
wards the  East.  " 


The  idea  of  many  Germans,  especially  of  those  who 
take  an  interest  in  Russian  and  Polish  affairs,  is  that 
Germany  should  not  merely  push  her  frontiers  "  several 
hundred  kilometres  farther  towards  the  East,  "  that  it 
should  not  merely  push  Russia  towards  the  wilds  of 
Asia,  but  that  it  should,  in  addition,  dominate  the  Baltic 
Sea  and  convert  it  into  a  German  lake.  Herr  Axel 
Ripke,  the  editor  of  the  well-known  periodical  Der 
Panther,  wrote  in  Der  Kampf  um  die  Ostsee  (Grumbach, 
p.  281),  Berlin,  1915: 

"  Among  the  political  problems  which  have  apparently 
been  solved  a  long  time  ago,  but  which  nevertheless 
demand  to  be  solved  in  an  entirely  new  manner  during 
the  present  time  of  bloodshed,  the  foremost  position  is 
occupied  by  the  question  of  the  domination  of  the  Baltic. 
...  As  a  peaceful  condominion  of  the  Baltic  exercised 
jointly  by  the  Germans  and  the  Russians  is  impossible, 
it  is  necessary  to  establish  the  German  Imperium  also 
along  the  shores  of  the  Baltic  Sea.  Historical  experience 
indicates  the  way  by  which  such  imperialism  will  be 
achieved. " 

Doctor  Gaigalat,  a  member  of  the  Prussian  Diet, 
who  is  greatly  interested  in  Russian  affairs,  wrote  in 
Die  Grenzboten  of  February  24th,  1915  (Grumbach, 
p.  199): 

"Lithuania,  which  has  hitherto  been  Russian,  and 
which  has  about  3,300,000  inhabitants,  of  whom  at 
least  2,000,000  employ  the  Lithuanian  language, 
should  form  a  separate  State  and  should  form  a  wedge, 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  RUSSIA          107 

a  buffer  State,  between  the  Germanic  and  Slavonic 
worlds.  .  .  . 

"  The  province  of  East  Prussia  requires  necessarily 
a  hinterland.  .  .  .  The  fear  that  the  Lithuanians  of 
Prussia  would  attach  themselves  to  such  a  Lithuanian 
State  is  perfectly  unjustified.  .  .  . 

"  The  principal  thing  is  that  this  new  Lithuanian 
State  be  placed  into  intimate  connection  with  Germany. 
Its  army  must  be  put  under  German  command  and 
its  territory  must  become  part  of  the  German  Customs 
territory.  That  would  be  in  the  greatest  interest  of 
Lithuania  itself.  '  Only  then  would  the  Lithuanians 
have  reliable  security  for  their  freedom  and  be  able 
to  form  a  bulwark  against  the  insatiable  greed  of  pan- 
Slavism.  " 

While  Doctor  Gaigalat  modestly  demands  the  in- 
corporation in  Germany  of  Lithuania,  with  3,300,000 
inhabitants,  most  Germans  who  have  discussed  Ger- 
many's war  aims  with  regard  to  Russia  have  demanded 
that  not  only  the  tribes  of  the  Baltic  Provinces  but  the 
Finns,  the  Poles,  and  the  Ukrainians  as  well  should 
be  'detached  from  Russia,  that  Russia  should  be  cut 
off  from  the  sea,  that  the  Black  Sea,  belonging  to  the 
Ukrainian  sphere,  should  become  a  Ukrainian,  that 
is  an  Au*stro-German,  lake,  for  the  projected  State  of 
Ukrainia  was  intended  to  become  an  Austro-German 
Protectorate.  General  von  Gebsattel  raised  these 
demands  very  interestingly  in  the  periodical  Der 
Panther  in  October  1915.  His  article  is  noteworthy, 
not  only  because  of  the  demands  with  regard  to  Russia 
which  it  contains,  but  also  because  the  general  frankly 
admits  that  Germany  had  gone  to  war  not  because 
the  war  was  "  forced  upon "  the  country,  as  the 
Government  has  unceasingly  asserted,  but  because 
Germany  thought  the  war  necessary  and  opened  it, 


io8      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

selecting  the  most  favourable  moment.    He  wrote  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  207)  : 

"  We  have  desired  the  war  because  we  thought  it 
necessary,  and  because  we  were  aware  that  a  war  is 
most  easily  fought  and  is  least  sanguinary  the  earlier 
and  the  more  determinedly  it  is  waged.  There  is 
an  advantage  in  selecting  the  favourable  moment  for 
war. 

"  We  must  turn  the  stiff-necked  Russian's  face  to- 
ward the  East  even  if  in  the  process  some  of  his  vertebrae 
should  be  broken.  We  must  tear  away  Russia's  frontier 
wall  and  convert  it  into  a  wall  for  the  protection  of 
Europe.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  that  will  be  possible 
when  Russia  is  beaten.  We  may  assume  that  the  non- 
Russian  people  of  Russia,  the  Poles,  the  Ukrainians, 
the  Finns,  and  even  the  Lithuanians,  will  rather  live  in 
a  State  of  their  own  that  under  the  Russian  knout. 
One  would  have  to  revise  Russia's  historical  develop- 
ment during  the  last  two  centuries  and  re-establish  the 
status  quo  of  the  Russian  Colossus  which  obtained  be- 
fore the  advent  of  Peter  the  Great.  We  must  give  to 
Russia  that  position,  and  those  tasks,  which  agree  with 
its  half-Asiatic  character. 

"  The  German  nation  could,  of  course,  not  be  asked 
to  fight  for  the  freedom  or  for  the  political  indepen- 
dence of  the  Ukrainians,  the  Poles,  and  other  foreigners. 
German  blood  is  too  precious  for  that.  We  have  no 
lives  to  spare  for  crusades.  If  we  fight,  we  fight  for 
our  own  advantage,  and  if  we  fight  Russia  we  do  it 
in  order  to  obtain  that  which  the  nation  needs.  The 
German  people  must  not  be  allowed  to  decay  within  its 
narrow  boundaries.  .  .  . 

"  It   may  be   objected   that   the    seizure   of    land   on 


WAR  AIMS  REGARDING  RUSSIA          109 

our  western  frontier  will  give  Germany  millions  of 
foreigners  whose  presence  will  endanger  the  national 
character  of  the  State.  Such  a  development  must 
be  avoided  at  any  price.  The  way  how  this  can  be 
done  is  happily  shown  by  a  number  of  historic 
precedents.  It  is  notorious  that  the  Romans,  the 
greatest  practical  colonisers  of  antiquity,  considered 
the  forcible  transference  of  masses  of  population  a 
favourite  measure.  A  similar  proceeding  was  success- 
fully inaugurated  later  on  by  Charlemagne  and  dur- 
ing the  present  war  by  the  Hungarians  who  transferred 
tens  of  thousands  of  Serbians  away  from  their 
country. " 

Doctor  Adolf  Grabowsky  wrote  in  Die  Polmsche 
Frage,  published  in  Berlin  1916  (Grumbach,  p.  282)  : 

"  The  only  solution  is  an  Austro-German  condominium 
over  Russian  Poland.  'The  joint  dominion  of  Germany 
and  Austro-Hungary  over  Poland  satisfies  the  vital 
needs  of  the  Central  Powers.  It  unifies  the  Poles  in 
a  way  which  is  disadvantageous  neither  to  Germany  nor 
to  Austro-Hungary,  and  converts  Poland  into  a  wall 
of  protection  which  both  countries  require. " 

Doctor  Paul  Rohrbach  wrote  in  Das  Grossere 
Deutschland  on  July  loth,  1915  (Grumbach,  p. 
224): 

"  I  have  previously  shown  that  Europe's  freedom 
from  the  Russian  danger  will  be  established  only  when 
the  historic  dividing-line  between  Muscovy  and  the 
Ukraine  has  been  recreated.  Apart  from  this,  the  re- 
establishment  of  Poland  is  the  first  necessity.  Germany 


i  io      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

need  not  consider  the  acquisition  of  further  Polish  ter- 
ritory, for  by  such  acquisition  it  would  cease  to  be  a 
national  State.  The  matter  is  quite  different  with  regard 
to  the  three  Baltic  Provinces  of  Russia  and  with  regard 
to  Lithuania.  Colonists  for  peopling  these  provinces 
may  in  the  first  place  be  found  in  Russia  itself.  The 
German  peasants  living  in  Russia  number  about  2,000,000. 
The  lost  children  of  Germany  should  be  called  back  and 
be  settled  on  the  German  land.  " 


CHAPTER  XII 
GERMANY'S  AIMS  REGARDING  HOLLAND 

THE  previous  chapters  of  this  book  have  made  it  clear 
that  the  German  official  circles,  the  German  business 
men,  the  German  intellectuals,  the  majority  of  the  Ger- 
man Socialists  and  the  bulk  of  politicians,  writers,  etc., 
demand  the  incorporation  of  Belgium  into  Germany. 
All  the  references  regarding  Belgium  may  easily  be 
found  by  means  of  the  Alphabetical  Index.  Some  have 
been  collected  in  Chapter  VIII,  entitled  "Germany's  War 
Aims  regarding  Belgium.  " 

If  Belgium  should  become  part  of  the  German  Em- 
pire, Holland  would  be  completely  hemmed  in  on 
land  by  German  territory.  It  would  be  a  German 
enclave.  Its  situation  would  become  precarious,  for 
it  would  be  in  Germany's  power  both  politically  and 
economically.  Germany's  conquest  and  permanent 
retention  of  Belgium  would  obviously  menace  Holland's 
independence,  even  if  Germany  were  at  present  in- 
clined to  respect  it.  In  course  of  time  Germany  might 
feel  tempted  to  annex  Holland  as  well.  Unfortunately, 
that  desire  is  already  very  strong  in  influential  German 
circles. 

Holland  possesses  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine  and  of 
the  Scheldt.  The  Rhine  is  by  far  the  most  important 
German  river.  The  possession  of  Belgium  would  make 
the  Scheldt  also  a  German  river  and  Antwerp  a  Ger- 
man port.  Many  Germans  are  loth  to  see  the  Rhine 
mouths  possessed  and  the  Scheldt  mouth  dominated 

in 


ii2      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

by  the  Dutch.  Moreover,  those  Germans  who  desire 
Germany  to  become  a  great  colonial  Empire,  hope 
that  Holland  may,  in  some  way  or  other,  be  incor- 
porated into  Germany  in  consequence  of  the  war, 
because  that  country  would  supply  Germany  not  only 
with  excellent  harbours  but  with  valuable  Colonies  as 
well. 

Some  Germans  have  advocated  the  acquisition  of  Hol- 
land, and  have  recommended  it  on  sentimental  grounds. 
They  have  reminded  their  compatriots  that  Holland  at 
one  time  belonged  to  the  German  Empire,  and  that  the 
German  and  the  Dutch  races  are  closely  akin.  For 
instance,  Professor  Doctor  Rachfahl  wrote  in  March 
1916  in  the  Internationale  Monatsschrift  fur  Wissen- 
schaft,  Kunst,  und  Technik  (Grumbach,  p.  338) : 

"  Rejuvenated  Germany  has  again  drawn  into  her 
arms  Alsace  and  part  of  Lorraine.  .  .  .  Will  Arndt's 
demands  be  fulfilled?  Will  the  Scheldt  and  the 
Ardennes  become  German  territory?  Will  Luxemburg 
and  Flanders  go  the  same  way  as  Alsace-Lorraine? 
We  must  not  forget  that  the  Netherlands,  of  which 
Belgium  is  only  a  part,  belonged  to  the  Old  German 
Empire,  and  that  they  are  largely  inhabited  by  a  Ger- 
manic people.  Present-day  Holland  was  German  since 
the  dawn  of  time.  " 

While  some  Germans  recommend  both  to  Germans 
and  to  the  Dutch  a  reunion  in  some  form  or  other  on 
the  ground  of  sentiment,  others  urge  it  with  consid- 
erable energy  for  reasons  of  advantage  or  of  necessity. 
They  state  with  great  emphasis  that  Germany  requires 
the  Dutch  harbours,  and  they  threaten  Holland,  should 
that  country  refuse  to  merge  itself  into  its  powerful 
neighbour.  For  instance,  Herr  Alfred  Ruhemann 
wrote  in  the  leading  German  political  weekly  Die 


AIMS  REGARDING  HOLLAND  113 

Grenzboten    on    December    23rd,    1914    (Grumbach,    p. 
192): 

"  Holland  may  learn  from  the  co-operation  of  the 
three  Scandinavian  Kingdoms  that  she  can  find  a 
guarantee  of  security  only  if  it  enters  into  a  coalition 
and  abandons  its  independence.  Would  it  not  be  wfse 
and  provident  of  the  Dutch  to  consider  already  to-day 
that  the  German  Empire  requires  additional  naval  bases 
on  the  North  Sea,  that  in  some  form  or  the  other  it 
must  obtain  these  either  on  the  coast  beyond  Belgium 
or  on  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine?  Had  the  Dutch  not 
better  reflect  that  a  strong  Antwerp  directly  connected 
with  its  industrial  hinterland,  the  Rhenish  Province, 
would  be  bound  to  destroy  the  prosperity  of  Rotterdam, 
especially  if,  in  addition  to  the  outlet  at  Emden,  the 
German  industrial  districts  possessed  a  second  outlet  to 
the  sea  through  Belgium?" 

Herr  Alfred  Ruhemann  wrote  in  Die  Vernichtung 
der  englischen  Weltmacht,  Berlin,  1915  (Grumbach, 
P-  305): 

"If  we  should  take  Antwerp,  we  should  by  its 
possession  not  obtain  free  access  to  the  sea.  We 
require  guarantees  for  that  free  access,  and  we  can 
obtain  it  only  if  Holland  is  willing  to  enter  into  better 
and  closer  relations  with  Germany.  Some  day  we 
might  have  an  army  in  Antwerp  and  a  fleet  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Scheldt,  but  could  not  bring  the  two 
together  unless  we  forced  a  passage  through  neutral 
Holland.  .  .  . 

"If  Portgual  should  really  be  obliged  by  treaty  to 
aid  England  by  sea  and  land,  we  could  make  it  very 


114      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

easy  for  that  country  to  get  rid  of  Angola  very  cheaply. 
We  had  intended  to  purchase  that  colony,  but  it  would 
be  better  to  obtain  it  gratis  and  to  get  the  Azores,  the 
Cape  Verde  Isles,  and  Madeira  into  the  bargain. " 

Many  Germans  have  advocated  that  Holland  should 
be  given  an  inducement  to  join  the  German  Federation. 
They  have  recommended  that  a  portion  of  the  Belgium 
territory  should  be  ceded  to  Holland  and  Luxemburg, 
with  the  understanding  that  these  two  aggrandised 
States  should  merge  themselves  into  the  German  Em- 
pire. Herr  Alfred  Ruhemann,  for  instance,  pointed  out 
in  Die  Grenzboten  on  October  7th,  1914,  that  Holland 
and  Luxemburg  might  be  attracted  into  the  German 
union  by  large  territorial  and  commercial  advantages. 
He  wrote  (Grumbach,  p.  189)  : 

"  Holland  has  suffered  materially  great  damage  by 
preserving  its  neutrality,  for  it  has  suffered  from  Eng- 
land's piracy.  Before  determining  Belgium's  fate, 
Holland  and  Luxemburg  should  perhaps  be  asked  what 
attitude  they  intend  to  take  up  towards  Germany  in 
the  future.  We  must  see  clearly,  for  we  have  learnt 
in  the  case  of  Belgium  that  treaties  and  declarations 
of  neutrality  cannot  be  relied  upon.  Both  Holland  and 
Luxemburg  may  claim  Germany's  gratitude  in  a  mate- 
rial shape. 

"  Our  gratitude  should  be  expressed  in  a  manner 
suitable  to  the  new  relations  into  which  these  two  States 
may  be  prepared  to  enter  with  Germany  after  the  war. 
If  these  two  countries  are  ready  to  act  in  accordance 
with  Germany's  wishes  and  to  increase  our  security 
towards  France  and  England,  it  would  perhaps  be  judi- 
cious to  increase  the  territory  of  Holland  and  Luxemburg 
at  Belgium's  cost. 


AIMS  REGARDING  HOLLAND  115 

"  Luxemburg  might  be  given  Belgian  Luxemburg,  and 
thus  a  firm  connection  would  be  created  with  German 
Liege,  the  German  Eiffel,  and  the  allied  Luxemburg 
State.  It  might  also  be  judicious  to  cede  Antwerp  and 
the  Flemish  Provinces  of  Belgium  and  the  coast-land, 
including  Dunkirk  and  Calais,  to  Holland  and  so  com- 
plete the  Flemish-Dutch  State. 

"  Then  Germany  would  possess,  in  the  West,  the  two 
great  harbours,  Antwerp  and  Rotterdam,  which  hitherto 
have  been  rivals  and  which  henceforth  might  be  made 
to  co-operate.  Lastly,  these  arrangements  would  de- 
prive us  of  the  worry  and  the  expenditure  of  admin- 
istering these  territories  ourselves.  The  question  now 
arises:  Will  Holland  and  Luxemburg  be  ready  to  give 
Germany  the  necessary  guarantees  of  security  in  entering 
with  us  into  a  Federation  ?  " 

Employing  similar  arguments,  Herr  G.  Cleinow,  the 
editor  of  Die  Grenzboten,  wrote  in  that  periodical  on 
November  nth,  1914  (Grumbach,  p.  190): 

"  Germany  wants  an  enlargement  of  its  power.  That 
is  shown  by  the  history  of  the  war.  We  must  protect 
ourselves  against  similar  attacks  in  the  future.  As  the 
Germans  outside  of  Germany  are  exclusively  domiciled 
in  friendly  countries,  we  must  seek  the  necessary  in- 
crease of  power  in  territories  where  the  German  language 
is  not  spoken.  .  .  . 

"  A  connection  of  Holland  with  Germany  can  be 
permanent  and  beneficial  only  if  both  the  Dutch  and 
the  Germans  should  find  other  advantage  in  such  a 
union.  Profit  and  loss  would  have  to  be  equally 
distributed.  Hence  no  German  politician  will  think 
of  inducing  Holland  to  attach  itself  to  the  Empire 


ii6      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

even  if  Germany  should  be  able  to  force  Holland  to 
do  so  after  the  peace.  Holland's  acquisition  would  be 
desirable  only  if  that  country  wished  for  it  and  believed 
to  find  its  advantage  in  a  connection  with  Germany. 
It  is  obvious  that  it  would  be  advantageous  for  Germany 
if  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine  were  German,  if  a  German 
sea-coast  were  facing  England.  However,  the  politician 
who  looks  ahead  would  not  be  satisfied  if  such  an  ar- 
rangement were  profitable  only  to  Germany.  Both 
countries  would  have  to  benefit.  That  would  perhaps 
be  the  case  if  Holland  should  obtain  from  Germany  a 
substantial  increase  of  power.  If  the  war  should  be 
brought  to  a  victorious  end,  Germany's  relations  with 
Holland  might  perhaps  be  developed  as  follows: 

"  Holland  enters  with  Germany  into  a  customs  union 
and  a  military  and  naval  union.  With  regard  to  all 
other  matters  it  retains  its  full  independence.  In  ex- 
change, it  receives  Flemish  Belgium,  inclusive  of  Ant- 
werp. 

"  Profit  for  Germany :  The  German  Rhine  mouths, 
a  broader  basis  for  its  Fleet,  freedom  of  commerce  in 
Holland  and  in  the  Dutch  Colonies. 

"  Advantage  for  Holland :  Gain  of  about  3,500,000 
citizens  of  similar  race  and  language,  protection  of  the 
Dutch  oversea  interests  by  the  German  Fleet,  great  in- 
crease of  the  Dutch  trade.  " 

Many  other  extracts  relating  to  Holland  may  be  found 
in  this  volume  by  means  of  the  Alphabetical  Index. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

A    GERMAN    CENTRAL    EUROPE 

GERMANY  and  the  States  allied  to  it  form  a  connected 
area.  Many  years  ago  ambitious  Germans  had  pro- 
posed that  the  old  German  Zollverein,  which  had 
united  the  -States  of  Germany  before  its  political 
unification,  should  be  revived  and  enlarged,  that  in 
Europe  a  great  economic  federation  should  be  created 
which  gradualry  might  become  a  political  federation 
as  well.  Germany  was  to  be  the  leader  in  such  a 
movement.  It  was  to  dominate  Europe,  and  eventually 
the  world.  ^ 

The  idea  of  creating  a  great  Central  European  Federa- 
tion under  German  leadership  was  greatly  strengthened 
during  the  war,  and  it  found  numerous  advocates  in 
Germany.  Herr  Naumann's  book  on  Central  Europe 
has  been  translated  into  English,  but  it  is  not  mentioned 
by  Grumbach.  His  valuable  book  contains  a  good 
many  references  to  Central  Europe  beyond  those  given 
in  this  chapter.  Reference  to  the  Index  at  the  end 
of  the  book  will  make  it  easy  for  the  reader  to  locate 
them.  It  should  perhaps  be  mentioned  that  M.  Grum- 
bach was  apparently  unacquainted  with  some  very 
important  pronouncements  in  favour  of  a  Central  Euro- 
pean Federation  which  appeared  before  the  publication 
of  his  volume. 

Some  Germans  blandly  assert  that  nature  has  willed 
that  Germany  should  dominate  Europe.  Professor 
Alfred  Weber  wrote  in  Gedanken  zur  deutschen  Sendung, 
published  in  1915  (Grumbach,  p.  276)  : 

117 


ii8      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

"  Nature  has  made  Germany  the  Power  of  Central 
Europe.  The  war  has  taught  us  that  we  can  with 
certainty  dominate  only  those  States  which  we  can 
group  around  us.  Without  wishing  to  under-estimate 
Germany's  expansion  as  an  oversea  Power,  we  must, 
in  the  first  place,  make  use  of  our  central  position  on 
the  European  Continent.  Nature  teaches  us  that  a 
Central  European  Federation  of  States  should  be  the 
basis  of  our  existence  and  that  from  thence  we  should 
advance  into  the  world,  in  the  first  place  by  land,  to- 
wards the  south-east,  by  way  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula 
into  Asia  Minor. 

"  Through  the  Alliance  with  Austria-Hungary  and 
Turkey  the  war  has  produced  the  outlines  of  the  great 
body  which  we  shall  have  to  complete  and  upon  which 
we  must  found  Germany's  world  position.  The 
accession  of  the  Balkan  States,  enlarged  to  their  ut- 
most extent,  should  strengthen  it  in  Europe.  The  largest 
portion  possible  of  Asia  should  be  attached  to  it  by 
means  of  traffic  lines.  In  the  second  place,  the  largest 
portion  possible  of  Africa  should  be  similarly  connected 
with  it. " 

Some  Germans  believe  the  creation  of  a  German- 
dominated  Central  Europe  necessary  for  the  political 
security  of  Germany,  and  for  economic  reasons.  Pro- 
fessor Dr.  Conrad  Bornhak  wrote  in  Die  Grenzboten 
on  March  I5th,  1916  (Grumbach,  p.  203)  : 

"  We  are  waging  at  present  only  the  first  Punic 
War  with  England.  No  treaties  of  the  past  or  of  the 
future  can  guarantee  to  us  the  freedom  of  the  seas. 
Real  securities  are  required,  as  the  German  Chancellor 
has  stated.  Germany's  economic  life  must  be  safe- 


A  GERMAN  CENTRAL  EUROPE          119 

guarded  for  the  future.  This  means  that,  on  the  one 
hand,  Germany's  industrial  territory  must  be  enlarged, 
and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  the  German  agricultural 
territory  must  be  expanded  so  that  the  two  may  be 
able  to  satisfy  not  only  the  present  requirements  of  the 
German  nation,  but  also  those  of  the  coming  German 
millions.  .  .  . 

"  If  we  look  upon  the  world-war  as  an  economic  war, 
we  must  draw  from  it  the  logical  economic  conclusion. 
The  great  continental  area  of  the  unified  political  system 
attached  to  the  German-Austrian  Alliance  reaches  from 
Antwerp  and  Hamburg  to  Libau  and  Vilna  and  to  Syria 
and  Mesopotamia.  It  must  be  politically  organised  for 
all  time.  " 

Some  German  writers  have  pointed  out  that  Germany 
is  entitled  to  the  creation  of  a  great  Central  European 
State  dominated  by  Germany,  not  only  because  such 
a  State  would  be  advantageous  to  Germany  on  political, 
military,  and  economic  grounds,  but  also  because  the 
German  race  is  far  superior  to  the  other  races.  Accord- 
ing to  them,  the  Germans  are  a  master  race,  and  their 
predominance  will  be  to  the  advantage  of  the  inferior 
races  and  of  civilisation.  Dr.  Konrad  Olbricht  wrote 
in  Die  Vernichtung  der  engllschen  Weltmacht,  published 
in  1915  (Grumbach,  p.  291): 

"  Not  only  the  fact  that  the  larger  part  of  the 
minette  ore  deposits  lie  in  France,  but  also  the  posi- 
tion of  the  much-discussed  fortresses  of  Liege,  Namur, 
Longwy,  Verdun,  Toul,  and  Belfort  compels  us  to  push 
forward  the  German  frontier  in  the  West.  The  prob- 
lem of  nationalities  in  the  annexed  districts  will  solve 
itself.  Since  1871  the  population  of  France  has  grown 
from  36,200,000  to  only  39,800,000.  In  consequence 


120      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

of  the  war  there  will  surely  be  a  serious  decrease  of 
the  French  population.  In  1912,  France  had  an  excess 
of  births  over  deaths  of  25,000,  as  compared  with 
800,000  in  Germany. 

"  Holland-Belgium  will  form  a  difficult  problem  in 
the  peace  negotiations.  The  least  to  be  expected  is  a 
customs  union.  However,  the  march  of  events  will 
probably  induce  Holland  to  effect  a  closer  connection 
with  Germany,  with  which  that  country  carries  on  the 
bulk  of  its  trade.  Happily,  we  are  now  in  a  position 
of  playing  out  Antwerp  against  Rotterdam. 

"  The  map  of  Europe  will  undergo  great  changes. 
The  war,  which  has  been  brought  about  by  England's 
envy,  is  a  struggle  of  pure  Germanism  against  Slavs 
and  Latins,  a  struggle  of  genius  against  barbarians 
who  only  too  long  have  disturbed  the  peace  of  Europe. 
The  outlines  of  a  new  Europe  are  appearing  in  the 
dawn.  We  see  the  lines  of  a  Federal  Union  which 
reaches  from  the  Baltic  towards  the  south-east,  beyond 
the  Dardanelles.  " 

The  advocates  of  a  German-dominated  Central  Europe 
desire  to  create  a  composite  State  directed  against  the 
Anglo-Saxon  nations  and  against  Russia  which  should 
comprise  about  200,000,000  inhabitants.  They  wish 
to  detach  from  Russia  the  Baltic  Provinces,  Poland, 
and  Ukrainia,  and  attach  these  to  Central  Europe.  As 
the  Black  Sea  lies  within  the  sphere  of  the  Ukrainians, 
or  Ruthenians,  that  sea  would  become  a  German  lake. 
Dr.  Carl  Jentsch  wrote  in  Der  Weltkrieg  und  die 
Zukunft  des  deutschen  Volkes,  Berlin,  1915  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  331): 

"  Highly  cultivated  Finland  must  either  become  inde- 
pendent or  fall  again  to  Sweden.  .  .  . 

"  Exactly    as    in    the    last    century    the    Zollverein 


A  GERMAN  CENTRAL  EUROPE  121 

abolished  our  internal  customs  duties  and  gradually 
pushed  forward  the  German  customs  frontier  up  to  the 
present  political  frontiers  of  Germany,  so  the  present 
frontiers  of  Germany  should  be  pushed  forward  to  the 
limits  of  the  Central  European  Federation  to  which 
probably  the  Ukrainians  also  will  belong,  for  these  have 
reason  to  complain  about  religious  persecution.  This 
federation  will  then  form  a  connected,  well-rounded, 
self-sufficing  and  militarily  unassailable  economic  area. 
Very  probably  it  will  be  joined  by  the  three  northern 
kingdoms,  because  Sweden  fears  Russia  and  because 
Norway  and  Denmark  are  suffering  from  English 
piracy  during  the  present  war.  Holland  and  Switzer- 
land also  will  come  into  the  union,  because  the  economic 
position  of  small  States  is  precarious.  We  do  not  re- 
quire them,  and  we  must  by  no  means  press  them  to 
join  us.  ...  Combined  with  these  States,  the  Federa- 
tion would  compromise  4,000,000  square  kilometres  and 
about  200,000,000  inhabitants.  As  the  remaining  States 
of  the  Continent  would  find  it  advisable  to  join  it,  the 
way  would  be  opened  to  the  creation  of  the  United 
States  of  Europe.  " 

As  the  Central  European  Federation  was  to  be  very 
largely  an  instrument  for  the  subjection  of  England 
and  of  the  British  Empire,  it  was  considered  important 
that  France  should  join  it,  for  the  assistance  of  that 
country  would  be  valu^le  against  England.  Therefore, 
many  advocates  of  the  Central  European  idea  have 
pointed  out  that  it  would  be  to  France's  advantage  to 
join  Germany  against  England. 

"  Ein  Deutscher "  wrote  in  Was  uns  der  Weltkrieg 
bringen  muss,  Leipzig,  1914  (Grumbach,  p.  313)  : 

"If  we   should  succeed  in  breaking  England's   sea- 


122      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

power,  we  should  not  act  with  suicidal  generosity,  but 
should,  notwithstanding  our  inborn  sentimentality, 
deal  with  Russia  with  energy.  We  should  be  guided 
only  by  our  own  interests.  By  a  drastic  surgical 
operation  we  should  separate  Western  Russia  from 
Russia  proper  and  attach  the  former  by  an  alliance  of 
defence  and  offence  to  the  Central  European  Peace 
Federation.  .  .  . 

"  Unless  England  has  been  robbed  of  all  its  Colonies, 
it  will  remain  Germany's  powerful  enemy.  That  coun- 
try can  get  rid  of  European  competition  in  a  twofold 
manner,  either  by  destroying  the  European  fleets  and 
merchant  marines  or  by  closing  to  the  European  trade 
the  British  colonies.  Europe  can  defend  itself  with 
success  against  this  twofold  strangulation  only  by  a  union 
of  all  the  European  States,  Russia  excepted. 

"  To  form  such  a  union,  it  is  necessary  that  Europe 
should  no  longer  be  split  up  into  small  independent 
States.  It  follows  that  Belgium  should  never  again  be 
permitted  to  become  an  independent  State.  That  State 
is  a  purely  artificial  creation,  a  product  of  fear.  It  has 
been  made  chiefly  by  England,  the  country  which  has 
caused  this  terrible  war.  Hence,  and  because  the  larger 
part  of  Belgium  belongs  naturally  to  Holland  and  the 
smaller  to  Luxemburg,  it  should  be  united  with,  these 
two  countries  under  the  condition  that  both  Holland 
and  Luxemburg  should  voluntarily  enter  the  German 
Empire.  The  two  States  should  cede  their  coast  towns 
and  their  harbours  to  Germany  and  these  would  be  con- 
verted into  fortresses  and  war  harbours.  The  Dutch 
and  Belgian  Colonies  should  be  placed  under  the  German 
Colonial  Office. 

"  France    should    pay    an    adequate    war    indemnity, 


A  GERMAN  CENTRAL  EUROPE  123 

and  waive  for  all  time  its  claim  to  Alsace-Lorraine.  Its 
present  possessions  on  the  Continent  should  be  guaran- 
teed to  it  provided  it  joined  the  European  Federation. 
It  would,  however,  have  to  cede  part  of  its  African 
Colonies  to  Germany  and  to  Italy. " 

As  the  old  German  Customs  Federation  had  been 
an  instrument  for  giving  to  Germany  predominance  in 
Europe,  the  Central  European  Federation  was  to  give 
to  Germany  the  mastery  of  Europe  and  supremacy 
throughout  the  world.  The  purpose  of  the  Central 
European  Federation  was  world-conquest,  and  partic- 
ularly the  conquest  of  the  British  Empire.  Hence 
many  demanded  that  the  Central  European  State 
should  not  be  confined  to  the  narrow  limits  of  the 
European  Continent,  but  should,  by  way  of  the  Bos- 
phorus  and  the  Dardanelles,  be  extended  deep  into 
Africa  and  Asia,  so  as  to  threaten  India  on  the  one 
hand  and  Cape  Colony  on  the  other.  Herr  Franz  Kohler 
wrote  in  Der  Neue  Dreibund,  Munich,  1915  (Grumbach, 
P-  333) : 

"  England's  destruction  stands  in  the  forefront  of 
our  wishes.  Some  have  advocated  a  separate  peace 
with  France  even  on  the  basis  of  leaving  its  frontiers 
unimpaired,  although  such  action  would  be  open  treason 
to  our  heroic  soldiers  in  the  field.  .  .  .  Financially  com- 
pletely exhausted  and  forced  to  pay  the  heaviest  possible 
indemnity,  France  would  be  relieved  by  the  loss  of  a 
large  part  of  its  African  Colonies.  .  .  . 

"  The  history  of  the  Baltic  Provinces  and  of  Finland 
shows  that  even  countries  of  a  higher  civilisation  may 
become  victims  of  Russia's  lust  of  conquest.  The  freeing 
of  Finland  from  the  Russian  yoke  would  rid  Sweden 
and  Norway  of  their  worries.  .  .  . 


124      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

"  There  is  no  reason  why  we  should  induce  Sweden 
to  intervene.  At  the  same  time,  it  must  be  questioned 
whether  that  country  will  be  able  to  look  on  with  folded 
arms  while  Russia  oppresses  the  Finns.  Although 
Germany  sincerely  desires  to  abolish  Finland's  servitude, 
a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  Finnish  problem  is  scarcely 
possible  without  Sweden's  intervention.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Baltic  Provinces,  Esthonia,  Livonia,  and  Cour- 
land  must  be  considered  as  valuable  German  settlement 
colonies.  .  .  . 

"  As  England  owes  its  former  superiority  to  its 
insular  position  and  to  the  impossibility  of  attacking 
it  by  land,  we  must  strive  to  create  such  frontiers 
that  we  can  reach  England,  or  rather  England's 
possessions,  by  land.  .  .  .  The  distance  from  Berlin 
to  Bombay  is  very  great.  Still,  the  difficulty  of 
threatening  England  in  this  direction  would  be  small 
compared  with  attacking  England  by  invasion  across 
the  Channel.  Besides,  the  capital  laid  out  on  railways 
from  Berlin  to  Bombay  would  be  more  usefully  spent 
than  a  similar  amount  devoted  to  general  armaments. 
Herein  lies  the  true  and  the  only  solution  of  freeing 
ourselves  from  the  English  yoke.  We  must  cut  the 
connection  with  the  richest  English  colonies,  South 
Africa,  and  India,  and  create  frontiers  which  enable 
us,  with  the  help  of  our  own  railways  and  our  Allies, 
to  come  in  touch  with  them  so  that  we  need  no  longer 
take  to  the  sea  route  or  have  to  proceed  by  way  of 
foreign  territory.  .  .  .  From  this  point  of  view  the 
creation  of  a  Federation  which  reaches  beyond  the 
Balkans  and  Turkey  up  to  the  gates  of  India  and  of 
Cape  Colony  becomes  significant.  That  is  the  necessary 
and  logical  solution.  .  .  . 


A  GERMAN  CENTRAL  EUROPE          125 

"  By  expanding  our  frontiers,  foreign  races  would 
have  to  be  acquired.  A  defeated  State  has  the  greatest 
interest  not  to  lose  its  population  together  with  the 
territory  which  it  has  to  cede.  It  will  be  necessary  to 
demand  certain  securities  from  that  part  of  the  foreign 
population  which  wishes  to  remain  on  the  conquered 
soil.  We  must  be  sure  that  the  denationalisation  of  the 
people  will  not  be  resisted,  that  the  conquered  people 
agrees  to  the  gradual  introduction  of  the  exclusive  use 
of  the  language  of  the  victor  and  of  his  education.  .  .  . 
The  solution  of  the  problem  will  be  facilitated  if  both 
combatants  undertake  a  certain  exchange.  No  value 
will  be  attached  to  retaining  the  Russian  elements  in 
the  East.  Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  has  already  en- 
deavoured to  induce  the  German  settlers  to  emigrate 
from  Russia. " 


CHAPTER  XIV 
GERMANY'S  COLONIAL  WAR  AIMS 

GERMANY'S  colonial  war  aims  are  part  of  its  Central 
European  policy  and  of  its  world  policy.  Therefore 
numerous  extracts  illustrating  that  country's  colonial 
ambitions  will  be  found  in  Chapters  XIII,  XV,  and 
XVI,  which  are  entitled  "  A  German  Central  Europe, " 
"  Germany's  War  Aims  in  the  Far  East, "  and  "  A 
German  World.  "  A  full  list  of  references  will  be  found 
in  the  Index  at  the  end  of  this  book. 

Those  Germans  who  desire  their  country  to  become 
not  only  a  great  European  State,  but  also  a  great 
Colonial  Empire,  wish,  in  the  first  instance,  that  Ger- 
many should  dominate  the  African  Continent.  They 
do  not  wish  to  possess  a  colonial  Empire,  which  can 
be  reached  only  by  a  sea.  They  would  prefer  a  colonial 
Empire  connected  with  Germany  by  land.  Germany's 
colonial  policy  is,  in  their  eyes,  merely  an  extension  of 
its  Central  European  policy.  Professor  Hans  Delbriick 
of  Berlin  University  wrote  in  Bismarck's  Erbe,  Berlin, 
1915  (Grumbach,  p.  299)  : 

"  The  first  and  most  important  of  our  national  de- 
mands which  we  must  put  forward  at  a  future  peace 
congress  will  be  that  of  a  very  large  colonial  Empire, 
of  a  German  India.  " 

Doctor     Paul     Leutwein    wrote    in    the    important 

126 


GERMANY'S  COLONIAL  WAR  AIMS      127 

periodical    Weltwirtschaft    in    May    1916    (Grumbach, 
P-  237)  : 

"  Only  if  we  remember  that  nearly  three-tenths  of 
Germany's  imports  are  colonial  products,  we  shall  be 
able  to  gauge  how  much  Germany's  economic  regenera- 
tion after  the  conclusion  of  peace  will  depend  upon  the 
acquisition  of  an  adequate  colonial  empire.  .  .  .  The 
world-war  has  yielded  us  a  twofold  lesson  from  the  point 
of  view  of  colonial  economy.  In  the  first  place,  we 
must  come  out  of  the  war  with  a  far  larger  colonial 
Empire  than  was  that  which  we  possessed  previously. 
Besides,  it  must  be  connected  by  secure  land-routes  with 
the  Motherland,  in  such  a  way  that  no  future  war  can 
interrupt  the  economic  connection. " 

Many  Germans  see  in  the  acquisition  of  the  larger 
part  of  the  African  Continent  not  an  end  in  itself,  but 
merely  a  means  to  an  end.  They  see  in  Africa  a  gigantic 
base  whence  may  be  dominated  the  three  great  seas 
around,  the  Mediterranean,  the  Atlantic,  and  the  Pacific. 
Dr.  Karl  Mehrmann  wrote  in  Gross-Deutschland, 
Dresden,  1915  (Grumbach,  p.  340)  : 

:<  The  wishes  formulated  by  open-minded  colonial 
politicians  and  the  obvious  aim  of  the  German  Foreign 
Office  can  be  fulfilled  at  the  conclusion  of  peace.  The 
final  defeat  of  France  and  Belgium  must  bring  to  the 
Germans  the  connection  of  Cameroon  Colony  and  the 
East  African  colony. 

"  A  Central  African  New  Germany  right  across  the 
Black  Continent  will  arise.  It  will  be  the  connecting 
link  of  the  sweep  of  territory  from  the  North  Sea  to 
Asia  Minor  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  connecting  link 
between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  on  the  other  hand. 


128      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

Our  political  dream  of  creating  a  balance  of  power  on 
the  Pacific  would  thus  be  fulfilled.  " 


Herr  Kuno  Waltemath  wrote  in  January  1916  in  the 
Preussische  Jahrbucher,  the  foremost  German  political 
monthly  (Grumbach,  p.  185)  : 

"  We  must  strive  to  acquire  bases  for  our  fleet  and 
our  oversea  troops.  We  must  remember  that  we  should 
have  achieved  far  more  in  fighting  our  enemies  upon 
the  sea  had  we  possessed  well-provisioned  and  well- 
armed  bases  which  could  be  employed  in  a  war  of  con- 
siderable duration.  We  have  lacked  these.  We  must 
in  future  never  again  try  to  carry  on  a  world-policy 
with  insufficient  means,  but  reckon  with  all  eventualities 
and  prepare  for  them. 

"  We  must  proclaim  the  national  task  of  becoming  a 
real  colonial  Power  in  Africa.  There  are  situated  our 
most  promising  territories.  Our  achievements  in  our 
African  colonies  entitle  us  to  the  highest  hope. 

"  We  require  territorial  acquisitions  in  Europe.  They 
are  necessary  to  improve  Germany's  frontiers;  but  as 
the  same  time  we  require  Colonies  in  Africa.  They 
must  be  the  prize  of  victory.  Can  there  be  a  more 
attractive  German  national  ideal  that  a  homogeneous 
colonial  Empire?  .  .  . 

"  The  creation  of  such  an  Empire  at  France's  cost 
would  deprive  the  French  of  territories  where  that 
country  can  raise  numerous  recruits  who  may  be  drawn 
by  it  from  Africa  in  increasing  numbers  in  the  future. 
Thus,  France  could  be  materially  weakened. 

"  To  sum  up,  we  must  tell  Germany's  leaders :  '  Con- 
tinental Power  and  Colonial  Power!  Do  not  forget  the 
one  in  striving  after  the  other. ' ' 


GERMANY'S  COLONIAL  WAR  AIMS      129 

Professor  Dr.  Karl  Dove  wrote  in  the  periodical 
Weltwirtschaft  in  November  1915  (  Grumbach,  p.  236)  : 

"  Africa  is  the  coming  continent.  Its  future  is  rich 
and  full  of  hope.  A  nation,  such  as  the  German,  which 
through  its  ability  has  gained  so  pre-eminent  a  position 
in  trade  and  industry,  cannot  possibly  stand  aside,  when 
other  nations  which  are  less  industrious  endeavour  to 
secure  for  themselves  the  lion's  share.  We  mean  at 
last  to  obtain  that  which  is  our  due,  because  we  need 
it  and  because  we  require  it  for  the  existence  of  our 
children. " 


CHAPTER  XV 

GERMAN    WAR   AIMS   IN   THE   FAR   EAST 

MANY  Germans  hope  to  obtain,  in  consequence  of  the 
present  war,  not  only  the  predominance  in  Europe  and 
in  Africa,  as  has  been  shown  by  extracts  given  in  the 
two  preceding  chapters,  but  they  reckon  upon  obtaining 
the  predominance  in  the  Far  East  as  well.  As  Asia 
Minor  is  to  form  part  of  the  projected  Central  European 
Federation  which  is  to  be  created  under  Germany's 
direction,  it  seems  only  natural  to  many  Germans  that, 
starting  from  Asia  Minor  and  using  that  country  as 
a  base,  the  Far  East  also  should  be  brought  under 
German  control.  We  have  learned  in  previous  chapters 
that  India  was  to  be  controlled  by  Germany  by  means 
of  railway  lines  which  would  bring  India  within  easy 
reach  of  the  German  Armies.  However,  China  also 
should  be  dominated  by  Germany.  Germany  should,  in 
the  Far  East,  take  the  place  to  which  Japan  aspires. 
The  well-known  diplomat  and  publicist,  Freiherr  von 
Mackay  wrote  in  Das  Grossere  Deutschland  on  April 
24th,  1915  (Grumbach,  p.  223)  : 

"  Although  Japan  strives  mightily  to  become  a  military 
power,  the  black  days  of  its  collapse  must  come  earlier 
or  later  in  view  of  the  economic,  social  and  moral 
weakness  and  backwardness  of  the  country.  And  when 
Japan's  hour  of  fate  has  arrived,  then  the  time  will 

130 


WAR  AIMS  IN  THE  FAR  EAST  131 

have  come  for  Germany  to  harvest  the  fruits  of  its 
European  victories  also  in  the  Far  East.  It  will  have 
learnt  by  its  bitter  experiences  and  will  re-establish 
Germany's  eminence  and  Europe's  prestige.  .  .  . " 

Doctor  Paul  Rohrbach,  who  has  travelled  a  good 
deal  in  Africa  and  the  Far  East,  believes  that  China 
should  become  a  German  Protectorate.  He  wrote  in 
Unsere  kolonlale  Zukunftsarbeit,  Stuttgart,  1915  (Grum- 
bach,  p.  303) : 

"  Of  course  one  should  take  all  land  which  one  can 
get,  for  land  is  always  valuable.  .  .  .  Should  among 
the  conditions  of  peace  be  the  acquisition  of  Angola, 
then  the  murder  of  our  three  South- West  Africans  by 
a  Portuguese  officer  would  weigh  heavily  in  the  balance. 
The  blood  of  these  men  would  not  have  been  spilled 
in  vain.  .  .  . 

"  China  has  400,000,000  inhabitants,  one  quarter  of  • 
mankind.  Let  us  ask  ourselves:  Which  of  the  great 
civilised  nations  of  Europe  will  be  the  architect  of  the 
external  and  internal  renovation  of  that  country?  It 
will  certainly  not  be  done  by  the  Japanese.  .  .  .  Will 
the  English  fulfil  this  task?  To-day  we  may  hope  that, 
in  consequence  of  the  war,  they  will  be  ruled  out. 
Whether  Germany  will  undertake  it  will  depend  on 
our  position  after  the  war.  If  we  are  victorious,  we 
shall  be  prominent  probably  also  in  East  Asia,  and 
even  if  we  should  not  obtain  a  greater  victory  than 
Frederick  the  Great  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  our 
prestige  would  be  enormous.  If  we  are  victorious  in 
spite  of  all  difficulties,  the  Chinese  will  conclude  that 
they  should  make  the  victorious  Germans  their  teachers. 
We  must  not  imagine  that  it  will  be  easy  to  undertake 


132      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

the  direction  in  the  rebuilding  of  the  Chinese  world, 
but  we  shall  ripen  towards  that  great  task.  " 

While  some  Germans  lay  stress  upon  the  political, 
the  military,  and  the  cultural  effects  of  a  German 
Protectorate  over  China,  others  regard  that  gigantic 
country  chiefly  from  the  economic  point  of  view,  and 
see  in  it  an  unlimited  field  of  exploitation  on  the  part 
of  German  financiers,  bankers,  manufacturers,  and 
traders.  Herr  Wolf  von  Dewall  wrote  in  Deutschland 
und  China  nach  dem  Kriege,  Berlin,  1916  (Grumbach, 
p.  309)  : 

"  During  many  years  Germany  has  taken  little  interest 
in  China.  Germany's  interest  in  that  country  should  be 
stimulated  by  a  good  information  service.  .  .  . 

"  The  iron-ore  deposits  of  China  are  most  promising. 
The  iron  wealth  of  the  country  is  of  the  first  order. 
Entire  provinces  form  connected  iron  deposits.  Nearly 
every  Chinese  province  possesses  iron,  and  coal  is  usually 
near  at  hand.  Hence,  the  conditions  for  the  develop- 
ment of  the  Chinese  iron  industry  are  very  favourable. 
Hitherto,  the  riches  of  the  soil  have  scarcely  been 
touched.  China  should  become  wealthy  by  mining.  The 
neglect  of  that  industry  is  due  to  lack  of  capital  and 
of  transport,  to  popular  obstructiveness  and  to  unfavour- 
able laws.  That  should  be  altered. 

"  It  is  necessary  to  seize  opportunities  in  mining  and 
act  in  China  as  we  did  with  regard  to  the  Chinese 
railway  concessions  in  order  to  obtain  the  business. 
Organisation  is  necessary  in  order  to  be  always  ready 
for  immediate  action.  Hongkong  must  no  longer  remain 
the  chief  emporium  of  Germany's  trade  in  Southern 
China.  We  require  a  German  settlement  on  the  South 


WAR  AIMS  IN  THE  FAR  EAST  133 

Chinese  coast.  Hongkong  owes  its  prosperity  to  the 
industry  and  energy  of  its  German  inhabitants  and  of 
its  Chinese  population  and  to  the  indolence  of  the 
Chinese  Government.  If  the  German  merchants  of 
Hongkong  and  their  Chinese  business  friends  leave  that 
English  colony,  and  if  the  Chinese  Government  should 
create  a  suitable  harbour  on  the  mainland,  Hongkong 
would  decline  and  become  another  Macao.  We  do  not 
want  to  induce  China  to  open  an  economic  war  with 
England,  but  we  shall  demand  for  ourselves  a  spot 
on  which  we  can  do  business  with  South  China  inde- 
pendent of  the  laws  of  our  enemies." 


CHAPTER  XVI 

A  GERMAN  WORLD 

WE  have  seen  in  the  three  preceding  chapters  that 
many  Germans  desire  to  make  Germany  absolutely 
paramount  on  the  European  Continent,  to  make  that 
country  the  leader  of  a  Central  European  Federation 
of  States  which  would  compromise  200,000,000  in- 
habitants or  more,  and  which  would  extend  across  the 
Narrows  into  Asia  Minor.  We  have  seen  that  many 
German  enthusiasts  hope  to  extend  the  German  Em- 
pire far  beyond  Asia  Minor,  and  to  make  Asia  Minor 
a  great  base  whence  on  the  one  hand  the  bulk  of  Africa 
will  be  conquered  and  whence,  on  the  other,  India  may 
be  threatened  and  attacked.  In  addition,  many  Ger- 
mans, seeing  still  farther  ahead,  hope  that  their  country 
will  dominate  the  Far  East  and  make  China  a  German 
Protectorate. 

The  views  of  German  enthusiasts  are  limitless. 
Domination  over  the  three  continents  of  the  old  world 
should,  in  their  opinion,  logically  lead  to  German 
domination  of  the  world.  Diplomats,  politicians,  pub- 
licists, and  business  men  share  that  hope.  A  former 
diplomat,  Freiherr  von  Mackay  wrote  on  November 
27th,  1915,  in  Das  Grosser e  Deutschland  (Grumbach,  p. 
229): 

"  Germany  must  become  the  Centre  State  of  Europe, 
its  organising  force,  which,  owing  to  its  political,  eco- 

134 


A  GERMAN  WORLD  135 

nomic,  and  moral  superiority  will  become  the  president  of 
the  whole  world  and  give  the  world  rest  and  peace. " 

Many  Germans  naturally  see  in  the  Turkish  Empire 
the  indispensable  link  and  instrument  for  the  achieve- 
ment of  world  domination.  With  the  help  of  Turkey, 
India  and  China  may  be  conquered.  Having  conquered 
these,  Germany  should  civilise  and  Germanise  the 
world,  and  the  German  language  would  become  the 
world  language.  Herr  Theodor  Springmann,  a  manu- 
facturer, wrote  in  Deutschland  und  der  Orient,  Hagen, 
1915  (Grumbach,  p.  308) : 

"  Germany's  connection  with  Turkey  has  become  so 
intimate  through  their  brotherhood  in  arms  that  after 
the  happy  close  of  the  war  we  should  found  a  friend- 
ship-colony. We  must  strengthen  Turkey  within  and 
without,  suppress  corruption,  improve  the  administra- 
tion and  the  schools,  introduce  compulsory  and  universal 
military  service,  organise  a  war-ready  army,  and  con- 
struct railways  up  to  the  frontiers  of  the  Caucasus, 
as  well  as  towards  India  and  Asia.  Enormous  uncul- 
tivated territories  await  exploitation,  and  these  can 
produce  so  much  grain  and  cotton  that  Germany  would 
never  experience  want  in  a  future  war.  Enormous  oil- 
wells,  iron-mines,  and  manganese  and  copper  deposits 
are  awaiting  us.  All  these  circumstances  combined 
yield  such  favourable  conditions  for  an  attack  in  case 
of  future  war  with  Russia  or  England,  and  these 
measures  will  be  such  an  enormous  help  to  us,  that  their 
aid  will  prove  decisive.  .  .  . 

"If  once  we  have  succeeded  in  making  Turkey  a 
strong,  faithful  and  devoted  ally,  then  we  can  advance 
towards  our  aim.  India  and  China  will  be  for  Germany 


136      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

the  perfection  of  its  development.  At  the  moment  Ger- 
many is  not  ripe  for  world-embracing  greatness.  And 
it  is  not  our  misfortune,  but  a  great  blessing,  that  the 
Hindoos  have  not  yet  revolted  against  England.  .  .  . 
England's  old  Colonial  Empire  must  fall  to  pieces,  for 
it  is  based  on  lies  and  tyranny.  .  .  .  We  shall  tell  the 
awakening  nations  of  the  East :  '  England  has  given  you 
the  knout,  but  Germany  is  presenting  you  with  golden 
liberty.  Come  to  us,  learn  our  language,  and  study 
our  achievements. '  We  shall  close  to  our  enemies  the 
German  schools,  the  mainsprings  of  our  power,  but  open 
them  to  our  friends,  to  India,  Islam,  and  China.  Then 
the  German  language  will  become  the  world  language 
in  this  new  world.  " 

While  some  Germans,  in  accordance  with  the  opinions 
of  Herr  Springmann,  hope  to  dominate  the  world  by 
conquering  Africa  and  Asia  and  by  forcibly  depriving 
the  British  race  of  its  imperial  domain,  seizing  India, 
Egypt,  the  African  possessions,  etc.,  by  an  attack  over 
land,  others  are  of  opinion  that  Germany  should  obtain 
the  mastery  of  the  world  and  the  control  of  the  British 
Empire  by  dominating  the  British  Isles  themselves.  The 
latter  recommend  an  invasion  of  England.  After  its 
successful  accomplishment  Dover  should  be  permanently 
occupied  by  German  troops,  and  the  British  Empire 
should  be  allowed  to  lead  a  shadow  existence.  It  should 
be  nominally  independent,  but  in  reality  it  should  be 
a  German  possession  endowed  with  the  appearances  of 
self-government.  A  well-known  publicist,  Konrad  von 
Winterstetten,  wrote  in  Nordkap-Bagdad,  Frankfurt, 
1915  (Grumbach,  p.  363)  : 

"  A  glance  at  the  map  shows  that  the  dyke  protecting 
Germany  against  Russia  must  extend  from  the  North 


A  GERMAN  WORLD  137 

Cape  to  the  Black  Sea  and  thence  to  the  Caucasus  and 
to  the  Persian  Gulf.  ...  It  is  of  immense  importance 
that  Germany  should  possess  lands  producing  cotton 
and  ore.  The  third  necessity  of  world-policy  is  the 
possession  of  settlement  colonies  where  the  surplus 
population  can  find  room.  .  .  . 

"  There  should  be  a  Federation :  Germany,  Austria- 
Hungary,  Rumania,  Bulgaria,  Turkey — these  States 
should  enjoy  full  sovereignty  in  internal  affairs.  They 
should  be  firmly  connected  by  a  defensive  and  offensive 
alliance  and  by  binding  military  and  political  agreements. 
Gradually  a  complete  customs  unity  and  economic  unity 
would  be  established.  A  Central  European  Empire 
should  arise  from  the  war.  An  independent  Albania; 
Serbia  should  be  partitioned;  the  three  Northern  States 
and  the  small  States  of  the  West  should  be  invited  to 
join.  This  Federal  Empire  would  have  185,000,000  in- 
habitants, and,  inclusive  of  the  Colonies,  240,000,000 
inhabitants.  .  .  . 

"  If  the  Central  European  State  desires  to  be  a  World- 
Power  it  must  reach  the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  and  it 
can  arrive  there  by  way  of  Bagdad.  If  it  has  obtained 
a  footing  on  the  Pacific  Ocean,  it  can  defend  the  valu- 
able possessions  which  Holland  has  in  that  sea.  These 
Dutch  possessions  must  be  entrusted  to  the  Central 
European  State,  for  otherwise  they  may  be  lost.  Holland 
has  no  option  in  this  new  epoch  of  world  revolution 
and  in  the  creation  of  gigantic  Empires.  It  can  save 
its  Colonies  and  independence  only  by  entering  the 
Central  European  Federation.  Otherwise  it  will  lose 
both.  .  .  . 

"  Germany's  territorial  booty  from  France  is  not  a 
problem  of  arbitrary  geographic  rearrangement,  but 


I38      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

one  of  political  and  economic  necessity.  It  would  be 
foolish  for  Germany  to  burden  itself  with  more  French 
territory  than  it  needs.  The  ore-beds  of  Lorraine,  the 
fortress  of  Belfort,  and  the  rest  of  the  frontier-lands 
cannot  escape  us  even  if  our  claims  are  drawn  up  with 
the  utmost  modesty.  The  appropriation  of  a  belt  of 
territory  along  the  Belgian  frontier  from  Verdun  to 
Boulogne  will  probably  be  found  necessary  in  order  to 
obtain  an  open  door  for  invading  France,  and  a  spring- 
board towards  England.  That  would  be  the  best  se- 
curity of  the  peace.  .  .  . 

"  More  important  than  the  question  of  correcting  the 
frontiers  is  the  problem  of  the  French  Colonies.  That 
subject  must  be  discussed  elsewhere.  It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  the  actual  occupation  of  the  French  Colo- 
nies by  Germany  is  possible  only  after  the  defeat  of  the 
British  Fleet.  .  .  . 

"  England  must  be  made  incapable  of  ever  again 
fighting  with  Germany.  .  .  .  This  can  probably  most 
easily  be  accomplished  by  making  ourselves  the 
masters  of  the  European  head  of  the  British  World- 
Empire.  The  road  from  Gravelotte- Verdun  to 
Dunkirk-Boulogne  might  be  continued  by  the  occu- 
pation of  the  bridge-head  of  Dover  by  means  of 
which  England  can  be  dominated.  That  proposal  may 
seem  fantastic,  but  it  is  as  feasible  as  a  landing  in 
England  without  which  the  war  would  last  for  years. 
Only  the  conquest  of  London  makes  peace  possible. 
After  its  conquest  one  condition  of  peace  will  be  as 
easily  enforcible  as  any  other.  England,  possessing 
only  part  of  her  Fleet — the  larger  part  being  in  our 
hands — England  being  militarily  always  in  our  power, 
yet  administering  freely  the  World-Empire,  in  which 


A  GERMAN  WORLD  139 

no  customs  duties  would  be  allowed  to  be  levied, 
would  henceforth  be  a  most  convenient  neighbour  to 
Germany. " 

It  is  obvious  that  if  Germany  should  succeed  in 
making  itself  supreme  within  the  three  old  continents 
and  should  be  able  to  dominate,  or  at  least  to  over-awe, 
the  British  Empire,  the  United  States  would  become 
a  negligible  factor,  and  little  consideration  need  be 
paid  to  their  Monroe  doctrine.  Herr  Alfred  Hettner 
wrote  in  Der  Deutsche  Krieg,  Berlin,  1915  (Grumbach, 
p.  300) : 

"  We  must  strive  after  the  enlargement  of  Germany's 
colonial  possessions,  especially  in  Africa,  and  must  par- 
ticularly aim  at  connecting  them  and  rounding  them 
off.  It  would  have  been  far  easier  to  defend  our  colonies 
had  they  been  interconnected.  The  idea  of  an  expansion 
and  a  completion  of  our  African  colonies  has  been  de- 
sired for  a  long  time.  .  .  . 

"  A  portion  of  German  public  opinion  is  too  modest 
with  regard  to  America.  Because  the  United  States 
have  raised  the  Monroe  doctrine  and  have,  so  to  speak, 
told  us  Europeans  to  clear  out  of  America,  it  does  not 
follow  that  we  must  bow  to  that  doctrine.  If  we  do 
it  as  a  rule,  this  is  due  to  the  disunion  of  Europe, 
which  has  made  it  possible  for  the  United  States  to 
fish  in  troubled  waters.  The  Central  and  South  Ameri- 
can States  have  recognised  the  Monroe  doctrine  only 
when  it  has  protected  them  against  Europe.  However, 
the  three  South  American  Great  Powers  have  deliber- 
ately opposed  it  when  the  United  States^  interfered  in 
Mexico.  .  .  .  Territorial  conquests  in  America  are  out 
of  the  question,  for  there  Germany's  interests  are 
economic  and  cultural.  , 


140      GERMANY'S  ANNEXATIONIST  AIMS 

"  Germany  cannot  confine  itself  to  its  European  area, 
even  if  it  is  enlarged.  " 

If  Germany  should  succeed  in  dominating  Europe, 
Asia,  and  Africa,  and  in  crippling  or  destroying  the 
British  power,  there  would  be  only  two  Great  Powers 
left  in  the  world:  Germany  and  the  United  States. 
Some  Germans  believe,  with  Herr  Konrad  von  Winter- 
stetten,  that  the  strength  of  a  Germany  dominating  the 
three  continents  of  the  old  world  would  be  so  vast  if 
compared  with  that  of  the  United  States,  that  that  coun- 
try need  not  seriously  be  considered.  Others  think  that 
Germany  and  the  United  States  might  agree  to  dominate 
the  world  jointly.  They  propose  a  partition  of  the 
world  similar  to  that  which  Napoleon  proposed  to  the 
Czar  Alexander  I  on  the  raft  on  the  river  Niemen  in 
1807.  Herr  Max  Schubert,  a  manufacturer,  wrote  in 
Deutschland  am  Schicksalswege,  published  in  Leipzig 
in  1914  (Grumbach,  p.  289) : 

"  Belgium,  the  bulk  of  whose  population  is  of  Ger- 
manic descent,  will,  after  the  disgraceful  deeds  of  the 
population,  probably  remain  permanently  a  part  of 
Germany.  If  we  succeed  in  seizing,  in  addition  to  the 
Belgian  coast,  part  of  the  Atlantic  coast  of  France,  then 
we  should  obtain  the  possibility  of  breaking  England's 
supremacy  in  European  waters.  If  we  can  enforce 
peace  with  France  and  Russia,  victory  over  England 
will  surely  follow.  We  can  enforce  our  will  upon  ap- 
parently inviolable  England  by  means  of  a  Continental 
blockade  and  similar  means.  Possibly  we  may  succeed 
also  in  throwing  England  out  of  the  Mediterranean, 
where  it  has  no  business  to  be.  ... 

"  Production  in  large  quantities,  which  is  particularly 
beneficial  to  the  national  economy,  is  possible  only 


A  GERMAN  WORLD  141 

within  large  economic  areas.  Already  Germany  forms 
such  an  area.  Together  with  its  friends,  and  allies,  it 
would  form  a  huge  economic  area  which  would  be  be- 
yond compare,  except  in  the  United  States.  We  could 
conclude  friendship  with  the  United  States  and  then 
we  could  lay  down  the  law  to  the  world.  " 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 


Note— The  letter  "  f  "  following  page  figure  signifies  and  following 
page;  "ff"  and  following  pages. 


Africa : 

"  Deutscher,  Ein,  "  on,  123 
Dove,  Karl,  on,  129 
Hettner,  Alfred,  on,  139 
Kohler,  Franz,  on,  123,  124 
Mecklenburg,  Duke  of,  on,  9  f. 
Mehrmann,     Doctor     K.,     on, 

127  f. 

Petition    of    German    Intellec- 
tuals, on,  49 
Rohrbach,   Doctor   P.,   on,   92, 

131 

Ruhemann,  A.,  on,  88 
Waltemath,  Kuno,  on,  128 
Weber,   Professor  A.,  on,   118 

America : 

Hettner,  Alfred,  on,  139 
Losch,  Doctor  H.,  on,  84 
Schubert,   Max,   on,    141 
Spahn,  Professor,  on,  75 

Angola,  114,  131 

Apt,  Professor  M.,  84  f. 

Asia : 

Dewall,  Wolf  von,  on,  132  f. 
Mackay,  Freiherr  von,  on,  130 
Mehrmann,     Doctor     K.f     on, 
127  f. 

Rohrbach,  Doctor  P.,  on,  131  f. 
Springmann,  Theodor,  on,  135 
Weber,  Professor  A.,  on,   118 
Winterstetten,  K.  von,  on,  137 

Asia  Minor: 

Bornhak,     Professor     C,     on, 

118  f. 

Olbricht,  Doctor  K.,  on,  120 
Petition  of  Intellectuals,  on,  48 


Asia  Minor  (continued)  : 

Springmann,      Theodore,      on, 

135 

Weber,  Professor  A.,  on,  118 
Winterstetten,     K.     von,     on, 

137 


B 


Balkan  Peninsula: 
Kohler,  Franz,  on,  124 
Oelzelt-Newin,  on,  72 
Petition    of    Intellectuals,    on, 

48 

Weber,  Professor  A.,  on  118 
Winterstetten,  K.  von,  on,  137 
Ballin,    Albert,    War    Aims    of, 

15  f. 

Bar,  Adolf,  67  f. 

Bases,  Naval.  See  Maritime 
Aims,  Channel,  Belgium, 
England 

Bassermann,  Herr,  70  f. 
Bavaria,    King   of,    on    Belgium, 

8  f . 

Belfort,  29,  43,  138 
Belgians,  to  be' expropriated  and 

disfranchised,  28  f.,  45,  66 
Belgium : 

Professor  Apt,  on,  84  f. 
Bavaria,  King  of,  on,  8  f. 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  on,  n  f. 
"  Deutscher,  Ein,  "  on,   122 
Grabowsky,  Doctor,  on,  76  f. 
Grenzboten,  Die,  on,  87  f. 
Haeckel,   Professor,  on,  71 
Kreuzzeitung,  85 
Losch,  Doctor  H.,  on,  83  f. 


143 


144 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 


Belgium  (continued)  : 

Manufacturer,  a  large,  86  f. 
Mehrmann,  Doctor  K.,  on,  127 
Muller-Meiningen,   Doctor,   on, 

82 

Oppenheimer,  Doctor,  on,  74 
Petition   on   German    Business 

Men,  on,  28  f.,  32 
Petition    of    German    Intellec- 
tuals,  on,  44,   50 
Ruhemann,  A.,  on,  88,  113  f. 
Schubert,  Max,  on,  140 
Schumacher,  Professor  H.,  on, 

1 02  f. 

Sieveking,  Professor,  on,  78 
Socialists,  German,  on,  55  ff., 

63 
Spahn,  the  Party  Leader,  on, 

12 

Spahn,  Professor,  on,  75,  85  f. 
Stresemann,  Herr,  on,  81 
Winsterstetten,  K.  von,  on,  94 
Belgium,      Partition     of,     advo- 
cated by: 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  n  f. 
Borchling,  Professor,  83 
Cleinow,  G.,  116 
"  Deutscher,  Ein,  "  122 
Grabowsky,  Doctor,  76  f. 
Haeckel,  Professor,  71 
Losch,  Doctor  H.,  83  f. 
Petition  of  Business  men,  29 
Petition  of  Intellectuals,  44 
Ruhemann,     Dr.     Alfred,     88, 

"5 

Socialists,  German,  59 
Bethmann-Hollweg,   on    Belgium, 

France,  and  Russia,  10  ff. 
Bornhak,  Professor,  78,  118 
Bovenschen,  Doctor  A.,  90 
Brandenburg,  Professor,  77 
Briey,    Mining    District    of,    29, 

33  ff-,  77,  94  ff-,  178 
Bulow,    Prince,    on   Annexations, 

14  f. 

Business   Men,   Petition  of  Ger- 
man, 24  ff. 


Calwer,  Richard,  61  ff. 
Central  Europe: 

Bornhak,  Doctor  C.  on,  118  f 


Central  Europe   (continued)  : 
Deutscher,  ein,  on,  121  ff. 
Jentsch,  Doctor  C.,  on,   120  f. 
Kohler,  Franz,  on,  123  ff. 
Mackay,     Freiherr     von,     on, 

134  *• 

Olbricht,  Doctor  K.,  on,  119  f. 

Oppenheimer,  Doctor,  on,  74 

Weber,  Professor  A.,  on  117  f. 

Winterstetten,     K.     von,     on, 

136  ff. 
Centre    Party,    Declarations    by 

the,  12,  17,  19 

Chancellor,      German,      Declara- 
tions by  the,  10  ff. 
Channel,    Control    of,    demanded 
by: 

Apt,  Professor,  M.,  85 

Ballin,  Herr,  16 

Mackay,  Freiherr  von,  98  f. 

Paasche,   Vice-President,   70 

Petition  of  Business  Men,  28, 
29 

Petition  of  Intellectuals,  43 

Spahn,  Professor,  75 
Chemnitser  Volksstimme,  56,  60 
China : 

Dewall,  Wolf  von,  on,  132  f. 

Mackay,  Freiherr  von,  on,  130 

Rohrbach,  Doctor  P.,  on,  131  *• 

Springmann,       Theodor,       on, 

135  f. 

Cleinow,  Herr,  105  f.,  115 

Coal  and  Iron  Districts  of  France 

and    Belgium    to    be    seized, 

29  f.,  33  ff-,  77,  94  ff.»  US 
Colonial  Aims: 

See  also  Africa,  Asia,  etc. 
Delbruck,     Professor     H.,     on, 

126 

"  Deutscher,  Ein, "  on,  121   ff. 
Dove,  Professor  K.,  on,  129 
Haeckel,  Professor,  on,  71 
Hettner,  Alfred,  on,   139 
Leutwein,  Doctor  P.,  on,  i26f. 
Mecklenburg,  Duke  of,  on,  9  f. 
Mehrmann,     Doctor     K.,     on, 

127    f. 
Petition  of  Business  Men,  on, 

28 
Petition    of    Intellectuals,    on, 

44.  49 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 


145 


Colonial  Aims   (continued)  : 
Solf,    Doctor,    Colonial    Secre- 
tary, on,  13  f. 
Waltemath,  Kuno,  on,  128 
Winterstetten,      K.     von,     on, 

137 
Colonies,    British : 

"  Deutscher,  Ein,"  on,   121    f. 
Kohler,  Franz,  on,  124 
Springmann,  Theodor,  135  f. 
Confiscation   of    Properties,    Dis- 
franchisement      and      Dena- 
tionalisation   demanded    by : 
Bar,  Adolf,  67  f. 
Dix,  Arthur,  65  iff. 
Eisenhart,  W.,  68 
Petition  of  Business  Men,  28  f., 

30,  31 
Petition    of    Intellectuals,    43, 

44  ff.,  46  f.,  52 
Schumacher,      Professor      H., 

96  f. 

Vietinghoff,  von,   64  ff. 
Congo  State : 

Haeckel,   Professor,   on,   71 
Mehrmann,  Doctor  K.,  on,  127 
Ruhemann,  A.,  on,  88 
Schulze-Gaevernitz,      Professor 

von,  on,  93 

Spahn,  Professor,  on,  75 
Conquests,  German,  must  be  re- 
tained, 17  ff.,  31,  70,  71,  74 
Conservative     Parties,     Declara- 
tions by  German,  17,  1 8 


Delbruck,  Professor  H.,  126 
Denmark,   121 
"Deutscher,  Ein,"  121  ff. 
Das  Grossere  Deutschland,  13 
Das  Neue  Deutschland,  75  f. 
Disfranchisement  and  Denation- 
alisation of  Conquered  Peo- 
ples,  29,    30,    31,   43,   45   ff., 
64  ff.,  66,  77,   109,   125 
See  also  Confiscation 
Dix,  Arthur,  65  ff. 
Dove,  Professor  K.,  129 


E 

Egypt: 

Jackh,  Ernst,  on,  100  f. 

Oelzelt-Newin,  on,  73 

Petition    of    German    Business 
Men,  on,   50 

Rohrbach,   Doctor  P.,  on,    101 

Schafer,  Doctor,  G.  A.  on,  102 
Eisenhart,  W.,  68,  79  f. 
Emperor,  German,  on  War  Aims, 

7 
England : 

Apt,  Professor,  on,  85 

Ballin,  Herr,  on,  16 

Bornhak,     Professor     C,     on, 

118 

Cleinow,  G.,  on,  116 
"  Deutscher,   Ein, "   on,    121    f. 
Dewall,  W.  von,  on,  133 
Free    Conservative    Party,    on, 

18  f. 

Fuhrmann,  Herr,  on,  99 
Haeckel,  Professor,  on,  71  f. 
Jackh,  Ernst,  on,  100  f. 
Kohler,  Franz,  on,  123,  124 
Kreuszeitung,  on,  85 
Leipziger  Neueste  Nachrichten, 

on,  99  f. 
Mackay,     Freiherr     von,     on, 

98  f. 
Manufacturer,    A    Large,    on, 

86  f. 

Oelzelt-Newin,    on,    73 
Olbricht,  Doctor  K.,  on,  119  f. 
Oppenheimer,  Doctor,  on,  74 
Paasche,     Vice-President,     on, 

70 
Petition  of  Business  Men,  on, 

28,  32 
Petition    of    Intellectuals,    on, 

43,  44,  48  ff. 
Rohrbach,   Doctor   P.,   on,   92, 

101 

Ruhemann,  A.,  on  88 
Schubert,  Max,  on,  140 
Schumacher,      Professor,      H., 

on,  94,   1 02  ff. 
Socialists,  German,  on,  61  ff. 
Spahn,  Professor,  on,  75,  85  f. 
Springmann,       Theodor,       on, 

135  f. 


146 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 


England   (continued)  : 

Winterstetten,     K.,     von,     on, 

94,    136  ff. 
Expropriation.     See  Confiscation 


Flemish.     See   Belgians 
France : 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  on,  u 
Bovenschen,  Doctor  A.,  on,  70 
Bulow,  Prince,  on,  14  f. 
Centre  Party,  on,  17,  19 
Conservative    Parties,    on,    17, 

18 

"  Deutscher,  Ein, "  on,   122   f. 
Haeckel,   Professor,  on,  71 
Kohler,  Franz,  on,  123 
Liberal  Party,  on,  17,  20 
Naumann,  F.,  on,  91 
Oelzelt-Newin,  on,  73 
Olbricht,  Doctor  K.,  on  119  f. 
Oppenheimer,    Doctor,    on,    74 
Petition  of  Business  Men,  on, 

2(5,  29  f.,  32 
Petition    of    Intellectuals,    on, 

43 

Radical  Party,  on,  17,  21   f. 
Rohrbach,  Doctor  P.,  on,  92 
Ruhemann,  A.,  on,  88  f. 
Schubert,  Max,  on,   140 
Shulze-Gaevernitz,       Professor 

von,  on,   93 
Schumacher,      Professor      H., 

on,  73,  94  ff. 

Socialists,  German,  on,  58,  63 
Waltemath,  Kuno,  on,  128 
Winterstetten,     K.     von,     on, 

93  f-,   138 

Frankfurter  Volksstimme,  57  f. 
Freedom  of  the  Sea.     See  Mari- 
time   Aims,     Channel,    Bel- 
gium, England 

French,  Conquered,  to  be  expro- 
priated    and     disfranchised, 
43  f-,  309 
Fuhrmann,  Herr,  99 


Gaigalat,  Doctor,  106  f. 
Gebsattel,  General  von,  107  ff. 
Geek,  Herr,  58 


Gibraltar,   73 

Glocke,  Die,  57 

Gottlieb,   Doctor  A.,   78   f. 

Grabowsky,  Doctor,  76  f.,  109 

Grenzboten,  Die,  5,  78  f.,  87  f., 

105   f.,    1 06  f.,    114  f.,    115, 

118  f. 
Gruber,  Professor  M.  von,  75  f. 

H 

Haeckel,  Professor  Ernst,  71  f. 

Hettner,  Alfred,  139  f. 

Hochland,  Das,  75 

Holland : 

Cleinow,  G.,  on,  115 
"  Deutscher,  Ein,  "  on,  122 
Grabowsky,  Doctor,  on,  77 
Haeckel,  Professor,  on,  71 
Jentsch,  Doctor  C,  on,  121 
Olbricht,  Doctor  K.,  on,  120 
Rachfahl,  Professor,  on,  112 
Ruhemann,  Alfred,  on,  112  ff., 

114  f- 

Winterstetten,     K.     von,     on, 
137 

Hongkong,  133 


Indemnities  demanded  by: 
Bar,  Adolf,  67  f. 
"  Deutscher,  Ein, "  122  f. 
Dix,  Arthur,  65  ff. 
Free    Conservative    Party,    186 
Schumacher,      Professor      H., 

96  f. 

Vietinghoff  von,  64 
India: 

K6hler,  Franz,  on  124 
Springmann,       Theodor,       on, 

135   f- 

Intellectuals,     Petition     of    Ger- 
man, 39  ff. 

Iron  and  Coal  Districts  of  France 
and    Belgium    to    be    seized, 
29  f.,  33  ff.,  77,  94  ff.,  138 
Italy : 

"  Deutscher,  Ein, "  on,  123 
Winterstetten,  K.  von,  on,  94 


Jackh,  Ernst,  100  f. 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 


147 


Japan : 

Mackay,  Freiherr  von,  on, 
130  f. 

Rohrbach,  Doctor  P.,  on,  131  f- 
Jentsch,  Doctor  C,  121 


Kohler,    Professor,    on    "Neces- 
sity stands   above   Law,"   5 
Kreuzseitung,  74,  79  f.,  85 
Kultur,  52  f. 


Landsberg,  Doctor,  57 

Law,     International,     Professor 

Zorn,  on,  5 
Ledebour,  Herr,  58 
Leipziger   Neueste    Nachrichten, 

99  f- 

Lensch,  Doctor  Paul,  37 
Leutwein,  Doctor  P.,  126  f. 
Liberal  Parties,  Declarations  by 

German,  17,  19,  20 
Luxemburg : 

Business    Men's    Petition,    on, 

34,  35 

"Deutscher,  Ein,"  on,  122 
Haeckel,  Professor  von,  on,  71 
Ruhemann,  Alfred,  on,  114  f. 


Mackay,     Freiherr     von,     98  f., 

130,  134  f. 

Magdeburgische   Zeitung,   98   f. 
Maritime  Aims.  See  also  Channel, 

Belgium,  England      • 
Apt,  Professor,  on,  85 
Ballin,  Herr,  on,  16 
"Deutscher,  Ein,"  on,  121  ft". 
Petition  of  Business  Men,  on, 

26,  29,  49  f. 
Spahn,  Professor,  on,  75 
Marum,  Herr,  59 
Mecklenburg,  Duke  of,  on  Colo- 
nial Aims,  9  f. 

Mehrmann,   Doctor  K.,   127  f. 
Monistisches    Jahrhundert,    Das, 

74 

Monroe  Doctrine,  139 
Morocco,  88,  103 


Munchner    Neueste     Nachrichten, 
on  Belgium,  8  f. 

N 

Nationalities,    Principle    of,    re- 
pudiated by: 

Non-Socialists,  5  f.,  79  f. 
Socialists,  57,  62  f. 

Naumann,  F.,  91 

Naval     Aims.       See     Maritime, 
Channel,    Belgium,    England 

"Necessity  stands  above  Law," 
Professor  Kohler,  on,  5 

Nice,  73 

Norddeutsche  Attgemeine  Zeitung, 
25 

North  Sea.     See  Channel,  Mari- 
time, Belgium,  England 

Norway,  121,  123,  124 


Oelzelt-Newin,  A.,  72 
Olbricht,  Doctor  K.,  119 
Oppenheimer,  Doctor,  74 


Paasche,  Vice-President  of  Reich- 
stag, 70 

Panther,  Der,  106,  107  ff. 
Papers,  Titles  of  German,  quoted, 

2 

People,  conquered,  proposed 
treatment  of.  See  also  Con- 
fiscation, Disfranchisement, 
and  Denationalisation,  28  f., 
30,  31,  43i  4Sff-»  64  ff.,  66, 
109 

Poland,  46,  71.  78,  105  f.,  108, 
109  f. 

Portugal,  113  f.,  131 

Professors,  Petition  of  German, 

39  ff- 

Property  Owners  in  conquered 
districts.  See  Confiscation 


Rachfahl,  Professor,  112 
Radical    Party,    Declarations   by 

the,  17,  21  f. 
Rheinische  Zeitung,  59 


148 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 


Ripke,  Axel,   105 

Rohrbach,    Doctor    P.,    92,    101, 

109  f.,  131  f. 
Ruheman,  Alfred,  87  ff.,   112  ff., 

114  f- 
Russia : 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  on,  n 
Bovenschen,  Doctor  A.,  on,  90 
Bulow,  Prince,  on,  14  f. 
Centre  Party,  on,  12,  17,  19 
Cleinow,  Herr,  on,   105   f. 
Conservative    Parties,    on,    17, 

18 

"  Deutscher,  Ein,  "  on,  122 
Gaigalat,  Doctor,  on,   106  f. 
Gebsattel,     General     von,     on, 

107  ff. 

Grabowsky,  Doctor,  on,   109 
Gruber,  Professor  M.  von,  on, 

75  f- 

Haeckel,  Professor,  on,  71 
Kohler,  Franz,  on,  123  f. 
Liberal    Party,   on,    17,    20 
Manufacturer,  A  Large,  on,  87 
Oelzelt-Newin,  on,  72 
Paasche,     Vice-President,     on, 

70 
Petition  of  Business  Men,  on, 

26,  30  f.,  32 
Position    of    Intellectuals,    on, 

45  ff. 

Radical  Party,  on,  17,  21  f. 
Ripke,  Axel,  on,   105 
Rohrbach,   Doctor   P.,   on,   92, 

109  f. 

Schubert,  Max,  on,   140 
Schumacher,  Professor  H.,  on, 

73 

Socialists,  German,  on,  58  ff. 
Winterstetten,     K.     von,     on, 

136  f. 
Russia,    to    hand    back    German 

settlers,  45,  47,   no,   125 
Russians,   Conquered,   to   be   ex- 
propriated     and      enslaved, 

3i,  45  ff- 


Scheidemann,  Philip,  59  f. 
Schippel,  Max,  55  f. 
Schubert,  Max,  139  f. 


Schulze-Gaevernitz,          Professor 

von,  93 
Schumacher,  Professor  H-,  73  f., 

94  ff.,  1 02  ff. 

Sea,  Freedom  of.  See  England, 
Channel,  Maritime,  Bel- 
gium. 

Serbia,  56,  72,   137 
Sieveking,  Professor  H.,  77  f. 
Socialists,    German : 
Advocate  Annexation,  56  ff. 
Repudiate   right  of  nations  to 
dispose    of    themselves,    57, 
62  f. 

War  Aims  of  the,  55  ff. 
Solf,  Doctor,  on  Colonial  Aims, 

i   f. 

Sosialistische  Monatshefte,  55  f. 
Spahn,  Leader  of  Centre  Party, 

Declaration  by,   12,   17 
Spahn,  Professor  M.,  75,  85  f. 
Springmann,  Theodor,   135  f. 
State    stands    above    Nationality, 

5 

Stresemann,  Herr,  81 
Suddeutsche  Monatshefte,  57  f. 
Suez  Canal: 
Jackh,  Ernst,  on,  100  f. 
Oelzelt-Newin,  on,  73 
Petition    of    Intellectuals,    on, 

50 

Rohrbach,   Doctor  P.,  on,   101 
Schafer,  Doctor  G.  A.,  on,  102 
Schumacher,  Professor  H.,  on, 

103 

Sweden,    72,    120,    121,    123,    124 
Switzerland,  121 


Tag,  Der,  61  ff. 
Toulon,  73 

Turkey,    73,    101,    103,    118,    124, 
135,  137 


Ukraine,  The,  108,  109,  121 

United  States: 

Hettner,  Alfred,  on,  139 
Losch,  Dr.  H.,  on,  84 
Schubert,  Max,  on,  141 
Spahn,  Professor,  on,  75 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX 


149 


Verdun,  29,  33,  36,  138 
Vietinghoff,  L.  von,  64  f. 


W 
See 


Belgium     and 


Walloons. 

Belgians 
Waltemath,  Kuno,   128 
Weber,  Professor  A.,  117  f. 
Weltwirtschaft,  Die,  126  f.,  129 
William  the  Second,  on  German 

War  Aims,   7 
Winterstetten,     K.     von,     93  f., 

136  ff. 


World-power  and  World   Domi- 
nation : 

Gottlieb,  Doctor,  on,  78  f. 
Grabowsky,  Doctor,  on,  77 
Mackay,  Freiherr  von,  on, 

134  *• 

Petition  of  Intellectuals,  on,  42 
Rohrbach,  Doctor  P.,  on,  101 
Springmann,  Theodor,  on, 

135  f. 

Winterstetten,     K.     von,     on, 

136  ff. 


Zorn,     Professor, 
tional  Law,  5 


on     Interna- 


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